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Abstract  
 
Commonage is land that is usually found adjacent to a town, which is owned by the local 
municipality and acquired through state grants or, historically, through the church. Since the new 
government dispensation in 1994, poor and previously disadvantaged residents have acquired 
access rights to commonage for agricultural purposes. Through the Department of Land Affair’s 
Commonage Programme, local municipalities are acquiring more commonage land for purposes of 
agriculture and grazing livestock. Commonages are increasingly being recognised as an important 
livelihood asset for the poor and unemployed residents’ of towns and rapid urbanisation is 
contributing to the increasing use of commonage for livelihood provisioning. Some municipalities 
view commonage as a key asset to promote Local Economic Development, while others are finding it 
difficult to manage the land effectively, to the extent that some analysts see tragic ecological 
consequences occurring due to over-grazing. This has been likened to the “tragedy of the commons” 
as advocated by Hardin in 1968. Commonage and common property resource systems have many 
similarities and co-management has been advocated as a potential management regime for 
commonage. Researching the policy framework, institutional structures and management bodies 
involved in commonage, gave a better understanding of the governance and management of the 
commonages in Grahamstown, Fort Beaufort and Bathurst. Current management attempts are not 
ensuring the efficient, equitable and sustainable use of these commonages. The governance 
framework is not adequately supporting proper management. In an environment of resource-poor 
institutional bodies, adaptive co-management could prove to be the most effective system to ensure 
the sustainable use and development of this natural resource. Furthermore, commonage is no 
longer contributing to the Land Reform Programme. Commonage should be better integrated into 
agrarian reform through lease schemes and an efficient Emerging Farmer Programme. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction to this Thesis 
The South Africa - Netherlands Partnership on Alternatives for Development (SANPAD) 
commissioned funding for four Master’s research projects on the topic of “commonages” in South 
Africa. The research topics covered land-use changes on commonage, ecological changes on 
commonage land, the livelihood provisioning of commonage and lastly, the institutional 
arrangements governing commonage. These four Master’s projects give a broad overview of the 
socio-economic, institutional and ecological status of commonage in the Eastern Cape, focussing on 
three particular towns; namely, Grahamstown, Fort Beaufort and Bathurst. This thesis covers 
research undertaken on the fourth topic, the institutional arrangements governing commonage in 
the Eastern Cape.   
 
The topic for the Master’s research programme was conceived due to recent literature indicating 
poor management of commonages in South Africa. Furthermore, the government of South Africa 
has recently embarked on a Commonage Programme. Although commonage land is a valuable 
natural resource, local government has been unable to manage it in a sustainable and efficient 
manner.  The research programme aimed to understand how commonage land-use has changed 
over time, and especially since 1994 when new laws allowed previously disadvantaged people to 
gain access to the resource. The programme also aimed to understand how the ecological 
component of commonage has changed over time, and whether high livestock numbers is leading to 
over-grazing. Furthermore, the programme aimed to understand how much commonage 
contributed to peoples’ livelihoods and whether commonage could be used to contribute to Local 
Economic Development. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to: 
1. Add to the limited existence of research pertaining to commonage management, especially 
in the Eastern Cape Province. 
2. Critique the way that commonages are managed and governed at the moment through an 
institutional analysis of the study sites. 
3. Through discovering limitations in the Commonage Programme, offer solutions to how 
commonages should be governed and managed. 
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There are a number of key questions that form the basis of this research. They are: 
1. What are the policies, laws and legislation that guide commonage governance in South 
Africa? 
2. What is the nature of commonage and how is it managed in three study sites in the Eastern 
Cape? 
3. What can these case studies teach us about commonage management in the South Africa? 
4. How should commonage be managed to address the goals of equity and efficiency? 
5. How can commonage complement the Land Reform Programme in South Africa? 
 
1.2. Structure of This Thesis 
The first section of this thesis aims to introduce the concept of “commonage”, giving an overview of 
what it is, how it features in the legislative framework for South Africa, the Commonage Programme 
and its role in the Land Reform Programme and the institutional arrangements which govern 
commonage. What is important to think about is how commonage laws have changed since the fall 
of the Apartheid government and how this has impacted on the management of commonage.  
 
The second section of this thesis gives an extensive overview of literature pertaining to key themes 
which impact on the governance and management of commonage. This section discusses how the 
Land Reform Programme in South Africa is failing to reach its targets of equity and efficiency and 
briefly mentions that role that commonage could play in contributing to reaching these goals. A 
more detailed discussion of this connection can be found in later sections of the thesis. Furthermore, 
this section considers the value of natural resources to peoples’ livelihoods and how commonage 
plays an increasing part in the livelihoods of many of the poorest urban dwellers. The literature 
overview also considers some of the debates about rangeland degradation and how the current 
understanding of communal grazing must consider the aspirations of farmers when determining the 
kind of management regimes that must be implemented to ensure continued grazing capacity of 
rangelands. Lastly, this section details how commonage can be considered a common property 
resource and how some of the current debates about common property resources will be crucial 
when formulating an effective management system for commonages in South Africa.  
 
The third section in this thesis describes the study sites where the research was conducted. It will 
give details of the commonages and the towns in which the commonages exist. This section will 
highlight the unique situation in which commonage features in the Eastern Cape and how 
commonage is an essential resource for the poor. This is because the Province is under-developed 
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and stricken by poverty and resource degradation. Furthermore, due to urbanisation, more and 
more people are migrating to towns but are discovering that it is difficult to find employment. As the 
demand for urban goods and services increases, and the number of unemployed people increase, 
more pressure is placed on commonage to provide natural resources. 
 
Section four describes the methodology used in conducting research on the management and 
governance of the commonages in the study sites. Through conducting interviews with key 
informants, an attempt was made to describe the current standing of commonage management in 
the three study sites.  
 
Section five sets out the results of the interviews and desk-based literature review conducted in this 
research. This section has been divided into general results which indicate the history and use of 
commonage, governance results which pertain to policy and management results. The results show 
just how poorly developed and managed commonages are in the three study sites.  
 
Section six discusses the results of this research; particularly, the failure of management, how 
broader processes affect management attempts, the use of commonage, the tenure situation on 
commonage, the emerging farmer programme and the goals of equity and efficiency Land Reform 
Programme. 
 
Section seven argues why commonage is important for the Land Reform Programme in South Africa 
and why it should be expanded and why it should be incorporated into a land rental market system. 
This section also debates the likely benefits of transforming management of these commonages into 
a system of Adaptive Co-Management system. The steps of transformation to an Adaptive Co-
Management model are detailed.  
 
1.3. Introduction to Commonage 
According to Donges & van Winsen (1940: 296) commonage lands are “lands adjoining a town or 
village over which the inhabitants of such a town or village have a servitude of grazing for their 
stock, and, more rarely, the right to cultivate a certain portion of such lands”. Commonage land, or 
land for public purposes, is land that was allocated to towns by the Crown as part of their 
establishment (Hall et al., 2007: 25). In terms of the Department of Land Affairs definition (DLA, 
1997: 1) commonage is a term “traditionally given to land, owned by the municipality or local 
authority, which was usually acquired through state grants or through the church”. According to 
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Donges & van Winsen (1940: 296) commonage was created through granting land to the local 
council, by the Crown, although land could also be granted by an individual or by the local council 
itself for the purposes of commonage. The purpose of granting this land to the municipality was to 
allow inhabitants of the town and erfholders to graze their livestock (Donges & van Winsen, 1940: 
297). All other uses of the commonage was not permitted to infringe upon this public benefit 
(Donges & van Winsen, 1940: 297).  
 
From the onset it is important to distinguish between two types of commonage as set out in the 
White Paper on South African Land Policy (DLA, 1997). “Traditional” commonage is land that was 
acquired historically; whereas “new” commonage is land that has been acquired after 1994 through 
the Department of Land Affairs Commonage Programme (DLA, 1997; Ingle, 2006: 47). Municipal 
commonage is found mainly in the Western, Eastern and Northern Cape; those areas of the country 
that were part of the old Cape Colony (Hall et al., 2007: 25). The Free State too has widespread 
commonage but most of this commonage was acquired through the Department of Land Affair’s 
Commonage Programme (Hall et al., 2007: 25).  
 
1.4. The Legal Nature of Commonage 
1.4.1. Legislation Applicable to Commonage 
Very little about commonage was mentioned in South African legislation before 1995 was and it is 
only since the new democratic government dispensation that commonage has featured more 
strongly in national legislation (Ingle, 2006: 48). References to commonage are found mostly in 
policy to do with general land issues and very little legislation relates to commonage specifically; 
although, there are many Acts that have implications on the management of commonage as land 
under the ownership of municipalities.  
 
In the past, commonage laws were contained within the laws applicable to local authorities; for 
example, the municipal regulations or ordinances. Because commonages fell within the Province of 
the Cape of Good Hope, the applicable law was the Municipal Ordinance 20 of 1974 (Anderson, 
1996: 3). Commonage was also regulated by Ordinance no 10 of 1912 and Ordinance no 33 of 1934 
and before this Act 45 of 1882 (Donges & van Winsen, 1940). The date of the latter Act indicates the 
length of time that commonages have been established in South Africa under law.   
 
The ordinances served particular roles. Section 17 of Ordinance 33 of 1934 describes the applicable 
legal uses of commonage. Although commonage is to benefit inhabitants of towns, it can also be set 
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aside for public purposes such as cemeteries and refuse sites. Furthermore, it can also be sub-
divided into erven1. Section 170 and 171 of Ordinance 10 of 1912 set out the conditions for the 
alienation and disposal of commonages. Municipalities may not dispose of commonage if people 
have acquired servitudinal rights to the land. Municipalities have rights of control over the 
commonage. These rights include the right to: 
 Provide for the management and protection of the commonage by fixing the number of 
animals allowed to graze and the fee applicable for use 
 Grant licences or permits to use natural resources 
 Grant temporary grazing rights to non-residents 
 Remove unauthorised buildings 
 
The municipality, when exercising these rights, may not infringe upon the rights of the inhabitants. 
However, Ordinance 18 of 1935 allows municipalities to infringe upon these rights if measures to 
prevent soil erosion have to be implemented. In this case, environmental and soil conservation can 
be implemented on the land, free of any interference by residents or law.  
 
Under the Apartheid government, the benefits of commonage largely accrued to white inhabitants 
of towns (Anderson, 1996: 3) and it was generally understood that land was available only for the 
use of white residents. In some instances parts of, or the whole, of the commonage was leased to 
the highest bidder and this system clearly discriminated against poor people; a group largely made 
up of the black residents of towns (Anderson, 1996: 7). Following the implementation of the ANC 
government policies after 1994, the DLA has stated that land must now be made available for the 
use of previously disadvantaged communities (DLA, 2002: 6). Although, during the Apartheid years, 
commonage lost its public nature through discriminatory laws and through leases between the 
municipalities and private farmers, the purpose of the original laws is becoming more applicable 
today, and commonage has regained its past nature and is now reverting back to its previous status 
as a public resource. 
 
Today, commonage is governed by new legislation, in particular the Provision of Land and Assistance 
Act 126 of 19932. Section 10 (1c) gives the Minister authority to “grant an advance or subsidy to the 
Municipal Council to acquire land to be used as commonage or to extend an existing commonage”. 
                                                          
1
 Erf is a term used to describe the subdivision of land into sections, each erf being allotted a number. 
Erven is the plural of erf.  
2
 This Act has since been amended by the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 and the Provision of 
Certain Land for Settlement Amendment Act 26 of 1998. However, these have not changed the provisions for 
commonage acquisition and expansion.  
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The Grant and Services document (version 6), as approved by state expenditure, allows for funds to 
be used for infrastructure development on new and existing commonage (Atkinson et al., 2004: 15). 
Hence, there is a movement towards extending or acquiring new commonage and developing old 
and new commonage alike.  
 
1.4.2. The Land Reform Policy and New Commonage 
Under the White Paper on South African Land Policy (DLA, 1997), a grant has been made available 
for the acquisition of commonage, subject to certain conditions (Scheepers, 2000: 144). This has 
allowed land to be acquired for purposes of commonage or commonage development. The 
municipality must show the following (Scheepers, 2000: 144):  
 That the land will be made available to the poor residents. 
 That the potential users of the land have participated in the planning and acquisition 
process. 
 That there is a plan for development, management and use of the land. 
 The municipality has disclosed all of its financial records. 
 The municipality will contribute to the purchase and development of the land. 
 The municipality is committed to meeting the needs of poor residents. 
 The purchase price of the land is market related. 
 
Once the land is purchased, a notarial deed of perpetual servitude is endorsed against the title deed 
(Scheepers, 2000: 144). This ensures that the municipality uses the land only for those purposes of 
commonage or commonage development. The precise legal position of commonage (old and new) 
depends on the conditions under which the land was granted or the conditions stipulated in title 
deed (DLA, 1997). According to the DLA (1997), the general condition applicable to all commonages 
is that they cannot be alienated (sold) without the consent of the Premier (or the MEC responsible 
for Local Government). 
 
Historical regulations still exist. According to the DLA (1997), the local municipality who owns 
commonage land is empowered to make by-laws to regulate the control and use of such lands. The 
measures are contained in the relevant Local Council Ordinances. The DLA (1997) recognises that 
many municipalities are unaware of these powers or do not know how to exercise them. This is not 
surprising if one sees the array of applicable ordinances, some which have been amended by 
subsequent ordinances or legislation. Furthermore, although land that is considered commonage 
must have its own title deed, accessing these documents can be difficult and time consuming, 
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especially if the deeds date back to the time of the first establishment of commonages (Pienaar pers. 
comm., 2008). 
 
1.4.3. Institutional Arrangements 
1.4.3.1. Introduction 
Before embarking on an account of the nature of the institutional arrangements that affect 
commonage management, it is important to look more closely at the structures of government that 
came into effect after the democratic elections in 1994. The former centralised government of the 
Apartheid era was replaced with a government with federal elements, whereby powers and 
responsibilities are currently devolved to provincial and local level (Bekink, 2006: 15). This sees the 
beginning of a tiered system of government with three spheres, national, provincial and local, which 
are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated; so set out in the supreme law, the Constitution of 
South Africa (Bekink, 2006: 16). According to the White Paper on Local Government (2000), the 
municipality is a developmental, autonomous and democratic sphere of government and as such is a 
“tier of government in its own right” (de Visser, 2005: 66). So, although municipalities are by law 
required to share responsibility with higher government tiers, they have their own mandate and 
powers.  
 
1.4.3.2. Developmental Local Government  
The preamble of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 states that “… the Constitution of our non-
racial democracy enjoins local government not just to seek to provide services to all our people but 
to be fundamentally developmental in orientation…” (emphasis added). Furthermore, the 
Constitution (section 152(1c)) states that the objectives of local government are to promote social 
and economic development. This clearly indicates the path that government is now expected to 
take; one that has shifted from service delivery, to one that is developmental.  
 
1.4.3.3. Integrated Development Plans 
An important means through which municipalities fulfil their developmental role is by means of the 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP) process. As defined in the Municipal Systems Act (section 35 (1)), 
the status of an IDP is all-encompassing, because the document guides and informs all planning and 
development and binds the municipality and all other affected parties to the duties and rights 
imposed on them through the IDP process. The IDP is a document that represents a single inclusive 
plan for the Municipality and “defines the new landscape for Developmental Local Government” 
(Ndlambe, 2007: 13). According to the White Paper for Local Government (1998), it is a tool for 
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transformation, and the process is stipulated within Chapter 5 of the Municipal Systems Act. This 
legitimate vehicle for development is a crucial way for commonage development to be guided, 
planned and implemented (Bekink, 2006: 71). Commonage should be well represented within the 
IDP of a municipality, showing concrete and specific proposals relating to commonage, indicating 
how the commonage can be utilised for livelihood provisioning and other uses (Govender-van Wyk, 
2007).   
 
1.4.3.4. Local Economic Development 
Atkinson (2005: 4) argues that commonage is, in many smaller towns in South Africa, “by far the 
most important developmental asset for the poor and often makes an important contribution to 
household food security”. As such, commonage is seen as an opportunity for Local Economic 
Development (LED) (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 18). This has partly been motivated by the notion of 
Developmental Local Government and also by the change in emphasis of the Land  Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development Programme (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 18). This change took place after 
the 2002 Commonage Policy made amendments to the former 1997 Commonage Policy. Whereas 
the previous policy made no specific mention of the kind of user who should be allowed access to 
the commonage (if you exclude the notion of ‘poor local people’), the latter policy clearly sees two 
kind of commonage users; that of the subsistence user and that of the emergent farmer (DLA, 2002). 
According to the 2002 Policy, the subsistence user will have little education, limited financial capital 
and management skills with little or no access to finance, resources or credit. This user will be using 
the commonage resources at a survivalist level and low levels of commercial activity will take place. 
In contrast, the emergent farmer will aspire to be a commercial farmer and will, over time, build up 
sufficient assets and skills to leave the commonage. This can be referred to as the “stepping stone” 
system or graduation system of commonage. The two user systems are envisioned to be separate, 
with individual leaseholds assigned to emergent farmers and communal leaseholds assigned to 
subsistence farmers (DLA, 2002). Each municipality is required to create an emerging farmer system 
with the assistance of other commonage role-players. This emergent farmer system is crucial for the 
development of the commonage, which will contribute to the LED responsibilities of the 
municipality.  
 
1.4.3.5. Commonage Institutional Arrangements 
According to the former Commonage Programme policy document (DLA, 1997), the following 
recommendations were made, (1) that commonage should retain its public character and, therefore, 
the DLA must commit itself to ensuring that existing commonage land is made available to local poor 
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residents for agricultural purposes; (2) that municipalities must be encouraged to develop conditions 
that will enable poor people to access the commonage land; (3) that provincial government must be 
encouraged to develop appropriate policy and legislative frameworks; and (4) that a Grant for the 
Acquisition of Commonage must be made available to municipalities to enable them to create or 
extend commonage for the purpose of establishing agricultural or other productive lease schemes. 
 
The document fails to specify which level of municipality is responsible for commonage 
programmes, although the duties of the local municipality are extensive because they are the 
owners of the land. A workshop was held with the intention to inform the commonage programme 
(Atkinson et al., 2004: 13). Following this, and other recommendations from analysts, specific duties 
and responsibilities were given to various government bodies, Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and commonage users, as set out in the new Commonage Programme policy document 
(DLA, 2002).  
 
There are essentially five governance scales of commonage role-players: national departments, 
provincial offices, district offices, local municipalities and grass roots level role-players. Table 1 
summarises the roles and responsibilities of these role-players. All information was acquired from 
the Commonage Programme policy document (2002).  
 
Although a respective Local Municipality (LM) owns its commonage, the DLA Commonage Policy 
focuses on both district municipalities and local municipalities as the driver of commonage projects 
(DLA, 2002). The District Municipality (DM), due to the legislative framework3, takes the role of land 
reform delivery (DLA, 2002). The Chapter 5 functions, as set out in the Municipal Systems Act, 
specify that the district municipality is responsible for Integrated Development Planning and the 
allocation of grants to local municipalities. Local municipalities, on the other hand, are expected to 
assist the DLA in its land reform objectives and use the IDP as a vehicle through which to determine 
whether there is landlessness, inequitable access to land or land claims within their jurisdiction (Hall 
et al., 2007: 26). Therefore, the IDP must also identify the commonage needs and development 
priorities.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 In particular the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 and the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
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Table 1: The Responsibilities of Commonage Role-players 
 
1.4.3.6. Commonage Management Committee 
It is recommended that commonage, although owned by the respective local municipality, be 
managed through a management body comprising of representatives from the local municipality, 
the users and other relevant authorities (DLA, 1997). According to the DLA (1997), the role of the 
Commonage Programme Role-players and Responsibilities 
Level Role-player Responsibilities 
National 
Department of Land Affairs 
1. Policy 2. Programmes 3.Coordination of provincial 
strategies 4. National budget 
Department of Agriculture 
1. Land-use management guidelines 2. Prioritisation 3. 
Manage allocated budget 
Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism None 
Department of Provincial and Local 
Government 
1. Contribution to policy 2. Monitoring of projects 3. Sign 
Notarial deed 
Provincial 
Provincial Land Reform Office  
1. Transfer funds to DM 2. Allocate budget (district land 
reform planning) 3. Member of Provincial Land 
Redistribution Committee (PLRC) 4. Ensure compliance 
and registration of deeds 
Department of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs 
1. Manage funds (commonage support and municipal 
infrastructure grant) 2. Feasibility reports and 
assessments 3. Training and land-use management 4. 
Emergent Farmer programme 4. Extension services 
Department of Economic Development 
and Environmental Affairs Occasional member of PLRC 
District 
District Land Reform Offices 
1. Land reform planning 2. Decisions on LRAD grants 3. 
Funding to LM 
District offices of the DoA Extension services (training and support) 
District offices of Environmental Affairs None 
District Municipalities 
1. Provide information to LM 2. Member of PLRC 3. IDP 
and commonage planning 4. Manage commonage funds 
5. Deliver projects (from identification, planning and 
implementation) 6. Needs analysis 7. Set up management 
committee and select users 8. Day-to-day management 
Local 
Local Municipalities  Site of day-to-day management 
Commonage Management Committee 
1. Contribute to commonage planning and management 
2. Establish user association 3. Responsible for life of 
project 
Grassroots 
Emerging Farmers Associations Support and management 
Other user associations Support and management 
NGOs 
1. Contribute to Prioritisation 2. Facilitation and 
assistance 
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management committee is to establish conditions and allocate procedures for users and ensure the 
effective use and management of the land, with the co-operation of relevant authorities. The local 
municipality is responsible for the creation of this body and must ensure that it is established before 
new commonage is acquired (DLA, 2002). The users must generally be part of a user association; 
however, if there is an existing user committee, such as a Stockowners’ Association, it is not 
necessary to create a new one (DLA, 2002). Essentially, this means that the responsibility and power 
to manage commonage has been devolved to community level and, therefore, management of 
commonage acquires a co-management approach (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 16); in other words, 
the management of commonage is jointly undertaken by the users, municipality and other role-
players.  
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2. Literature Overview 
2.1. The Land Reform Programme in South Africa 
The Land Reform Programme has been necessitated by the inequitable land situation in South Africa 
at present, which is a product of the past “land laws” that governed South Africa pre-1994 
(Badenhorst et al., 2006: 585). These land laws4 were designed as measures to segregate people of 
different races and regulated the occupation of land according to race. Homelands were established 
and black people were moved to these areas in order to separate them from whites who lived in all 
other available areas of South Africa. These laws led to the erosion of the rights of black people in 
the country (Badenhorst et al., 2006: 585). This has resulted in a situation where the black people in 
South Africa are experiencing landlessness, poverty, vulnerability, unemployment and lack of basic 
services (Lahiff, 2003: 2). This in turn has “racialised”, not only the land issue in South Africa (Walker, 
2005: 806), but also the agricultural issue; whereby large commercial farms are concentrated in the 
hands of white farmers, and black farmers continue to farm in a subsistence manner in the 
communal areas (Goebel, 2005: 364). However, in the time leading up to the new democratic 
dispensation, and since then, numerous legislative acts have abolished this racial geographical and 
social separation and, since the Final Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), government policies are now 
actively seeking to redress these imbalances (Badenhorst et al., 2006: 592). 
 
The Constitution is the supreme law of South Africa and all other legislation must be consistent with 
it (Act 108 of 1996 ss2). Under section 25 of the Constitution (the property clause) the Land Reform 
measures are stated. In South Africa, Land Reform is divided into three programmes: Land 
Redistribution, Land Tenure Reform and Land Restitution. Without expanding on the goals of all 
three programmes, it is adequate for this thesis to state the collective purpose of the Land Reform 
Programme, which is fourfold (DLA, 1997): (a) to redress the injustices of the past; (b) to foster 
national reconciliation and stability; (c) to underpin economic growth; and (d) to improve household 
welfare and alleviate poverty. The practical goal of the Land Reform Programme is to transfer 30% of 
agricultural land from white people to black people through its various programmes. The Land 
Reform Programme of South Africa is considered the most progressive, but costliest and slowest 
form of Land Reform (van den Brink et al., 2007: 174).  
 
2.1.1. The Redistribution Programme 
The Redistribution Programme requires that the South African State is to “take reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain 
                                                          
4
 These being the Black Land Act 27 of 1913; the South African Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 
and the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 to name a few. 
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access to land on an equitable basis (Act 108 of 1996 s25:5). The ‘reasonable legislative measures’ 
concept has resulted in the White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997), which contains all the 
Land Reform Programmes and sets out funding and other developmental measures to address the 
requirements of the Constitution.  
The Commonage Programme is a sub-component of the Redistribution Programme (which has a 
number of different facets) and falls within its Land Redistribution of Agricultural Development sub-
programme (LRAD5). According to Badenhorst et al., (2006: 593), the aim of Land Redistribution is to 
“provide the landless (or poor) with land for residential and agricultural purposes in order to 
improve their livelihoods”. Through this Programme, various “access products” have been created; 
such as the Commonage Programme and LRAD (Badenhorst et al., 2006: 594). The LRAD sub-
programme is set out in two parts; one aspect of the programme is to transfer agricultural land to 
specific individuals or groups, to create a new class of black commercial farmers (Jacobs et al., 2003: 
1); and the second aspect is to improve peoples’ access to municipal and tribal land for grazing 
purposes (Didiza, 2006: 22). Hence, the Commonage Programme is intricately connected to LRAD. 
This has two implications; (1) the intended implication that commonage is used for grazing or 
agricultural purposes (Govender-van Wyk & Wilson, 2006: 2); and (2) the unanticipated implication 
that the focus on commonage is not exclusive, and it has the potential to lose its significance in the 
greater Programmes into which it falls.  
 
LRAD is the programme that has, to some extent, replaced the former Settlement and Land 
Acquisition Grant (SLAG), which was a grant system aimed at different types of projects, such as 
group settlement, group and individual production, on-farm and off-farm settlement and farmer 
equity schemes (Didiza, 2006: 22). LRAD has performed better than SLAG since its inception in 2001 
and SLAG is now predominantly used for settlement purposes (Didiza, 2006: 22). The initial pro-poor 
focus of SLAG has been replaced by the emerging farmer approach of the LRAD programme. The 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) of the Department of Agriculture is used to 
support LRAD through a grant for the development of land purchased through LRAD or acquired in 
other ways. 
 
The LRAD programme has been amended recently after thorough reviews of the failures of the 
programme by various analysts (see the section below on failures of the Land Redistribution 
                                                          
5
 LRAD offers a ‘sliding-scale’ of grants to black South Africans who wish to buy land on which to practice 
agriculture. The grants used to vary from R20 000 to R100 000 depending on the level of ‘own contribution’ 
(Hall, 2007). LRAD has since been amended to increase the level of the grants to vary from R111 152 to 
R430 857 (DLA, 2008: 6). 
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Programme). Of significance is the increase in the level of grants offered (DLA, 2008: 6). The targeted 
groups for the grants are the most vulnerable black members of society (DLA, 2008: 3). The 
objectives of the revised programme are to increase access to land and to stimulate agricultural 
growth (DLA, 2008: 3). One of the methods envisioned to achieve this objective is to abolish the 
restriction on sub-dividing land (DLA, 2008: 11). Thereafter the grant should be sufficient to 
purchase a private and economically viable land parcel.  
 
There are a number of reasons why it is important to contextualise commonage within the greater 
Land Reform Programme. The first is that, as stated above, commonage is part of the Redistribution 
Programme of Land Reform and is calculated into the percentage of land that the South African 
government wants to redistribute (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 1). The second reason is that 
commonage is intended to be used as a “springboard” for the LRAD programme through the 
emerging farmer system of the Commonage Programme (DLA, 2002). As indicated above, the 
“stepping stone” policy of the Commonage Programme should result in emerging farmers accessing 
enough skills, capital and livestock to exit the commonage. The LRAD grant will allow the emerging 
farmer to purchase his or her own land on which to farm independently. Thirdly, as per the goals of 
the Redistribution Policy, commonage should be used to alleviate poverty and contribute to 
economic development (Jacobs et al., 2003: 4). A careful consideration of the Land Reform 
Programme, with specific reference to the Redistribution policy, can, therefore, shed light on the 
future of commonage as a redistributive mechanism and how it should be better integrated into the 
greater Land Reform Programme.  
 
Lastly, commonage land, although peri-urban in nature, is subject to land-use practices that are 
characteristic of communal areas in South Africa. Communal areas are characterised by a number of 
individuals using the same piece of land; therefore, communal land can be viewed as a Common 
Property Resource. Land used for commonage purposes, as this thesis will argue later, is also a 
Common Property Resource. Both these property regimes are subject to land-use practices which 
are driven by livelihood needs, for supplementing incomes and for subsistence needs. Therefore, 
one can argue that there is a strong connection between goals of communal farming and 
commonage farming. Problems occurring in Land Reform projects are mirrored by problems 
occurring on commonage projects. However, commonage has a strong advantage over other 
Common Property Resource systems; it has a potentially strong institutional body for management, 
the respective Local Municipality. 
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2.1.2. Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation 
As a poverty alleviation strategy, the Land Reform Programme has not made significant progress 
(Andrew et al., 2003). In a recent study, it was found that 50% of Land Reform projects have failed to 
make beneficiaries permanently better-off (CDE, 2008b). Goebel (2005: 358) states that is it 
becoming more difficult to argue convincingly that Land Reform will significantly relieve rural 
poverty and Cousins (2007) feels that Land Reform is necessary but not sufficient for economic 
transformation. For example, land transferred in redistribution processes is Limpopo were found to 
be either abandoned or used less productively than before (McCusker, 2004: 71). These failures have 
led some to argue that Land Reform progress should not be about hectares transferred from white 
to black ownership, but about how that land has impacted on the lives of the poor (Walker, 2005: 
819). Hence, it is not the quantity of land that is important but the quality of the benefits derived 
(Jacobs et al., 2003: 26). 
 
Land Reform has been slow (CDE, 2008b). Some authors argue that it is slow because of the route 
taken, that of Market-Based Land Reform (Walker, 2005; Didiza, 2006; Lahiff, 2007), and many are 
now arguing that the process needs to be fast-tracked, with proactive state involvement (Kepe & 
Cousins, 2002; Wegerif, 2004). Market-Based Land Reform (MBLR), or the Willing-Buyer, Willing-
Seller approach that South Africa has adopted, has been heavily criticised for various reasons. The 
MBLR concept is a neo-liberal approach adopted with the support of the rest of the “westernised” 
world and is premised on the protection of private rights (Goebel, 2005: 361). It seeks to redistribute 
land, liberalise land and other markets, draw small-holder farmers into commercial production and 
minimise the role of the state in land allocation, the regulation of the agricultural economy and rural 
development (Lahiff, 2007: 7). It is based on a voluntary market system where beneficiaries are self-
selected and where land owners have the freedom to choose whether or not to sell their land 
(Saturnino & Borras, 2003: 370). Therefore, it has been embraced by commercial farmers and the 
non-poor have availed themselves to the programme (Saturnino & Borras, 2003: 384). As described 
by Saturnino & Borras (2003: 369), supporters of MBLR believe that this system leads to the efficient 
and equitable redistribution of assets. 
 
Widespread critics feel that MBLR pushes up land prices, excludes the poor and has failed to draw in 
willing sellers and private sector agencies (Lahiff, 2007). It requires good planning and good support 
services; and lack of these has led to poor performance in South Africa (Saturnino & Borras, 2003: 
385). The main programme on which it is based, LRAD, has many flaws. The following section will 
examine the failures of both the Redistribution and the LRAD programme. 
26 
 
2.1.3. The Criticisms of Land Redistribution and LRAD 
As noted before, several agencies and observers have noted that the process of land redistribution is 
too slow (Didiza, 2006; CDE, 2008b). The bureaucratic red-tape of the process hampers fast, easy 
and efficient exchange of land (Lahiff, 2007: 12) and many farmers would rather use private markets 
to sell their property6. However, not only is the programme slow, it has been discovered that there is 
also not enough money available for the Land Reform Programme in general (Walker, 2005; CDE, 
2008b). The responsibility for Land Reform rests on the shoulders of provincial departments who 
have little financial and other resources and there is no explicit role for Local Government (Lahiff, 
2001). Furthermore, it has also been discovered that the performance of Land Redistribution has 
been hampered by a subversion of the process by the Restitution7 Programme of Land Reform; once 
land has been transferred, new farmers are discovering that it is under a land claim (CDE, 2008b).  
 
A very important criticism of the Land Reform Programme is that it is no longer pro-poor, because of 
the financial contribution required, which results in the poor losing out to the non-poor (Lahiff, 
2007: 14), generally because the non-poor can mobilise more capital to buy land (Hall, 2007). 
Therefore, the labour, income and gender inequalities in South Africa are not being addressed 
through Land Reform (Lahiff, 2001; McCusker, 2004: 69). Furthermore, HIV/AIDs is compromising 
the ability of people to use the new land due to labour shortages and time spent caring for the sick 
(Walker, 2005: 17).  
 
Another important criticism of the Land Redistribution Programme is that land prices in South Africa 
are high (Lahiff, 2007: 11) because current owners of land control the time of sale and the price of 
the land (Lahiff, 2001). The LRAD grant size is too meagre to purchase large-scale commercial farms 
which results in people buying the land in groups. This further results in too many beneficiaries using 
the same piece of land, and they are generally disorganised and lack capital (McCusker, 2004: 66). 
Because of the restriction on the sub-division of the land, which creates a communal farming 
situation, it is often the weakest and poorest members of the group who have little say in the 
management of the land (Lahiff, 2007: 10). One suggested response to this issue is to identify better 
equipped beneficiaries, with adequate capital and experience (Walker, 2005: 819). For example, it 
has been found that black farm workers remain the most marginalised people in the country; they 
are poorly paid, geographically isolated and politically marginal (Crane, 2007: 1038). Yet, they are 
                                                          
6
 However, this has meant that the extent of Redistribution has been underestimated; the private markets 
have contributed as much as 40% of land transferred between black and white farmers (Lahiff, 2007: 8). 
7
 The aim of the Restitution programme is to compensate people for being unfairly disposed of their land 
after 1913. They will either receive monetary compensation for the value of the land, or will be able to claim 
back the land. 
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not always identified for Redistribution projects, even though they may be skilled in farming 
(Atkinson & Buscher, 2006).  
 
One of the issues not addressed in the Land Reform Programme is that of arable land, of which 
South Africa has very little (Walker, 2005; Didiza, 2006: 28). Furthermore, there are climatic and 
water constraints to farming (Marcus et al., 1996). In addition to the poor climatic conditions for 
farming, the economic climate in which agriculture is now practiced is competitive and difficult due 
to agricultural deregulation, lack of subsidies and trade liberalisation (Hall, 2007: 88). This has 
resulted in small farmers struggling to compete with larger established farmers.  
 
Another pertinent criticism of the Land Reform Programme is that it is too focused on commercial 
production (Lahiff, 2007: 15). Furthermore, there is a failure to recognise the difference between 
household and national food-security (CDE, 2008a). Household food security is linked to small-scale 
subsistence farming, while national food security requires large-scale commercial production. The 
South African government does not recognise that rural people adopt multiple livelihood strategies 
and that small-scale agriculture can be as productive as large-scale commercial agriculture (Goebel, 
2005: 353). Private consultants usually draw up the business plans for the newly redistributed land, 
without taking into account the multiple users and uses of the land (Lahiff, 2001). Therefore, it has 
been argued that LRAD is not contributing to livelihoods and access to land does not mean better 
livelihoods or better land-use practices (Andrew et al., 2003).  
 
A criticism of the Land Reform Programme, that has a crucial bearing on the use of commonage, is 
the criticism that, whereas DLA focuses on large-scale agricultural away from towns and cities, there 
is an urban bias to land reform; therefore, people are more interested in acquiring rights to urban or 
peri-urban land (Adams et al., 2000; McCusker, 2004; Walker, 2005). The increased demand for 
urban land can be partly attributed to urbanisation, and partly due to the failure of land to 
contribute to poverty alleviation in rural areas, which results in people leaving rural areas to find 
employment in cities and towns. In this urbanising climate, the demand for commonage is rapidly 
growing. Commonage is becoming more valuable because it contributes to peoples’ livelihoods and 
because it can be used for cultural practices.  
   
2.1.4. Solutions to Land Reform Failures 
The most widely entertained solution to Land Reform failures is a systematic integration of Land 
Reform into broader rural development processes (Lahiff, 2003; CDE, 2008b). Land only plays a 
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permissive role in poverty reduction and must, therefore, be part of a broader poverty reduction 
strategy before it is able to contribute to the livelihoods of people (Chimhowu, 2006: 7). Therefore, a 
process of agrarian reform, which will help to improve rural dwellers’ access to markets, social 
services and employment, is a good way to complement and enhance the greater Land Reform 
process  (Jacobs et al., 2003: 28). This will require restructuring the rural economic space, the 
property regimes and the socio-economic relations between the rural and urban areas (Cousins, 
2007). It will also require that agriculture be better supported by central government through 
national economic policies (de Visser, 2005; van den Brink et al., 2007). It is still unclear how the 
finer details of agrarian reform will be carried out and if it will succeed in its goals.  
 
Another solution, as offered earlier, is that the State must be more active in the redistribution of 
land (Jacobs et al., 2003; Chimhowu, 2006; Cousins, 2007). This idea has been accepted by the South 
African government through its Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS). Some years after its 
inception, representatives of the government, recognising some of the flaws of the Land Reform 
Programme, came up with the following policy solutions: proactive land acquisition, better 
expropriation measures, subdivision of land and “levelling the playing field”; in other words, 
ensuring that the non-poor and the poor have equal access to the benefits of land reform (Didiza, 
2006: 22). PLAS was conceived in 2003 and has been implemented since 2006. The aim of this 
government strategy is to proactively target land and match it with demand, with emphasis on 
developing the land prior to assisting people to access the land (DLA, 2006). However, it is uncertain 
how this objective may be achieved. As will be shown later, the costs of undertaking Land Reform in 
South Africa may be a hindrance to such a scheme. 
 
Because of the high urbanisation rates in South Africa, it is important that government programmes 
should start to make more land available for peri-urban and urban residents (Walker, 2005: 822). 
Land reform must, therefore, focus on land close to settlements (Jacobs et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
the rural geography left over from Apartheid is highly inequitable (van den Brink, 2002: 15). Some 
analysts suggest that small-scale farming can address this inequality because this system is more fair 
and equitable than large-scale farming (van den Brink, 2002: 13; Lahiff, 2007). In addition to this, it is 
believed that, in order for land to be appropriate for the poor, smaller groups sizes and individual 
projects may be more advantageous than the communal purchase of large land parcels (Jacobs et 
al., 2003: 25).  
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The South African government policies need to recognise the continuum of farmers and their various 
needs; from subsistence to commercial, part-time to full-time and large and small-scale farmers 
(Andrew et al., 2003). Therefore, there may be merit in researching the likelihood of introducing 
small-holder farming to the Land Reform Programme, for those without the capital to purchase 
large-scale commercial enterprises. This may require subdividing larger pieces of land (van den Brink 
et al., 2007). However, small farms are more efficient, especially when one considers the livelihood 
benefits of the land (van den Brink et al., 2007). Small farms also allow for people to self-finance the 
land (van den Brink et al., 2007). Although Goebel (2005: 353) agrees with other analysts that small-
holder farming can be socially efficient and economically efficient, other analysts feel that small-
holder farming does not drive economic growth (Chimhowu, 2006: 42).  
 
Deininger et al. (2008) take a closer look at equity of land access in the form of land rental markets. 
They show that in India, China and Vietnam, land rental markets allowed the poor access to land, 
and increased equity of land holdings (Deininger et al., 2008: 893). This is corroborated by other 
research in Hungary (Vranken & Swinnen, 2006: 481). This could have important implications on the 
redistribution of land. One analyst believes that the South African government policies must explore 
land rental markets because these allow for the participation of the poor (Chimhowu, 2006: 38). The 
poor have better access to land through rentals in countries where there are other land market 
imperfections, such as poor access to credit and high transaction costs (Vranken & Swinnen, 2006: 
481). Furthermore, rental markets allow families to farm on land that is optimal in size (Vranken & 
Swinnen, 2006: 496) as well as to diversify income streams in the case of renting out (Deininger et 
al., 2008: 893). This indicates that Land Rental Markets could be pro-poor in the sense that poor 
peoples’ labour can determine their access to land, as opposed to their financial capital. Another 
important consideration of Land Rental Markets is the effect it has on productivity. In India, 
increased rental market activity led to an increase in productivity on farms (Deininger et al., 2008: 
893). This may be attributed to better access to land by those with higher farm management skills, 
as was found in the case of China (Vranken & Swinnen, 2006: 496).  
 
The Commonage Programme can be related to the recommendations above in two ways. Firstly, the 
emerging farmer programme can be enhanced by rental markets, which make it easier and less-risky 
for emerging farmers to exit the commonage and farm independently. Secondly, through the same 
programme, the Commonage Programme could be used to enhance an agrarian reform programme 
because the commonage can contribute to the socio-economic system that would connect urban 
areas to their surrounding rural areas. The Commonage Programme could provide the financial, 
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managerial and rangeland management skills that improve the use of rural land use and contributes 
to the Land Reform Programme; firstly, by contributing “hectares”, and secondly by ensuring new 
black farmers are equipped to use redistributed farmers efficiently.  
 
2.2. The Equity-Efficiency Debate 
As Olubode-Awosola et al. (2008: 851) acknowledge of the SA Land Reform Programme, the policy 
needs to address the challenge of balancing equity with efficiency. The Programme aims to transfer 
30% of all agricultural land to black South Africans by 2014 (DLA, 2008: 1). The LRAD programme, 
although aiming to improve the plight of the poor and landless by helping them to gain access to 
land, allows LRAD grants for food safety-net projects and equity schemes, as well as large-scale 
productions schemes (DLA, 2008: 1). One of its overall objectives of LRAD is to stimulate growth 
from agriculture (DLA, 2008: 3). Although not defined, or spelt out explicitly, the Land Reform 
Programme (Redistribution, Restitution and Land Tenure Reform) aims to improve the equity of land 
holdings, while ensuring the efficiency of the use of the land such that agriculture can stimulate 
economic growth. As Hall (1998: 452) notes, when a policy aims to promote equity and efficiency, it 
must indicate how these two objectives will work together because they can be conflicting without 
clear, workable instruments. Government policy must consider whether the goals of Land Reform 
can be reconciled; for example, whether poverty reduction can be reconciled with the 
“deracialisation” of land and equitable access (Chimhowu, 2006).  
 
In terms of the definition of equity and efficiency, authors use various interchangeable words for 
both. For example, Hall (1998) uses “productive” to refer to efficiency. Besley & Burgess (2000: 391) 
speak of “poverty reduction and growth” as the outcome of Land Reform. Policy developers within 
the South African Government view economic growth and poverty alleviation as the goals of the 
Land Reform Programme, which could indicate that the policy defines efficiency as “economic 
growth”. However, one goal that is neglected in the Land Reform Programme is that of sustainable 
development; which means improving ecological system health and ensuring the maintenance of the 
ability of the ecological system to adapt to changes (Islam et al., 2003: 152). The issue of ecological 
system health is a third dimension of the equity-efficiency debate; it is a dimension that will require 
more attention in the future. However, for this thesis, the discussion will remain on how the South 
African government policy hopes to reconcile economic growth with Land Redistribution goals.  
 
According to van den Brink et al. (2006: 18), Land Redistribution is important for equity, conflict 
prevention, economic growth, jobs and poverty alleviation. They argue that 1) equitable land 
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redistribution is good for agricultural and non-agricultural, rural and non-rural growth; 2) good farm 
land can lift people out of poverty permanently; and 3) unresolved land issues leads to land conflict. 
Small-scale farming has been suggested as one of the ways to ensure that the challenges of equity 
and efficiency are met in land reform programmes. SA bases its equity judgement on the 30% 
transfer figure; although it is submitted that a 30% transfer rate of agricultural land does not equate 
to land ownership equity because black people make up the greater majority of the SA population 
figures. Furthermore, as indicated above, owning land does not automatically mean that poverty 
levels will be reduced, because other inputs, such as mechanical and physical infrastructure, are 
necessary to make the land productive. 
 
In his essay on Land Reform in South Africa, van den Brink (2002: 11) discusses the notion of small 
farmer efficiency. He equates high efficiencies with more output for less input. Here output and 
input can be either in cash or in kind. He suggests that high yields does not equal efficiency (van den 
Brink, 2002:11). Small farmers usually use their household labour and farm on land sizes that they 
can comfortably manage without large inputs of cash or outside labour (van den Brink, 2002: 11). 
Therefore, small-scale farmers use resources (capital, land and labour) more efficiently than large-
scale farmers (van den Brink et al., 2006: 18). Van den Brink (2002: 13) also believes that focussing 
Land Reform on the creation or maintenance of large-scale farms can lead to rural poverty and, 
therefore, country-wide economic problems. Olubode-Awosola et al. (2008: 851), in an extensive 
modelling exercise of Land Reform, found that this assumption may be false, and that large-scale 
farming is much more productive than small-scale farming. They found that land fragmentation and 
the settling of groups on land decreases the ability of the land to contribute to regional production 
and can be a poverty trap for those who have settled there. However, they do note that small-scale 
land parcels can be more efficient when serving a safety-net function (Olubode-Awosola et al., 2008: 
852). The question remains whether the safety-net function of land is as important as national food 
security function of land and whether small-scale farmers are able to contribute to the agricultural 
markets in a way that ensures that the urban populations are fed. Consensus on this matter will help 
to inform Land Reform Policy. 
 
2.3. Land Reform and Livelihoods 
Some analysts of the Land Reform Programme, especially Lahiff (2003; 2005), feel that government 
policy needs to take into account how livelihoods are defined and provided for when embarking on 
rural reform programmes. Land Reform is too focussed on giving support to medium to large-scale 
black commercial farmers and gives little support to subsistence farmers; these people also deserve 
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access to markets and social services and systems (SLSA, 2003: 23). Indeed, Land Reform will impact 
on millions of households in the Eastern Cape by affecting their access to land and resources (Lahiff, 
2005). Therefore, Land Reform must take into account secondary products, such as fuelwood, 
medicinal plants and wild vegetables, that contribute to the range of livelihood benefits; this will 
have implications on the business plans and feasibility studies connected to redistribution and 
restitution processes (Cousins, 1999: 314). Land Reform may also be crucial for sustainable resource 
use and the avoidance of degradation (Meadows & Hoffman, 2002: 436). The next section will 
consider more closely the connection between land and livelihoods, and later, how this influences 
the management of rangelands.  
 
2.3.1. Rural Livelihoods 
Cousins (1999: 300) refers to rural livelihoods as multiple, diverse and dynamic; the aims being to 
manage risk, reduce vulnerability and enhance livelihood security. Hence, livelihoods in the Eastern 
Cape and elsewhere are made up of various sources of income and other provisions, such as natural 
resources and agricultural off-take (Lahiff, 2003; Ainslie, 2005). Although agriculture generally 
contributes a relatively minor percentage to peoples’ livelihoods, compared to remittances and 
social grants, it still plays an important role in supplementing income for many rural households 
(Lahiff, 2003: 9). In the Eastern Cape, the largest agricultural sector is livestock production (Ainslie, 
2002: 2), although livestock owners lie on a continuum of scales of activities; in other words,  there 
are different farming activities along a continuum between purely subsistence and purely 
commercial farming (Ainslie, 2002: 10). In general, therefore, rural or urban-poor households will 
rely on a combination of social grants, remittances, natural resources, arable fields and livestock 
production for their livelihoods. 
 
2.3.2. Livestock and Natural Resource Benefits to Rural Livelihoods 
Rural people rely on their surrounding natural resources for various direct and indirect contributions 
to their livelihoods. Communal rural households procure a wide range of natural resources for 
consumption or sale, which are sometimes sold in urban areas (Shackleton et al., 2001: 582). These 
are often complemented by other agricultural-based endeavours, such as livestock production and 
arable fields (Shackleton et al., 2001: 593). Therefore, arable production, animal husbandry and 
natural resource harvesting all contribute in various ways, across sites and scales, to livelihood 
provisioning (Shackleton et al., 2001: 582).  
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Natural resources are not used just by poor rural dwellers. Shackleton & Shackleton (2006: 313) 
suggests that the contribution of Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) to households is similar across 
all income levels in the Kat River Valley in the Eastern Cape. The differences between the use of 
NTFPs by poor and less poor households is related to whether there was own collection, as opposed 
to the sale of NTFPs; for example, the poorer households tended to collect more and sell more, 
while the less-poor households tended to buy more products (Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006: 314).  
 
The study by Shackleton & Shackleton (2006: 307) shows that guiding and enhancing the use of 
NTFPs can lead to increased livelihood security and possibly poverty reduction. However, the 
authors warn of the dangers of commercialisation of natural products; which can create 
opportunities for poorer households, but may lead to the exploitation of the products by elites and 
outsiders (Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006: 315) or over-harvesting by locals. When commercialising 
agricultural activities there is also the danger of increasing the risks to a household because it may 
lead to a dependency on one source of income (Shackleton et al., 2001: 596). Instead, it is suggested 
that the multiple livelihood strategy approach adopted by poor households in rural areas ensures 
that risks are spread, and NTFPs are often used as a safety-net in times of crisis (Shackleton et al., 
2001: 582).  
 
Certain commonalities characterise livestock production and rural livelihoods (Shackleton et al., 
2001: 586):  
 A minority of households own cattle and cattle ownership is highly skewed; usually those 
households that receive higher off-farm income own large herds and account for a 
disproportionate percentage of total cattle numbers. 
 Benefits of livestock are distributed widely (throughout communities) and the use and 
benefits of cattle are multipurpose in character. 
 Less well-off cattle owners use a larger variety of livestock benefits. However, owner benefit 
priorities change over time according to the livelihood strategies adopted. 
 When considering the range of products and services accrued through owning cattle, 
communal areas may be more productive than commercial areas; which is also due to lower 
input costs in communal areas. 
 Off-take of cattle from communal areas is perceived to be low, but may be as high as 
commercial off-take.   
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It is suggested that livestock have multiple uses within livelihoods, such as direct consumption, 
socio-cultural outputs and non-market outputs (Dovie et al., 2006: 261). Livestock are kept for their 
multiple uses, as opposed to just being kept for the social status attached to their ownership, as was 
suggested in the past (Shackleton et al., 2005; Dovie et al., 2006: 260). Direct and non-direct 
contributions of livestock also accrue to non livestock-owning households (Shackleton et al., 2005: 
135). Ainslie (2005: 136) indicates that cattle also have a strong social role in rural areas; “they are a 
means of engaging in and maintaining social networks and circuits of exchange that extend beyond 
the rural homestead into the village and further”. He further suggests that Xhosa people prefer not 
to sell cattle, and will only do so when there is strife in the household (Ainslie, 2005: 137). Therefore, 
livestock production is not just about commercialising and selling to the markets (Ainslie, 2002: 7), 
but has a social, cultural and safety-net worth.  
 
If policy makers took these suggestions into account, it may impact on how land reform and rural 
development programmes. It also impacts on how outsiders may view the management of land by 
households in rural and other areas. Government’s rural development policies must take into 
account the value of livelihoods, and ensure their enhancement alongside other commercial 
ventures (Shackleton et al., 2001: 582). The Land Reform Programme tends to promote one sector, 
large-scale commercial agriculture (but with multiple beneficiaries), without considering the impact 
it has on these livelihood strategies (SLSA, 2003). However, considering the equity-efficiency debate, 
it is still important that livestock production contributes to national food security. Commercial 
agriculture is promoted by Government in its Land Reform Programme because it is more productive 
than subsistence agriculture. It contributes to economic growth, the export markets and national 
food security. So, although some may argue that subsistence production is valuable in the rural 
agricultural setting, it is important to consider if subsistence agriculture is more efficient and 
equitable than commercial agriculture. It is suggested that, for social and cultural reasons, an equal 
mixture of both may be appropriate for South Africa. 
 
2.4. Commonage Management Success 
2.4.1. The Importance of Commonage for Livelihood Provisioning 
The Department of Land Affairs identified Commonage as a pillar of Land Reform because “it is 
public land which does not need to be acquired, there is an existing institution which can manage 
the land and needy residents live next-door and have certain rights to the land” (DLA, 1997: 54). 
Commonage is intended as a livelihood option for poor people (Atkinson et al., 2004). It serves 
numerous livelihood needs; such as livestock grazing, fuelwood collection, wood collection for 
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building materials, vegetable production and the collection of various other natural resources 
(Anderson & Pienaar, 2003; Ingle, 2006: 47). Commonage is sometimes the only resource available 
for livelihood provisioning for very poor households (Atkinson, 2005: 1). Furthermore, natural 
resources are productively and resourcefully used by many poor beneficiaries, even though their 
livelihoods are limited to survivalist mode (Andrew et al., 2003). Commonage benefits the urban 
poor as opposed to the rural poor (Deininger, 2003), and is an urban resource subject to peri-urban 
land-use practices (Ingle, 2006: 48). Many people prefer to engage in peri-urban land-use practices 
because engaging in rural land-use practices (for agricultural or livelihood provisioning) is difficult 
without capital and services and the risks are far higher (Anseeuw & Laurent, 2007: 660).  
 
Considering the value of commonage, the following section will focus on the failures of the 
Commonage Programme, with special emphasis on the failures of local government to develop 
commonage and ensure that the management of the land results in the equitable and sustainable 
utilisation of the land. There is not an extensive amount of peer-reviewed literature pertaining to 
commonage in South Africa. Much of the literature is constituted by theses, popular articles and 
reports. However, much of this literature is rife with pessimistic views of commonage management 
and this thesis will argue that management failure is intricately linked to a governance system that 
does not adequately take cognisance of the poor performance of developmental local government 
and the place of commonage in the lives of the poor residents of towns in South Africa.  
 
2.4.2. Management Failure 
Municipal commonage is a resource that is used communally by a large number of people, with 
increasing numbers of livestock; and this raises the question of the sustainability of current 
management practices (Atkinson, 2005: 2). Anderson & Pienaar (2003: 13) sum up the poor attempt 
at commonage management rather aptly when they state that “the result has been self-help, 
dominance and exclusion of women and the poor, non-payment of user-fees, land degradation and 
severely reduced or minimal benefits to the few who manage to gain access”. Poor management 
and absence of adequate resource-use rules has resulted in an open-access situation whereby the 
powerful and wealthy dominate access to the land (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 15). In this 
environment there is little or no creation or enforcement of rules, and even when rules exist, no one 
has the authority, capability or desire to punish those who infringe upon these rules. These open-
access systems are unsustainable in the long-term and overgrazing is becoming more prevalent in 
commonage situations, such as in the Free State (Atkinson, 2007b: 193). Therefore, the poor 
institutional environment of commonage management is resulting in the “tragedy of the commons”, 
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as described by Hardin (Ingle, 2006: 52). As acknowledged by the Department of Land Affairs in a 
review of the commonage programme, most of the commonage projects visited by them showed 
that unsustainable land-use practices are leading to degradation of parts of the land (DLA, 2005: 29). 
 
2.4.3. What are the Constraints to Effective Commonage Management? 
In a substantial legal and technical review of the Commonage Programme of the DLA, Atkinson et al. 
(2004: 5), the following three core recommendations were advocated by Pienaar in the section on 
Policy and Legal Issues. Firstly, the institutions and legal aspects of commonage projects in SA need 
to ensure that the individual user rights are better defined and allocated. Secondly, leases should 
not be exclusively promoted, but should be promoted as one of a number of institutional structures 
that can be used to manage the commonages. Lastly, Local Government should be allowed to apply 
for a planning grant for commonage projects. This review highlights a number of problems that are 
constraining effective commonage management. These and other constraints have been widely 
acknowledged elsewhere. 
 
Commonage managers are constrained in their abilities to consider commonage as a developmental 
option; these constraints are financial as well as related to the political will to develop commonage 
for the benefit of the poor residents (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 20). As Ingle (2006: 52) indicates, 
the transaction costs for municipalities of abandoning the commercial rental option that was so 
prevalent in the past, and the money that is forfeited in doing so, is very high in many instances and 
has led municipalities to continue to lease commonage, even though the Commonage Policy is 
explicit when it states that commonage must revert back to its public character of the past (DLA, 
1997). However, DLA only has the power to determine the use of new commonage land, and some 
municipalities continue to lease old commonage to commercial farmers. The transition of 
commonage to a “pro-poor” nature has meant a corresponding increase in the number of 
responsibilities of local government (Atkinson, 2005: 3). Local municipalities suffer from 
organisational and capacity defects and are failing to address their developmental mandates 
(Benseler, 2004: 48).  
 
Local government receives poor and uncoordinated support from its district and provincial 
counterparts, as well as from the DoA (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 20). Local government has never 
had the function of agricultural development and has neither the necessary expertise nor the 
capacity. It is, therefore, essential that DoA support local municipalities in agricultural functions; 
however, any support is usually insufficient and local municipalities are failing to manage 
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commonage adequately (Benseler, 2004: 49). In the Northern Cape it was found that there is also 
some confusion about the strategic roles of the offices of the provincial departments, who have 
decision-making powers and more capacity than the local municipalities (Benseler, 2004). Atkinson 
(2007b) stresses the need for agricultural guidance and extension services for commonage farmers 
and for the DoA to engage with municipalities in order to share environmental and rangeland 
management knowledge. This is supported by other studies that suggest that support from other 
departments must be provided to the municipalities, by providing aftercare facilities, skills and 
resources once commonage is purchased; as well as to the commonage users, by providing 
extension services (Benseler, 2004: 15). 
 
The commonage management committees are in the rarest cases functional and suffer from their 
own capacity constraints, as well as lack of power to make decisions (Benseler, 2004: 52). In some 
instances there is no CMC, as was discovered by the DLA when they conducted a review of 
commonage projects (DLA, 2005: 15). Furthermore, most of the informal structures that are 
managing commonage are not registered as legal entities (DLA, 2005: 25). However, even where the 
commonage management committees are functional, they will sometimes subvert any attempts by 
municipalities to impose a management system. This was found to be the case in Namaqualand, 
where the commonage committee was dominated by the wealthier men in the community; and the 
disjuncture of their management attempts in theory and practice led to elite capture and over 
stocking of communal lands (Lebert, 2004: 29).  
 
2.4.4. Integrated Development Planning 
In a study done by Hall et al. (2007) on the IDPs of a number of municipalities, a key finding with 
regards to commonage was that some officials were unclear about what constitutes commonage 
land and some were unclear about such a category of land (Hall et al., 2007: 25). Furthermore, 
commonage was not always considered a strategic resource that can be used for development 
purposes or to satisfy land needs. These issues, and problems with administration and the 
encroachment of housing onto the land, led the authors to conclude that commonage land needs 
investments in (1) land rights administration and (2) physical infrastructure (Hall et al., 2007: 27).  
 
Some of these issues are intricately linked to the developmental mandate of local municipalities. 
Ingle (2006: 53) feels that local municipalities are finding their role as agencies of development 
difficult, and that municipalities barely fulfil the functions of a ‘developmental’ government and 
have been “crushed by ‘unfunded mandates’ thrust upon them by government line departments”. 
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The responsibility of commonage development comes at a time when local municipalities have other 
necessary developmental functions such as tourism, integrated planning and service provision, but 
have also lost the critical revenue from commonage leases. There may be some justification in 
Ingle's (2006: 54) suggestion that municipalities, as they are currently constituted, will never be able 
to adequately manage their commonage land. Therefore, he concludes that the system of 
developmental local government needs to be reconsidered.  
 
2.4.5. Livelihood and Economic Benefits 
Very few cases of graduation by means of the emerging farmer system have been reported and 
there are no guidelines on how this process should take place (DLA, 2005: 20). Only one graduation 
from commonage has been reported (Govender-van Wyk & Wilson, 2006: 7). The reasons for lack of 
graduation have not been formally studied. However, it has been suggested that graduation has not 
taken place for several reasons. Stock limitations do not allow substantial gains in cattle numbers; 
very few farmers make a profit from farming and some farmers face exorbitant fees and cannot 
access credit or funding in order to purchase their own land (DLA, 2005: 20). Anseeuw & Laurent 
(2007: 666) found that there is no system in Namaqualand that provides for the conversion of 
subsistence farming to commercial farming. In conclusion to a study on livestock farming on 
commonage in Namaqualand, Govender-van Wyk & Wilson (2006: 25) concluded that livestock 
farming cannot provide sustainable livelihoods for users. 
 
There are many constraints to livestock farming in many rural areas in South Africa. Govender-van 
Wyk & Wilson (2006: 10), through an amalgamation of a number of studies, suggest that the 
following are key constraints: there is a shortage of grazing and forage resources, livestock are in 
poor condition and suffer from disease and drought, there is a shortage of labour for livestock 
production (partly due to HIV/AIDs) and there are knowledge and capital constraints to marketing 
and selling livestock. In another study conducted by Masiteng et al. (2003: 90) it was found that 
small farm sizes, population pressure, land tenure problems, distance from markets, poor transport 
and poor infrastructure constrained the communal farming system on commons in the Free State. 
Therefore, even if a farmer were able to graduate from a commonage situation, they face added 
constrictions in rural areas.  
  
Subsistence commonage users have neither regressed or progressed in their livelihoods (DLA, 2005: 
20). The commonage policy is silent on other livelihood strategies that are practiced on commonage; 
which is a mirror of the general Land Reform Programme which fails to take diverse livelihoods and 
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multiple income streams into account when considering rural development (Govender-van Wyk & 
Wilson, 2006: 7). Although the benefits of commonage to livelihoods is difficult to quantify, the 
contribution may be substantial; however, it is constrained by poor management of the land 
(Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 15).   
 
2.5. Rangeland Management and Environmental Considerations 
In light of the poor management performance of local government, it is easy to suggest that the 
future of commonage rangelands is uncertain. But is it too simplistic to advocate the notion of the 
“tragedy of the commons” and implement “scientific” rangeland management measures (such as 
carrying capacity) to counteract the unsustainable use of this important natural resource? The 
following discussion will consider the mixed-income strategies that dominate commonage use, 
despite concentrated efforts on grazing projects on commonage (Anderson, 1996: 22), and how 
conventional rangeland management techniques are not always appropriate for communal 
rangeland management whereby a number of individuals are farming on the same piece of land.  
 
Ainslie (2002: 1) indicates the four assertions that underpin the views of communal rangeland 
management and livestock production: 
1. Rangelands in communal areas are overstocked. 
2. There is a free-rider problem inherent in communal rangeland management. 
3. Off-take to the market is minimal. 
4. Livestock production techniques in communal areas are backward. 
 
Ainslie (2002: 7) feels that these discourses arise from the Hardin tragedy; the idea that a rational 
livestock owner will overstock the land because the negative effects of his actions are shared by all. 
But these assertions ignore a number of different other variables in rangeland management for 
livestock production. In a literature overview conducted in 1993, Shackleton (1993: 73) found that 
overstocking is not necessarily an outcome of communal rangeland management systems. 
Generally, overstocking and overgrazing (degradation) are believed to be two sides of the same coin 
(Ainslie, 2002: 6) but Shackleton (1993: 74) feels that, even where rangelands are overstocked, this is 
not necessarily the only driver of rangeland degradation; for instance, there are also natural drivers 
such as droughts. Indeed, Meadows & Hoffman (2002: 435) show that drivers of degradation in 
communal areas is usually a combination of drought and high stocking rates. 
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Meadows & Hoffman (2002) and Ainslie (2002) feel that overstocking in communal areas is rooted in 
the historical and political past. Furthermore, Benjaminsen et al. (2006: 525) view carrying capacity 
as a concept that stems from the political and ecological processes of the past, whereby communal 
rangeland management was considered backward and ecologically unsustainable. Furthermore, 
Ainslie (2002: 8) asserts that the discourse of communal farming as irrational and inefficient stems 
from the desire of white colonist farmers to expand their territory and was also used to justify the 
creation of homelands as a source of cheap labour. However, this situation has exacerbated  
degradation, which can now be attributed to the tenure situation in the homelands of the Apartheid 
era, which has led to a high concentration of people living off a small percentage of the South 
Africa’s land (Meadows & Hoffman, 2002: 435).  
 
Many analysts believe that rangelands in communal areas are in fact managed through community 
norms and other institutions. For example, Cousins (1999: 301) feels that livelihoods are 
institutionally mediated through formal and informal rules. In agreement are Allsopp et al. (2007: 
749) who believe that the commons in Namaqualand are managed through a complex social system 
of shared norms. Allsopp et al. (2007) found that these same commons are managed through 
informal institutions; and that livestock keepers realise the trade-offs between high livestock 
numbers and poor livestock condition. Their reasons for keeping livestock at times differ from 
commercial mindsets, and there is a strong aversion to reducing numbers (Allsopp et al., 2007: 750). 
However, this does not suggest that communal institutions do not need government interventions, 
especially when there are cases of community management systems that result in the poor losing 
out to the non-poor. It suggests that community norms and rules can be as effective, and are as 
important, as formal, imposed management systems. 
 
What outsiders do not always recognise are the objectives of the management system and the 
factors that are driving those norms. The objectives of rangeland management in communal areas is 
generally multipurpose (Cousins, 1999: 306); in other words, rangeland management is undertaken 
in a way that ensures that communal users  can take full advantage of  the multiple uses of land and 
its resources. As stated above, livestock have a number of different uses. Due to this, people try to 
maximise numbers of livestock (Shackleton, 1993: 70). Furthermore, because of this multipurpose 
character, high stocking rates make economic sense and may not be ecologically unsustainable 
(Cousins, 2000: 4). In Namaqualand, it was found that agricultural professionals ignore the reasons 
why people keep livestock and support only those people who are willing to commercialise their 
activities (Allsopp et al., 2007: 745). Furthermore, it was found that, even with high livestock 
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numbers, the productivity of the land has not changed in decades (Allsopp et al., 2007: 749). 
Therefore, it may be suggested that stocking densities are rational adaptations to the particular 
constraints, needs and objectives of the individual farmers (Benjaminsen et al., 2006: 531). 
 
 The reasons for keeping livestock and the multiple benefits of livestock suggest that “westernised” 
views of rangeland management may be inappropriate for communal areas (Allsopp et al., 2007: 
750). Communal farming methods are criticised and abandoned for conventional scientific ways of 
management; for example through leaseholds and the enforcement of stocking rates and rotational 
grazing systems (May & Lahiff, 2007). These systems are viewed as superior ways of avoiding the 
“tragedy” and are used to justify “privatisation” of communal and common land (Lebert & Rohde, 
2007: 827). As indicated by Mashinini & de Villiers (2004: 40), some analysts believe that communal 
rangeland management can lead to sustainability, equity and good governance because local 
institutions are involved. However, commercial forms of management such as fixed stocking rates 
and rotational grazing is advocated strongly for communal rangeland management or for the 
management of common property resources (Benjaminsen et al., 2006: 530).  
 
Lebert & Rohde (2007) build a strong case against conventional rangeland management of the 
commons in Namaqualand. Indeed, strong voices of protest against “privatisation” and commercial 
management systems flow from this semi-arid region of the Northern Cape (see, for example, 
Benjaminsen et al., 2006; Lebert & Rohde, 2007). The tendency to sub-divide pieces of commonage 
land to lease out to the highest bidder is seen as a form of “privatisation”; and these pieces of land 
are often “captured” by the less poor or wealthier members of the communities in Namaqualand 
(Lebert & Rohde, 2007: 823). This has been intensified by the creation of management committees 
who are made up of wealthier and elite members of the community and who are able to wield their 
power to gain access to these individualised camps (Benjaminsen et al., 2006: 535). Lebert & Rohde 
(2007: 832) concluded that the narratives of degradation and commercial rangeland management 
are biased against the poor.   
 
In a similar vein, some analysts believe that there is a poor understanding amongst commonage 
managers and stakeholders about the multiple benefits of commonage; benefits that extend beyond 
commercial activities such as livestock keeping (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 17). In fact, commercial 
and communal farmers have contrasting management aims (Benjaminsen et al., 2006: 529); which 
could also include contrasting aims between subsistence communal farming and commercial 
communal farming. In a study done on Grahamstown commonage in the Eastern Cape, it was 
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suggested that there are very different goals and production methods between farmers who want to 
farm commercially versus those farmers who farm for their subsistence needs (Davenport & 
Gambiza, 2008: 6). Although there was low commercial production of cattle, some farmers had very 
large herds, whilst the majority had very small herds (Davenport & Gambiza, 2008: 5).  
 
A better understanding of commonage use, and the management goals which drive use, will inform 
the management decisions that are undertaken and the geographical and ecological situation of the 
land acquired for commonage purposes (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 17). However, this is not 
suggesting that conventional rangeland management methods, such as stocking rates, should be 
ignored. Discussions about land management prove to be a sensitive matter, considering that land is 
a contentious issue in South Africa. However, in the light of climate change and food security issues, 
management may need to take into account more conservative methods of livestock production, 
because it is uncertain how changing rainfall and weather patterns may affect the commons in South 
Africa. Furthermore, livestock owners may need to make allowances for other commonage uses, 
especially where grazing may impact on the natural resources available to people. Lastly, although 
communal farming methods may be considered ecologically “sustainable”, because the main use of 
the land (grazing) can continue despite heavy stocking densities, it may result in reduced biodiversity 
on the commons which impact on other uses of the land. For instance, biodiversity may be essential 
for livelihood provisioning, such as the collection of medicinal plants, and for eco-system services, 
such as water retention, soil stabilisation and carbon sequestration. These services accrue to non-
users of commonages and are, therefore, beneficial to everyone.  
 
In addition to the above, “privatisation” of the commons should not be seen in such a negative light, 
but should rather be viewed as individualisation of land. Individualisation of land should not be 
considered the same as privatisation of the land, although it may be similar. Privatisation equates to 
individual ownership that is more formal than individualisation and in most instances has a long-
term and legal basis. As will be demonstrated later, there is a continuum of property regimes, and 
individualisation will fit somewhere between private land and public land.  
 
Furthermore, leases are not a form of privatisation, because leases can be revoked after a set time 
has passed. Privatisation is not, therefore, a consequence of leaseholds, or the enforcement of 
stocking rates, rotational grazing systems or individualisation because privatisation requires legal 
enforcement. Even though it may lead to individualisation, outside interventions into rangeland 
management may be necessary, and the enforcement of conventional practices, having been used 
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for decades elsewhere, may prove to be more appropriate in some contexts than informal 
management practices. The enforcement of lease systems and conventional management systems 
may also prove to be the most beneficial for poor people. For example, it allows the poor access to 
land, it prevents elite capture, if it is fairly enforced, and it also ensures that the land continues to 
provide in a productive manner for decades to come.  
 
2.5.1. Property Rights under Commonage Systems 
Throughout commonages in South Africa, rights allocation processes, which determine who has 
access to commonage land and how much of the resources they are allowed to extract, are non-
existent or poorly developed and the structures for administration of land rights is not in place 
before land is transferred to municipalities (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 16). Although the DLA 
advocates a lease agreement scheme for commonage access and use, the DLA is now acknowledging 
that, although formal agreements are necessary for compliance with environmental regulations, 
user agreements may also be necessary to implement (DLA, 2005: 21). User agreements are 
agreements whereby a fee per head of livestock is paid to the municipality, as opposed to a fee per 
portion of land. Poor rights allocation processes has resulted in many poor residents, and especially 
women, not benefitting equally from commonage access (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 10). 
Furthermore, the emergent farmer focus of new commonage restricts access of the poor and new 
members of towns to commonages in Namaqualand (Anseeuw & Laurent, 2007: 669). For example, 
in Leliefontein in Namaqualand, it was found that the “privatisation” of new commonage farms for 
emerging farmers resulted in only a few members of the farming community benefitting from access 
and use (Lebert, 2004: 29).  
 
Unfortunately, as found in the Namaqualand example, and supported by Bennett & Barrett (2007), 
common property resource management by communities, without any outside control, can intensify 
the elite capture and privatisation (individualisation) of the commons. In times of population growth 
and technological change, there may not even be a minimum of common property resource 
management and this can lead to a system of open-access with elements of privatisation (Bennett & 
Barrett, 2007). Privatisation is not new to southern Africa; it is occurring throughout the region due 
to appropriation of land by individuals and as a response to competition for resources (Bennett & 
Barrett, 2007: 109). As one can see from the Namaqualand example, this does not lead to equity. In 
Lesotho, it was found that membership or grazing fees led to the marginalisation of the very poor 
(Mashinini & de Villiers, 2004: 43). Furthermore, tenure reform in the form of privatisation of pieces 
of land can create more problems than it solves (Ainslie, 2002: 10). As Mashinini & de Villiers (2004: 
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40) indicate, the poor performance of communal rangeland management is often due to conflicts in 
and outside of the community. By interfering in the management structures at community level, the 
incidences of conflict could intensify and one group may benefit more than another (Allsopp et al., 
2007: 751).  
 
The question now arises as to what property regime may be more appropriate for managing 
commonage land. Thornton (2008: 4) stresses the need for flexible land ownership options in peri-
urban settings in the Eastern Cape town of Peddie; whereby low intensity cultivation in individual or 
community gardens can take place. Leases can lead to de facto privatisation of the commons as was 
found in Namaqualand (Lebert, 2004; Lebert & Rohde, 2007). However, systems of co-management, 
the parties being users and municipalities, has also proved to be a flawed system because of issues 
with the commonage management committees, as stated above (Lebert, 2004: 29). As Bennett & 
Barrett (2007: 109) reveal, common property resource management is not as straightforward as one 
would suppose. Common property regimes are vulnerable in South Africa, and this leads to 
ecological degradation, spontaneous enclosure of resources and elite capture (Cousins, 2000: 5). 
These systems are sometimes dominated by open-access and private tenure (through elite capture), 
which is often a result of increasing pressure for the resources to provide for increasing numbers of 
people and for commercial ventures (Bennett & Barrett, 2007: 108). However, as this thesis will 
reveal later, managing commonage as a common property resource may be best for equity and 
efficient use of the resource; but only if the management system is adapted to suit the needs of the 
social-ecological system as is the case of adaptive co-management. 
 
2.6. Commonage as a Common-Pool Resource 
Property regimes fall somewhere within the continuum between the free-for-all regime of open-
access and the individualised regime of private property (Bromley & Cernea, 1989: 10). However, 
there are four main regimes that fall within the public or private domain (see Bromley & Cernea, 
1989; Vatn, 2007). Public domain regimes include state land (people acquire rights of use but not 
ownership), common property land (in which a number of people have rights to the land) or open-
access land (where no rights are conferred). Private domain land is private land, and the person or 
group who owns the land has the right to exclude others from access and use of the land. Van den 
Brink et al. (2006) feel that the extension of common property is public property (which extends the 
members from group to larger community size) and state property (which is property for the nation 
as a whole). Vatn (2007: 625) refers to state land as public land and notes that some property 
regimes are more distinct than others. 
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Commonage is described as a Common Pool Resource (DLA & DANCED, 2001; Benseler, 2004; Ingle, 
2006). Common Pool Resources are resources jointly used by a group of persons, referred to as a 
resource community (Husain & Bhattacharya, 2004: 201). The term Common Pool Resource is used 
to refer to the resource itself, rather than the arrangements that govern that resource (Dietz et al., 
2002). The term Common Property Resource (CPR) refers to how the resource is managed. 
Therefore, a resource is referred to as a CPR if it is managed as a resource that is common to many, 
dependent on rules that govern the collective (Dietz et al., 2002). Hence, a common property regime 
is defined as a set of institutional arrangements that define the conditions of access to, and control 
over, a range of benefits arising from collectively-used natural resources (Swallow & Bromley, 1995: 
100). This distinction is important because it indicates that Common Pool Resources are able to fall 
into open-access regimes and it also suggests that there are a wide range of common property 
regimes that govern Common Pool Resources (Swallow & Bromley, 1995: 100). Vatn (2007: 624) 
asserts that the different resource regimes, the institutional arrangements, will affect individuals’ 
behaviour, which will affect how people manage the resource. 
 
The definition of CPR, as stated above, allows for a wide range of institutional arrangements and 
governance structures (Swallow & Bromley, 1995: 100). Common property can be individualised or 
made private when strict rights of use to a piece of the land is assigned to an individual (van den 
Brink et al., 2006). As indicated by Bromley & Cernea (1989: 15) and van den Brink et al. (2006), 
common property is private property for a group, as the group has rights to the land and the use of 
the land can be regulated. Common property is non-exclusive by nature and its characteristics 
include the difficulty in excluding others and the inherent ability of users to extract resources from 
the property (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997: 466). Every common property resource is different from the 
next and the way it is managed, therefore, changes too. 
 
Policy makers have, in the past, assumed that central state intervention, markets regulation or 
privatisation of resources are the ideal means by which to manage natural resources (Agrawal, 2002: 
44). However, new knowledge about common property management regimes suggests that under 
certain conditions, communal arrangements can compare favourably in terms of efficiency, equity 
and sustainability (Agrawal, 2002: 44). Therefore, policy makers are becoming more concerned with 
how rules impact on rights and powers of access, use, management, exclusion and transferability of 
natural resources (Agrawal, 2002: 44). This is allowing common property resource management to 
find a place within natural resource governance. 
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2.6.1. Introduction to Common Property Resource Theory 
The theory of Common Property has been constantly proved, disproved and adapted since its 
inception in the 1960s. Most of the theorists use, as their starting point, the famous paper by Garrett 
Hardin (Hardin, 1968) entitled “The Tragedy of the Commons”(Husain & Bhattacharya, 2004: 203). 
Hardin’s greatest rival in the Common Property Resource field is Elinor Ostrom, who has spent many 
years attempting to prove that Hardin’s belief that “the tragedy of the commons as a food basket is 
averted by private property” (Hardin, 1968: 1245) is not true, and that common property can be 
managed effectively, equitably and sustainably by institutions (Ostrom, 1990; van Laerhoven & 
Ostrom, 2007). Hardin’s rivals feel that he made the mistake of confusing “common property” with 
“open-access” when he states that “freedom in the commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin, 1968: 
1244). That is not to say that the “tragedy” is not an actual phenomenon; Hardin’s theory has been 
proved under certain limited conditions (van Laerhoven & Ostrom, 2007: 19). 
 
Ostrom, in her influential work on institutions, set out eight principles for effective institutional 
governance of Common Pool Resources (Ostrom, 1990: 91). She uses these to describe the scenario 
where the “tragedy” can be avoided and, since then, researchers have critiqued these principles 
using case studies where Common Property Resource management has worked or not worked. The 
principles are best used to describe the situation of the Common Pool Resource. Therefore, the 
principles are a useful tool for assessing the management of commonage at a local, situational level. 
However, the following sub-section will show that the focus on institutions at a local level ignores 
contextual factors that, should these factors be left out from CRP research, would give us an 
incomplete appreciation for how institutions govern CPR.   
 
2.6.2. Contextualism 
Common Property Resource theory has adapted over the years in response to criticisms from a 
school of theorists called Contextualists. They believe that the focus of commons research on 
institutions is too shallow and that researchers should focus more broadly on outside influences. As 
described below, another criticism of commons research is that theorists have yet to fully develop a 
theory of what makes sustainable common property resource management (Agrawal, 2001: 1651). 
Contextualists believe that it is important, for advancements in Common Property Resource theory, 
that contextual factors are always considered, as it gives a more complete picture of CPR 
management (Edwards & Steins, 1998: 2).  
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Recent work by Agrawal (2007) summarises the variables that are important to focus on when 
considering successful resource governance. The important variables are the characteristics of the 
resource system, the characteristics of the users, the characteristics of the institutional 
arrangements and the nature of the external environment (Agrawal, 2007: 119). The final variable is 
important, as it relates to the context of the Common Pool Resource. Demographic, cultural, 
technological and market related factors, the nature of the state agencies, the level of involvement 
by other actors and the forces such as Non-Governmental Organisations and international aid flows 
all impact on Common Property Resource management (Agrawal, 2007: 124).  Here he is supporting 
the theorist, Pauline Peters, who, as an advocate of the Contextualism school, believes that 
institutions are “socially embedded” (Peters, 1987: 34); in other words, that one cannot ignore the 
social, political, power and economic context in which a Common Pool Resource is entrenched.  
 
There is a distinction made between internal and external contextual factors. The internal or local 
factors influence how people act and the external or remote factors determine the supply and 
demand for a resource (Edwards & Steins, 1998: 3). In a commons situation, the users and uses 
interact in a complex manner and one must distinguish between different institutions at play and 
the various direct and indirect uses that emanate from a resource. This is an exercise that is difficult 
when one considers that the researcher must be sensitive to the physical, technical, social and 
institutional arrangements governing a resource (Edwards & Steins, 1998: 10). In reality there is a 
‘Contextual Factors Continuum’ (Husain & Bhattacharya, 2004: 203) which further complicates the 
process of research. This continuum refers to “ a series of relationships linking remote with local 
contextual factors…which implies that remote and local contextual factors may mutually enforce 
changes in the system…” (Husain & Bhattacharya, 2004: 203). Although contextual studies may 
prove complicated, Agrawal (2001: 1662) feels that, should a researcher fail to look at the causal 
factors (the context) of their study, they may fail to apply the correct method to their research.  
 
2.6.3. Governance and Management  in Common Property Resource Theory 
The subtleties between Institutionalism and Contextualism are very important for this thesis. When 
considering management of Common Pool Resources it is important to consider the institutional 
structures that create the rules of the game; which is how Institutionalism works. However, 
Contextualism considers how the management structures (institutions) are influenced by their 
embeddedness in broader processes; that is, in the governance structures that determine the 
creation of the rules of the game. These differences in meaning are especially important for showing 
that case studies on common property management must be viewed in light of the social, historical, 
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political and economic structures which determine how these broader structures (governance 
structures) shape the rules that are played out on the ground. As will be argued later, the capacity to 
manage natural resources effectively is reliant on the broader structures that determine the actions 
of individuals. Hence, management must always be viewed in the context in which it is embedded.  
 
At this point is necessary to elaborate on the concepts of governance and management. 
“Management” can be understood as the day-to-day activities that are guided by operational rules 
and these are performed under the umbrella of collective choice rules (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005: 70). 
These collective choice rules are developed by the governance system and can refer to the laws, 
regulations, debates, negotiations, conflict resolutions, elections, public consultations, protests and 
other decisions making processes that are part of the governance system (Lebel et al., 2006: 20). 
“Governance” means creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action through 
structures and process by which people can make decisions and share power (Folke et al., 2005: 
444). Carlsson & Berkes (2005: 70) refers to governance as the setting of rules, and the application 
and enforcement of those rules. Management is thereafter considered the way that these rules are 
implemented on a day-to-day basis. Governance is not the sole pursuit of government but emerges 
through the interaction of many actors; it can be formally institutionalised or carried out through 
subtle norms (Lebel et al., 2006: 20). 
 
2.7. Co-Management of the Commons 
Co-management is a new intellectual tradition in natural resource management (Plummer & 
Armitage, 2006) 62) and has emerged due to blending of both practice (decentralisation in natural 
resource management) and theory (Common Property Resource theory) (Plummer & FitzGibbon, 
2004a: 63). Co-management is, therefore, almost solely associated with Common Property Resource 
management (Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2004a: 67). It is a response to natural resource management 
challenges (Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2004a: 63) and aims to link local communities and government 
(Armitage et al., 2007: 1). Co-management was advocated by Fikret Berkes in his earlier work, where 
he recognised the limitations of purely national-level management and purely local-level 
management (Berkes, 1997: 5) and the conflict between them (Berkes, 1994: 18). At the time, co-
management was defined broadly as “an integration of local- and state-level systems” (Berkes, 1994: 
18), the function of which is to “encourage partnerships” (Berkes, 1997: 6).  
 
What was recognised then, and is a idea that still exists, was that co-management could have a 
variety of possible arrangements with various degrees of power sharing (Berkes, 1994; Pomeroy & 
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Berkes, 1997: 466). Co-management is considered a middle ground between pure state control and 
pure communal control (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997: 467). Carlsson & Berkes (2005) explain that there 
are different levels of participation and shared responsibilities and power, which are indicative of 
the continuum of co-management regimes that exist in practice. This continuum shows the different 
kinds of partnerships that communities can enter into with the state, from a simple exchange of 
information to a formal partnership (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005: 66). As Plummer & FitzGibbon (2004b: 
70) show, co-management requires that a number of actors take part in a power sharing process; 
therefore, co-management is multi-dimensional and complex. Hence, many definitions of co-
management fail to capture the complexity, variation and dynamic nature of these systems (Carlsson 
& Berkes, 2005: 67).   
 
Co-management is a special type of governance (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005: 67) because co-
management can be described as a network of actors involved in the management of natural 
resources across scales (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005: 70). Dietz et al. (2003) uses the concept of 
governance to expand the management focus to the broader social contexts that enable the 
management to take place (Folke et al., 2005: 444). Therefore, co-management is a process that is 
embedded in a wider social and institutional context (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005: 69).  
 
Van Laerhoven & Ostrom (2007: 11) refer to the emerging issues of the commons. These are issues 
related to new understandings of complexity, uncertainty and institutions. For example, co-
management systems are vulnerable to external drivers and are insufficient to deal with cross-scale 
challenges (Berkes, 2006: 54). Scale-related complexities include: complexity at the level of the 
community, the existence of externalities, the problem of mismatch of the resources and 
institutional boundaries, and the necessity of the management system to deal with these (Berkes, 
2006) 47). Hence, theories of co-management have been evolving for some time and theorists are 
becoming influenced by new understandings of social-ecological systems (SES).  
 
Social-ecological systems occur where there is a coupling of social organisations with resource 
conditions (Nayak, 2004: 7). Uncertainty is inherent in any SES (Armitage, 2005: 712) which is 
characterised by non-linear dynamics and evolves across temporal and spatial scales (Folke, 2007: 
14). Furthermore, social-ecological systems have multiple outcomes and limited predictability 
(Olsson et al., 2004a: 76). Therefore, they are referred to as complex adaptive systems (Olsson et al., 
2004a: 76). This indicates that they have the capacity to adapt and change in the face of complexity 
and uncertainty (Armitage, 2005: 74). Hence, complexity scientists are interested in how the world is 
50 
 
constantly adapting and changing in response to environmental feedback (Plummer & Armitage, 
2006: 64). 
 
This ability to adapt and change in certain circumstances is referred to as the resilience of the system 
(Folke et al., 2005: 444). However, as Folke (2007: 14) warns, the adaptive capacity of these systems 
can be eroded by incorrect governance systems that ignore crucial ecological functions of the system 
in the urge to fulfil social or economic goals. This is because social and ecological systems are 
intricately linked and their management requires an interdisciplinary undertaking (Folke, 2007: 14). 
Hence, theorists of natural resource management recognise that these systems of co-management 
need to build resilience both in the social and the ecological system. The result is a new governance 
system referred to as an adaptive co-management system. Adaptive co-management is a system of 
management that responds to SES dynamics and helps to increase the ability of the system to adapt 
(Olsson et al., 2004a: 87). 
 
2.7.1. Adaptive Co-Management of the Commons  
Adaptive co-management systems are flexible community-based systems of resource management 
tailored to specific places and situations and supported by, and working with, various organisations 
at different levels (Olsson et al., 2004a: 75). Nayak (2004: 4) views the management approach as 
dynamic, conscious, context-specific, evolutionary and responsive to change. Adaptive co-
management combines the dynamic learning process that is characteristic of adaptive management 
and the linkage characteristic of co-management (Folke et al., 2005: 448; Olsson et al., 2004a: 75). 
Adaptive co-management is also referred to adaptive governance.  
 
The development of adaptive co-management systems requires either that new organisations are 
crafted, or that a process of self-organisation takes place (Olsson et al., 2004a: 83). However, the 
environment must be conducive to the creation of these management systems (Nayak, 2004: 5). 
Certain factors play an important role in enabling the self-organisation process (Olsson et al., 2004a):  
 Leadership and trust building 
 An enabling environment that requires devolution of power and decision making 
 Funding 
 Monitoring of environmental feedback by the community 
 Information flows and social network building 
 Combination of various sources of information 
 Senses making of knowledge 
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 Arenas for collaborative learning 
 
2.7.2. Adaptive Co-Management and Commonage  
This thesis will argue that commonage is currently poorly managed, which is linked in complex ways 
to an environment of natural resource governance that is both inequitable and inefficient. 
Furthermore, the governance system that creates the context for commonage management is 
hampering effective management due to substantial social problems in South Africa and 
management bodies (local municipalities) with little financial capacity and manpower. However, 
without proper institutional arrangements, commonage, as a natural resource, will lose productivity 
and will fail to provide for the poor into the future. Commonage has the potential to address food 
security and poverty relief, but only at a household level. However, with an effective emerging 
farmer programme, it can be an asset in the creation of a new class of black commercial farmers and 
support the Land Reform Programme currently embarked upon in South Africa. Land Reform in 
South Africa is currently experiencing many difficulties. Commonage can help to address the goals of 
increasing national food security and reducing poverty, as well as “deracialising” land ownership 
patterns.  
 
Thus, it is crucial for commonage to be managed efficiently and for a system to be developed that 
ensures that commonage contributes to the Land Reform Programme. Therefore, commonage must 
be expanded to ensure that the expanding poor urban populace have access to the products and 
services that the resource produces. Secondly, commonage should be incorporated into a rural 
development programme which includes the expansion of a land rental market. In this way, those 
emerging farmers who would like to graduate to commercial small-holdings are able to do so 
without experiencing the risks associated with large-scale commercial farming.  
 
In order for commonage to be able to embrace the goals of both efficiency and equity, it should be 
managed as a common property resource. Currently, commonage is subject to open-access natural 
resource harvesting practices. Current arrangements for co-management of commonage may work 
in theory, but not in practice. An adaptive co-management approach must be adopted in order to 
transform the current system of management into one that is sustainable and resilient. Actors 
involved in adaptive co-management must recognise the multiple uses of commonage, embrace the 
needs and aspirations of the community, link commonage users with higher governance bodies and 
learn through adaptation. This will create a meaningful system of resource governance. 
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Transformation into an adaptive co-management system will require those ingredients as advocated 
by Olsson et al. (2004a). 
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3. Study area 
3.1. Eastern Cape Province 
The Eastern Cape Province, situated on the eastern seaboard of South Africa, has the highest 
incidence of poverty out of the nine provinces in the country (Lahiff, 2003; Nauta, 2004). It is the 
third largest Province in South Africa with a population of 6.4 million in 2001 (CSIR, 2004: chapter 1). 
The region is constituted by a Xhosa-speaking majority, who are largely rural based and who depend 
on the land and its resources to supplement their household needs, and are still highly dependent 
on government grants (Lahiff, 2003). The province is made up of two former homelands, namely the 
former Transkei and Ciskei. The creation of these “Buntustans” during the Apartheid era led to the 
forced settlement of thousands of individuals in these areas, resulting in high population densities 
and land shortages (Nauta, 2004). Thus, historical inequalities enduring from the Apartheid era have 
contributed to a land-hungry populace. Over 48% of the people in the province are living in poverty 
conditions, whilst over 59% of arable land is in the hands of white commercial farmers (Lahiff, 2003).  
 
The Eastern Cape Province has the highest number of biomes and vegetation types out of all the 
provinces in South Africa (CSIR, 2004: chapter 5). It has many sensitive and conservation-worthy 
areas in the region which are under threat from alien vegetation, erosion, pollution and poor land-
use practices (CSIR, 2004: chapter 5). Due to the special and varied environment in the Eastern Cape, 
there are opportunities for improving economic development; however, these are constrained by 
insufficient physical and human capital resulting from the high incidence of poverty and 
unemployment (CSIR, 2004: chapter 5). Economic development is also constrained by poor 
institutions, lack of management skills, local political tensions and an inadequate fiscal base. 
 
In the last few years the Eastern Cape has experienced mass migrations of rural people to towns and 
cities in the Province in search of employment (Nauta, 2004). This can be partly attributed to the 
large-scale eviction of thousands of farm workers following new labour and land rights (Nauta, 
2004). For example, under the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA), many farmers feared that 
their workers would have too many rights, including the right not to be evicted, and farmers pre-
emptively evicted farm workers before these workers’ security of tenure could be established. Other 
drivers of labour shedding included global economic competition, lack of tariff protection and the 
lack of government subsidies for agriculture, which resulted in farming becoming a difficult and 
costly business. Other drivers of urbanisation are the droughts of the 1980’s which preceded more 
farm evictions, the retrenchment of migrant workers from mines and the ending of influx control 
laws following the new political dispensation (Higginbottom et al., 1995). The abolition of the 
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discriminatory land laws has allowed people more freedom of movement, and many rural people are 
moving to urban areas seeking jobs and a better quality of life. This mass migration to urban centres 
has resulted in the establishment of informal settlements in the peri-urban spaces and some 
settlements are situated on commonage land (Higginbottom et al., 1995). These informal 
settlements are poorly serviced, compared to the well-serviced urban areas of the Eastern Cape 
(CSIR, 2004).  
 
In two of the towns in the study area, Grahamstown and Bathurst, migration was occurring in the 
1940s (Manona, 1988: 95). This is attributed to farms becoming mechanised and fewer jobs being  
available for black Africans, who then chose to seek employment in urban centres (Manona, 1988: 
95). As the town of Grahamstown expanded, it attracted more and more black people to its fringes 
and adjacent farms. These people brought cattle with them and attempted cultivation in 
surrounding areas (Manona, 1988: 96). This trend led to, firstly, an emphasis on the reform of urban 
land, to allow opportunities for black people to settle in towns, and secondly, increased demand for 
peri-urban land in order to engage in agricultural practices (Marcus et al., 1996). 
 
Today, the former homeland areas of the Eastern Cape are subject to social, economic, political and 
ecological problems (Nauta, 2004). The formal employment sector is in decline and people are 
turning to land-based activities to obtain a livelihood (Lahiff, 2003: 36). With limited land suitable for 
cultivation and water being a constraint to commercial and communal agriculture, the predominant 
farming occupation is livestock (Marcus et al., 1996). Another constraint to communal land-based 
activities is massive land degradation resulting from soil erosion and overgrazing (CSIR, 2004: 
chapter 9). The agricultural sector is still largely dominated by rural women who have to overcome 
problems of drought, erosion and inland winter frost, as well as stock theft, in order to engage in 
productive subsistence farming (Nauta, 2004). Subsistence agriculture is the most predominant form 
of agriculture (CSIR, 2004: chapter 9) but contributes a small percentage (2%) to the Gross 
Geographic Product of the Eastern Cape (Marcus et al., 1996).  
 
The redistributive Land Reform projects in the Eastern Cape are dominated by SLAG and LRAD 
projects (Jacobs et al., 2003: 8). Land Reform is largely dependent on the Department of Land Affairs 
and local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to steer the various projects. These bodies have 
proved to be innovative and fairly successful, although they have been hampered by various 
constraints that are affecting Land Reform projects in other areas of the country (Lahiff, 2003). This 
has led Lahiff (2003: 43) to conclude that, although the NGO sector is involved in meaningful work, 
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their work, and that of the government departments’ is failing to show real benefits to communities. 
Slow and unsuccessful Land Reform have impacted on the development and management of the 
land in the Province and large tracts of land is poorly utilised and unproductive (CSIR, 2004: chapter 
9). Approximately 51% of the Province’s land is unmanaged and 11% of the land is severely degraded 
(CSIR, 2004: chapter 9). Furthermore, although only 30% of the land in the Eastern Cape is 
communally owned, while 66.5% is privately owned, most of the severely degraded land is in the 
communal areas (CSIR, 2004: chapter 9). 
 
Commonage land is predominantly found in the Western, Eastern and Northern Cape and Free State 
regions of South Africa. Commonage in the Eastern Cape consists of thousands of hectares of peri-
urban land and is an important livelihood asset for many poor residents in towns all through the 
province (Higginbottom et al., 1995). There has been no study done to determine the number of 
hectares of commonage that exists in the Province but it can be safe to assume that a large number 
of towns have commonage land available to them. As mentioned before, commonage is being 
encroached upon by informal settlements; however, it is also being used for recreational, 
agricultural and consumptive purposes (Higginbottom et al., 1995), as well as for residential, cultural 
and conservation purposes. There is an increasing demand for land for cultivation purposes, to 
supplement household income, and for settlement purposes. These livelihood and agricultural needs 
emphasise the increasing importance of land in peri-urban areas. However, the Eastern Cape 
government has been slow in emphasising the use of commonage and peri-urban land for poverty 
alleviation projects (Cocks et al., 2002: 389). To understand the importance of commonage in the 
towns of the Eastern Cape, indeed the towns within the study area, it is necessary to recognise the 
socio-economic and political context of the towns and districts. 
 
3.2. The study sites 
The research was conducted in three study sites with their own unique circumstances. However, 
because they are situated in the Eastern Cape, there are similarities in the social-political, economic 
and cultural context in which they are found. Nonetheless, it is important to consider each site in 
isolation before looking at their similarities. The three towns under discussion are Bathurst, Fort 
Beaufort and Grahamstown. The study sites were isolated using municipal boundaries. As per the 
tiered structure of the municipal system in South Africa, each study site falls into the jurisdiction of a 
Local Municipality (LM), which in turn falls within the jurisdiction of a higher-order District 
Municipality (DM). See figure 1 for details of where the study sites are located in South Africa. 
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Figure 1: Map showing the locality of the study sites 
 
3.2.1. Cacadu District Municipality  
Grahamstown and Bathurst are situated within the Makana Local Municipality and Ndlambe Local 
Municipality respectively. These Local Municipalities are further situated within the jurisdiction of 
the Cacadu District Municipality. The Cacadu district is dominated by semi-desert Karoo, although its 
climate ranges from mild conditions with moderate rainfall on the coast, to harsh conditions with 
low rainfall in the Karoo or interior (Cacadu, 2007: 47). Due to erratic rainfall conditions, the 
vegetation can only support extensive grazing on large farms, and economic development in the 
district is reliant on agriculture and tourism (Cacadu, 2007: 49).  
 
Small rural towns are scattered around the landscape of Cacadu; however, urbanisation to affluent 
bigger centres is on the rise because the labour demand on large commercial farms is decreasing. 
This is resulting in the establishment of large informal settlements on the outskirts of towns and 
subsequent land and housing backlogs (Cacadu, 2007: 45). The district is plagued by a high 
unemployment rate of 20.5%, a high population growth rate of 2% (higher than the provincial and 
national rates), water shortages and a significant proportion of people dependent on social grants 
(Cacadu, 2007: 14). The web of scattered rural towns is proving a hindrance for service delivery, 
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because funding for infrastructure have to be spread out thinly and existing infrastructure cannot 
meet current demands (Cacadu, 2007: 48). The Cacadu IDP (2007: 30) acknowledges that there is a 
strong need to support local municipalities in the district and build up their capacity for 
development. However, both Makana and Ndlambe are considered last on the priority list of towns 
to support, presumably because they are better developed than other local municipalities in the 
district.  
 
3.2.1.1. Makana Local Municipality  
The Makana Local Municipality consists of three large towns; namely, Grahamstown, Alicedale and 
Riebeeck-East. It is an agriculturally-orientated region with various state reserves (nearly a million 
hectares are devoted to private and state-run game reserves) interspersed with game, beef, goat 
and ostrich farms (Makana, 2008: 21). The Makana Local Municipality has a significant proportion of 
the population of the district and is experiencing the highest housing backlog and the highest 
unemployment rate in the region (Cacadu, 2007: 15). Only 42% of the population is economically 
active and nearly 66% of these people have no income (Makana, 2008: 13). Unemployment has 
increased significantly from 1996 to 2001, whilst employment has decreased (Makana, 2008: 13). 
Furthermore, there is a 33% illiteracy rate in the area, and a dependency ratio of 5 people to every 1 
working person (Makana, 2008: 173). The people in the Makana region are getting poorer faster 
than the rate of the province and the Local Municipality is feeling the pressure of providing more 
houses and services; especially because Makana is the key node for urbanisation in Cacadu (Makana, 
2008).  
 
3.2.1.2. Ndlambe Local Municipality 
The Ndlambe Local Municipality consists of 9 wards and approximately 27 settlements, the largest of 
which are Port Alfred, Bathurst, Alexandria and Kenton-on-sea (Ndlambe, 2007: 29). The Local 
Municipality is grappling with the problem of a large influx of farm workers into the urban areas, 
which has resulted in an increased demand for social and public service provision (Ndlambe, 2007: 
14). The region is also experiencing high poverty levels (63% of population live in poverty) and nearly 
60% of households receive social grants (Ndlambe, 2007: 15). Bathurst is described as a meeting-
point between urban and rural, due to the extent of agriculture bordering on the town and due to 
the number of small-holdings in the town (MAFA, 2006: 4). Like many apartheid towns, Bathurst 
consists of a black township and a white town (MAFA, 2006: 19). The township settlement of 
Bathurst, called Nolukhanyo, has a high number of female-headed households and has one of the 
highest numbers of people in the Local Municipality earning under R800 a month (Ndlambe, 2007: 
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41). However, the area has a number of positive attributes and good potential for tourism 
development. It has a pristine coastal area with low residential development, and well preserved 
river mouths and diverse vegetation types. 
 
3.2.2. Amathole District Municipality 
The area of the Amathole District Municipality encompasses some of the lands of the former 
Transkei and Ciskei homelands, as well as old Cape Provincial land, known as the “border area” 
(Amathole, 2006: 43). The District Municipality contains 25.9% of the Eastern Cape’s population, 
comprises of eight local municipalities, and has a high population of black Africans (92% of the 
population), who are found mostly in the rural and peri-urban areas. The poverty levels are high in 
the Amathole district, and have increased since 1996. Many of the rural municipalities show 
alarming rates of poverty and unemployment, especially those in the former homeland areas 
(Amathole, 2006; Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006: 308). There is also massive urbanisation occurring 
and poverty levels are increasing in areas outside of the major city centres of King Williams Town 
and East London (Amathole, 2006: 33). More than 80% of households have an average annual 
income of less than R18 000. The area has a very good agricultural potential, but this is 
underdeveloped, contributes little to formal employment, and this potential is being superseded by 
the game industry (Amathole, 2006: 131). The people in Amathole depend, to a large extent, on 
government grants and subsistence agriculture (Amathole, 2006: 131). 
 
3.2.2.1. Nkonkobe Local Municipality 
Nkonkobe Local Municipality is located in Amathole District Municipality and comprises three major 
towns, Alice, Fort Beaufort and Middledrift, as well as numerous smaller settlement zones, peri-
urban settlements and rural areas (Amathole, 2006: 23). It is the second largest local municipality in 
the Eastern Cape, and Fort Beaufort is the most densely populated town in the region (Nkonkobe, 
2007: 6). Fort Beaufort is an agricultural town with a population of approximately 20 000 people 
(Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006: 308). The eastern portion of the Local Municipality is situated in the 
former homeland state of the Transkei; and due to this legacy, there is massive underdevelopment, 
high levels of unemployment and poverty and poor service provision (Shackleton & Shackleton, 
2006; Nkonkobe, 2007: 11). The population is dominated by Black Africans (95% of the population) 
who are largely rural dwellers. People in Nkonkobe rely heavily on social grants because 74% of the 
population has no income at all (Nkonkobe, 2007: 12). The agricultural sector in the area has been in 
decline for a number of years and people are dependent on government to fund agricultural 
projects, even though many LRAD initiatives in the area are failing (Nkonkobe, 2007: 22). However, 
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there are a few emerging farmers in the area who are leasing citrus farms (Shackleton & Shackleton, 
2006: 308). The Local Municipality is gearing towards the tourism market, with major plans to 
upgrade tourism facilities and create new tourism centres (Nkonkobe, 2007). 
 
3.2.3. General Characteristics of the towns 
Each study site is an urban area experiencing the following generalities: 
1. The towns are situated in a province that is economically poor, but has immeasurable 
ecological wealth that has potential to improve the lives of its people. It has a relatively 
benign climate with significant and regular rainfall. 
2. The towns exist in a province that has a large communal populace and there are strong 
economic and social links between the rural and urban areas. 
3. The towns have a large poverty-stricken populace and a spirit of dependency; a result of 
previous racially discriminating practices. Consequently, people depend on social grants. 
4. The towns are experiencing mass urbanisation and, due to the agricultural nature of the 
surrounding rural areas, have many ex-farm workers in their resident populace. 
5. There is limited employment, huge service backlogs and an increasing reliance on social 
grants. Many of these problems persist in the peri-urban fringes of the towns. 
6. The economy of the area is reliant on tourism and the renewal of the agricultural sector, 
which is expected to contribute to economic growth. 
7. People tend to rely on the municipalities to improve their lives, but the municipalities are 
struggling to do so because of limited fiscal and human resources. 
 
3.2.4. Town Commonage 
The study sites of Grahamstown, Fort Beaufort and Bathurst fall under the old Cape Province and 
each has land that is considered “old commonage”. The following map (see figure 2) of the towns 
was created showing the extent of commonage in the Transitional Local Council (TLC) period (1994-
2000) and, hence, is inaccurate. Details about the latest commonage boundaries were assembled 
from key informant interviews, and in the case of Bathurst, from the MAFA document and mapping 
exercise (MAFA, 2006). It was impossible to get GIS boundary lines because the Local Municipalities 
did not have their own maps of the commonage.  
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Figure 2: Map of the traditional commonages during the TLC period (1994-2000) 
 
3.2.4.1. Grahamstown 
The Grahamstown municipal commonage covers approximately 8741 ha of land surrounding the city 
of Grahamstown. According to Bates (pers. comm., 2008) the commonage in Grahamstown was 
expanded in 1994, and also in 2002. In 1994, two farms were purchased, totalling 1766 ha, and six 
new farms, totalling 2920 ha, were bought in the Northern area of the town in 2002. This is referred 
to as “new commonage” land. “Old commonage” consists of approximately 4397 ha of land, which 
has been owned by the Grahamstown municipality since the establishment of the town in the early 
1800s (Puttick, 2007: 7). According to Puttick (2007: 7) the commonage falls within four vegetation 
biomes; grassland, thicket, karoo and fynbos, and is, therefore, biologically diverse. The rainfall 
season is all year round, even though it is unreliable (Puttick, 2007: 7). According to Bates (pers. 
comm., 2008), there are approximately 2000 head of cattle on the commonage. 
 
3.2.4.2. Fort Beaufort 
The extent of the commonage is Fort Beaufort is unknown to the Municipality but, according to a 
Master’s student it is approximately 2350 ha (Dube pers. comm., 2009). According to Trollope (pers. 
comm., 2008) the extent of commonage in Fort Beaufort has decreased since the TLC period. 
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Although he was unable to point out the boundary lines, he indicated that southern sections of the 
commonage were sold to a farmer and to the local agricultural college. The land belonging to the 
agricultural college has been invaded by residents of Fort Beaufort and is currently used for grazing 
(Trollope pers. comm., 2008). Mean annual rainfall in Fort Beaufort is 500 mm and the area’s 
vegetation consists of Eastern Thorn Bushveld, dominated by Acacia Karroo, and succulent thicket 
vegetation types (Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006: 308), which are presumably the type of vegetation 
types found on the commonage. The numbers of livestock currently grazing and browsing on the 
commonage is unknown in the literature, and the Nkonkobe Local Municipality is also unaware of 
numbers. 
 
3.2.4.3. Bathurst 
According to Higginbottom et al. (1995: 12), the Bathurst commonage consists of approximately 
3031 ha of Thicket and Grassland vegetation. However, according to MAFA document (2006: 6) the 
commonage is approximately 2900 ha. The boundaries of the Bathurst commonage has largely 
remained static since the early 1900s, except for the addition of 400 ha of “Erf 2” in 1924 (MAFA, 
2006: 6). The commonage is used mainly for grazing purposes and is largely unsuitable for cultivation 
(MAFA, 2006: 7). Bathurst has a mild subtropical climate, and the commonage consists of dense 
thicket vegetation with grasslands scattered in the flatter, middle sections (Higginbottom et al., 
1995: 12). In the time that Higginbottom et al. (1995) did their study, there was bush encroachment 
occurring (dominated by Acacia Karroo) and signs of soil erosion, indicators of overgrazing. 
According to Higginbottom et al. (1995: 19), the thicket vegetation on the commonage has high 
conservation potential and many different species of birds and animals live in the area, some of 
which are rare and endangered. According to MAFA (2006: 27), there are anywhere between 500-
700 head of cattle and 100-500 goats on the commonage, although numbers are estimated.  
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4. Methodology 
4.1. Important Considerations 
This research is largely influenced by the two important and interrelated considerations. The first 
consideration is that Common Property Resource theory was used to describe and critique 
commonage management and governance. Consideration of this theory impacted largely on the key 
questions and focus of the research. The second consideration is that the terms “governance” and 
“management” are regarded as having different meanings in this thesis, although they are words 
that are often used interchangeably in the literature. This distinction impacted on the methodology 
used to answer key questions regarding one or the other. Key questions regarding governance were 
largely answered through careful analysis of literature, although interviews were used to 
supplement governance questions about the study sites in particular. In contrast, interviews were 
largely used to gain insights into the management practices, at the local level, which are influenced 
by the governance structures at the local and higher level institutions.   
 
4.2. Research Design 
This research was conducted using a qualitative research design. According to Janse van Rensburg 
(2001: 1) research is influenced by the methodological approach of the researcher, which 
determines the method of research and the technique used. 
 
The methodological approach adopted for this work is Interpretivism. The Interpretivist researcher is 
interested in rich, detailed information of a qualitative nature, that can be interpreted in order to 
learn how people make meaning of phenomena (Janse van Rensburg, 2001: 16), in this case 
commonage. The methodology requires that the researcher try to adopt a neutral approach and no 
prior theory is established about the phenomena; rather, the researcher would seek to gain a better 
understanding of it through qualitative methods (Janse van Rensburg, 2001: 16). Being objective is a 
difficult task, and the researcher is likely to have established pre-conceived ideas about the 
phenomenon. Nonetheless, the researcher should strive for objectivity. The researcher must look at 
actions and interpret these actions as being influenced by certain intentions or ways of seeing the 
phenomena (Connole, 1993: 13). Through understanding the situation, the researcher can unravel 
the relationships and complexities of the phenomena being studied (Janse van Rensburg, 2001: 17).  
 
The research method consists of a case study analysis of three small towns in the Eastern Cape. 
Using the Interpretivist methodology, this method was used to gain an understanding of the 
management situation of each study site and how it is influenced by the governance framework. The 
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technique used to gain this understanding was through in-depth interviews with key stakeholders 
and informants. The second approach was through a desk-based literature review of commonage 
governance, land reform in South Africa, the historical, social and economic situation in which the 
study sites are embedded and the management of commonages in other parts of South Africa. 
 
The way that management bodies and individuals take action determines how commonage is 
managed. In other words, what Local Municipalities considered the purpose of commonage, what 
decisions were made about commonage and how they interacted with commonage users gives an 
indication of how commonage is managed. The question of governance of commonages was 
investigated in existing policy and literature. Furthermore, by investigating policy and literature, and 
through interviews, it is possible to understand how management takes place and how it is 
influenced by broader institutional and governance context.  
 
This study method supports the Contextualism School in Common Property Resource Theory (see for 
example, Edwards & Steins, 1998; Agrawal, 2007). The Contextualist approach allows the researcher 
to determine the environment in which Common Pool Resource management takes place; and it 
allows the researcher to look at the layers of institutional, social, ecological, political and economic 
structures that determine how commonage management is conducted (Edwards & Steins, 1998: 1). 
 
4.2.1. Desk-based Literature Review  
The research required a desk-based literature analysis of the governance of commonages in South 
Africa. In February 2007 the desk-based literature review began with a thorough literature review 
covering the following topics: the theory of Common Property Resource Management, Common 
Property Resource management in South Africa and in Africa, the Land Reform Programme in South 
Africa, the Commonage Policy in South Africa, commonage history, commonage management, 
Developmental Local Government, legislation relating to Developmental Local Government and Land 
Reform, Local Economic Development, Integrated Development Planning, and environmental 
policies.  
 
4.2.2. Case Studies 
The case studies, Grahamstown, Bathurst and Fort Beaufort, were chosen by the Project Supervisors. 
The criteria on which they based their decision were the following:  
1. Three study sites is an adequate number for a Master’s level project. 
2. The study sites are not too widely dispersed – which is more cost effective to research. 
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3. They are reasonably small towns and the local authorities are receptive to research. 
4. Recent work has been done on the commonage.  
5. The social or ecological setting across sites is diverse. 
6. The commonages in the study sites are not subject to land claims. 
 
Between September 2007 and October 2008, interviews were conducted with various role-players in 
commonage management. A “snow-ball” qualitative method was used to identify these 
organisations, institutions or individuals; for example, by asking various interviewees to identify 
other individuals that may be important to interview. The topics for the interview schedules used 
were directed by the literature review, which helped to identify concerns regarding commonage 
management and governance.  
 
4.3. The Interview Schedules 
Four different interview schedules were developed, each representing a different level of 
institutional involvement. However, many questions were replicated so that different views could be 
ascertained on the same key topics or themes. This method was important in order to triangulate 
information (Janse van Rensburg, 2001: 9) so that the situation of commonages could be better 
understood from as many perspectives as possible. Furthermore, the interview schedules were 
created in order to ensure that they same key themes were investigated and improved the interview 
technique to ensure credibility and transferability of information if such a study were to be 
replicated or scrutinised (Janse van Rensburg, 2001: 9). 
 
The Local Municipality interview schedule is the longest, and most detailed, for the primary reason 
that local municipalities are the owners of commonage land. The questions cover the following 
topics: the commonage history and scale, establishment of new commonage, commonage use and 
users, infrastructure, commonage and economic development, co-management, training and 
mentorship, developmental local government, other institutional and governmental involvement, 
environmental management and, finally, policy and direction. The main concerns, when developing 
this interview schedule, were the changing Local Municipal mandate after 1994, and the ability of 
Developmental Local Government to cope with new responsibilities, with an emphasis on the 
management of commonage. Practical management is situated at the Local Municipality level and 
municipal departments have more knowledge about the everyday commonage issues and problems 
that arise than any other government level. 
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The role of District Municipalities is to administer certain district-level functions and to assist local 
municipalities to build up their capacity. For this reason, and because district municipalities do not 
own the land, the District Municipality interview schedule is much shorter and contains fewer 
questions directly related to physical commonage. Instead the questions relate to Developmental 
Local Government, institutional and government involvement, environmental management and 
policy and direction. The main concerns directing these questions were how district municipalities 
perceive the efforts of local municipalities to manage commonage land, and how much support was 
given to local municipalities by district municipalities and other institutional bodies.  
 
An interview schedule was developed for the district-level offices of national or provincial 
government departments such as Agriculture, Environmental Affairs and Land Affairs. The district 
branch of these departments was chosen as the institutional level for this research because this level 
of government may be involved in the governance of commonage. Higher levels of these national 
and provincial government departments are primarily concerned with policy development, planning 
and funding. The questions to national and provincial departments covered the following topics: the 
experience of the commonage issue, Developmental Local Government, institutional and 
governmental involvement, environmental management and policy and direction. The concerns 
directing these questions were these departments’ responsibilities to commonage governance and 
how they support and enhance the development and maintenance of commonage at a local level. 
 
The final interview schedule was developed for the lowest level institutional body involved in 
commonage management: that of the Commonage Management Committees (CMC). Questions to 
the CMCs focussed on the following topics: commonage users, the committee, committee capacity, 
institutional relationships and communication, rule making and enforcement and problems 
identified on the commonage. The concerns that directed these questions were how the CMC 
conducted its day-to-day management responsibilities, if and how they were supported in doing so 
and some of the practical difficulties of managing commonage. 
 
An interview schedule was not developed for Non-Governmental Organisations or other interested 
parties. Instead, questions were asked based on the interests or involvement of the organisation or 
individual regarding commonage. Therefore, the interviews were conducted as informal 
conversations discussing any topic that arose, but including topics of concern (some of which would 
have been mentioned in the other interview schedules). Concerns included how they were involved 
regarding commonage, who they had interacted with in the process, what problems they have 
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encountered regarding commonage management, and what solutions they see, and how they view 
the Land Reform policy of the National Government.   
 
4.4. Ethical Considerations 
When interviewing the individuals in question, introductions were made, the research was discussed 
and the organisation for which the research was being conducted was identified. The right to 
confidentiality and the right of refusal was made clear to the respondent. All respondents, with one 
exception, reacted positively to being approached about being interviewed and did not request 
confidentiality. Care was taken to keep questions simple and neutral, while encouraging 
respondents to share information openly. Informants seemed comfortable with the institution 
(Rhodes) and no “ulterior motives” were conceived with regards to the interviewer’s reason for 
asking certain questions. Feedback to the community and respondents was provided in the form of 
community feedback meetings in the towns of Bathurst and Grahamstown and one additional 
meeting was conducted with the Makana Municipality. Unfortunately a community meeting in Fort 
Beaufort proved too difficult to arrange and no meeting took place in this town. Feedback was also 
given to all interested and affected parties in the form of a summary document. Finally, e-mails 
containing this document will be sent to all interviewees. 
 
4.5. The Interviews 
Shorter interviews took approximately 15 minutes, especially when the respondent knew little about 
the topic. The longest interview took an hour and 15 minutes. Most respondents were interviewed 
face-to-face with the exception of the district DLA in East London, the national DLA in Pretoria and 
the District Municipalities of Amathole and Cacadu. These individuals were interviewed 
telephonically. The interviews were conducted telephonically to save costs of transport and to save 
the respondents’ time. All these individuals reacted favourably to being interviewed in this manner. 
 
It would be fair to caution the reader that views or opinions reflected in this thesis do not necessarily 
correspond with the views of the organisation or department that the individual is representing. 
Hence, although no one asked for a confidential interview, any remarks that may seem subjective 
are simply the opinion of the interviewee. 
 
4.5.1. The Interviewees 
The government officials interviewed were selected because of their involvement with commonage 
management or because of their knowledge of commonage management or governance. Some 
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officials could not be interviewed because they had resigned from their respective departments or 
municipalities. Certain officials were essential to interview and they were approached first. These 
were Local Municipality officials, DLA officials and DoA officials. Through anecdotal evidence and 
through inquiries about other role-players, NGO’s, key informants and other 
institutions/government departments were identified and approached.  These could essentially 
support, contest or add to the findings from the Local Municipality interviews, especially with 
regards to the history of commonages and their uses and management. Lastly, the final key 
interviews were conducted with emerging farmers associations. Some information was also received 
though anecdotal evidence. 
 
The study sites fell into different Municipal boundaries; the Makana, Ndlambe and Nkonkobe Local 
Municipalities and the Amathole and Cacadu District Municipalities. Care was taken to interview a 
representative from each. Some respondents were responsible for just one study site in their 
jurisdiction, while others were responsible for two or more study sites in their jurisdiction. See 
Appendix 1 for the list of interviewees.  
 
4.6. Limitations to this Study 
For several reasons the number of interviews was more limited than originally anticipated. The 
researcher found it difficult to find the appropriate or relevant people to interview, such as in the 
Nkonkobe Municipality where the potential interviewee had resigned. Some of the interviewees, 
therefore, were unclear as to the intricate workings of commonage management. Furthermore, it 
would often take many months to organise an interview and sometimes data was not provided, such 
as municipal minutes or copies of grazing agreements. However, being resident in Grahamstown for 
six years has allowed the research to be supplemented by anecdotal evidence. Care was taken to be 
critical of such information, but often the information came from more than one source.  
 
Another pitfall to the research was the inability to interview the Emerging Farmers’ Association in 
Bathurst. The livestock owners are suspicious of outsiders and the intentions of scientists or 
academics. At the time of the research, the Ndlambe Municipality was making plans to implement a 
tourism initiative on the commonage and the cattle owners were objecting to the idea. After 
repeated attempts to interview a certain livestock owner, without success, the interview was 
shelved. It is unfortunate because the internal structures of the association could not be better 
understood and information about the livestock owners had to be gained from previous work 
documented in the MAFA report (MAFA, 2006). 
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The final limitation of this study is the lack of formal documentation from which to compare the 
information from interviewees. Council minutes, grazing agreements and management plans were 
difficult to obtain from municipalities for a number of reasons. Firstly, some municipalities did not 
have this documentation. Secondly, one municipality was not forthcoming with council minutes for 
unknown reasons. However, it is assumed that the municipality either did not have a proper minute-
taking system or there was sensitive information contained in the documents. This gives an 
indication of the limited capacities of municipalities to acquire all relevant documents. There is also a 
perceived lack of trust between municipalities and researchers. This is very frustrating for 
researchers who have to work with municipalities. This, along with poor understanding of subject 
matter, can make the process of research difficult and the results poor. However, this research was 
conducted using the method of triangulation to insure against poor results. Even when formal 
documents could not be found, other supplies of information were sourced. 
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5. Results  
5.1. The Nature of Commonage  
H. Prinsloo (pers. comm., 2008) sees new commonage as having a “private” nature, as opposed to 
the public nature of old/traditional commonage. This private nature may stem from the 
individualisation of new commonage by emergent farmers. This is in contrast to old commonage 
whereby a community of users has access to its resources. However, the nature of the commonage 
will change according to the situation and town. Each piece of commonage land is subject to 
different legal requirements as set out in the title deed attached to the land (Prinsloo, H. pers. 
comm., 2008). Therefore, to determine the title deed provisions, which will give an indication of the 
stipulated legal arrangements of the deed and the corresponding nature of the commonage, one 
must look at the actual deed. These conditions can be altered through permission from the 
Provincial Administrators.  
 
5.2. History of Commonage 
5.2.1. Fort Beaufort 
According to the Chairperson and Secretary of the local Emerging Farmers’ Association, the 
commonage in Fort Beaufort was not used exclusively by white people in the past (Dyasi & Tonisi 
pers. comm., 2007). Instead, the then “white” municipality allowed black people to graze livestock 
on three pieces of commonage land. It was a well functioning system whereby the Municipality 
created a camp system and maintained the infrastructure (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. comm., 2007). Mr 
Mxoli, who is director of Town Planning in the Nkonkobe Local Municipality, has only been in the 
Municipality since 2002 (Mxoli pers. comm., 2007). Therefore, he is unaware of how many hectares 
the commonage consists of and could not give an indication of commonage history. He did suggest 
that more land has been accessed by the municipality, donated by the Department of Public Works, 
for use of residents of the town. However, this is not referred to as ‘commonage’. The extent of this 
land, consisting of one farm, is unknown and the Mr Mxoli was also not sure about the date of 
purchase. This land is leased per head of livestock to a number of black farmers in the area. As 
indicated by a local Fort Beaufort resident and rangeland specialist, Dr Trollope (pers. comm., 2008), 
two sections of commonage have been sold to a private commercial farmer and the local 
Agricultural College, but the time of sale is unknown. 
 
5.2.2. Bathurst 
According to the MAFA document (2006: 6) the Bathurst commonage is approximately 2900 ha in 
extent and was first handed over to the people of Bathurst in 1825 by the Royal Commission. 
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According to a commonage worker in Bathurst, there is only old commonage in the town (Ntlokwana 
pers. comm., 2007); however the original commonage was extended in 1924 to include what is now 
known as Erf 2 (MAFA, 2006: 6). Ntlokwana (pers. comm., 2007) produced a map detailing the 
number of hectares of the commonage. According to him, the land was used in the same way before 
1994, as it is being used now, for grazing of cattle by black and white residents, but that no white 
residents graze cattle on the land anymore. This is supported by Higginbottom et al. (1995: 18) who 
indicate that the commonage was divided into camps that separated black and white owned 
livestock. The MAFA document (2006: 7), which is an amalgamation of a study done on the Bathurst 
commonage by members of the Rhodes University Department of Environmental Science, indicates 
that, until 1994, the privilege of grazing cattle on the commonage was reserved for whites only and 
blacks had no say in the management of the commonage. Whites used the commonage for 
pineapple farming, grazing cattle, vegetable production and the collection of natural resources 
(MAFA, 2006: 7). 
 
During the 1990’s there were conflicts between blacks and whites over the use of commonage, with 
the latter expressing anger that people who do not pay rates should be allowed use of the 
commonage (MAFA, 2006: 7). The commonage is now used by black cattle farmers; however, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that one white farmer still grazes cattle on the commonage. According 
to a source in the Conservation Department in the Ndlambe Municipality, Mr Fouche (pers. comm., 
2008), the commonage was placed under the mandate of the Conservation unit of the Ndlambe 
Municipality when the new Local Government structures were created, post-1994. However, the 
Conservation Department in the Ndlambe Local Municipality has not been extensively involved in 
managing the commonage presently and, since 1994, the involvement of the Ndlambe Local 
Municipality in commonage management has dwindled. This is supported by MAFA document 
(2006: 7) which indicates that the commonage is not being actively managed, nor is it generating an 
income for its management. At present, the maximum head of stock per farmer (20 per farmer as 
set out in the original agreement) is being exceeded by some individuals. Currently, the DoA is 
involved in dipping of cattle and the Ndlambe Local Municipality is involved in infrastructure 
maintenance.  
 
5.2.3. Grahamstown 
According to the Management Plan and Grazing Agreement for Grahamstown Commonage (ECARP, 
2002b) the previous council in Grahamstown (before 1994) had a formalised farming unit of 900 ha 
divided into nine camps, with watering points, dipping facilities and the introduction of bulls for 
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breeding purposes. A register was kept for all stock units and a fee of R5/LSU/Month was paid to the 
council. According to the Director of Parks and Recreation in the Makana Local Municipality, Mr 
Bates (pers. comm., 2008), this system was run by the then Agricultural Department (the equivalent 
of the DoA today). This system worked efficiently because it was a small piece of land, tightly 
managed and the number of animals on the commonage never exceeded 200. This land was used by 
black farmers. Just before 1994, Grahamstown experienced a time of social unrest and the 
infrastructure on the land was vandalised and badly damaged and farmers refused to pay for access 
to the land (Bates pers. comm., 2008; ECARP, 2002b). Since 1994, the land has been grazed in excess 
of the carrying capacity and new farms have had to be purchased due to the expansion of livestock 
numbers (ECARP, 2002b). Subsequent attempts to repair damaged infrastructure and implement 
new infrastructure have been met with more vandalism and theft (Bates pers. comm., 2008; ECARP, 
2002b). 
 
There are some inconsistencies regarding the number of hectares that constitute the Grahamstown 
commonage. According to Puttick (2007: 7) there are approximately  8741 ha but, as noted in the 
section on the expansion of Grahamstown commonage, there are approximately 4057 ha, according 
to ECARP (2002b). However, a calculation of the figures supplied by Bates (pers. comm., 2008) brings 
the total to 9083 ha.   
 
Table 2: The history and expansion of commonages in the study sites 
 
Commonage History 
    Grahamstown Bathurst Fort Beaufort 
Pre-1994 
users 
  
Small numbers of 
black livestock 
owners 
Black and white 
livestock owners  
Black and white 
livestock owners  
Hectares 
Old 4397 2900 2350 
New 4686 N/A Unknown 
New 
commonage 
establishment 
  
New commonage 
established in 
2003 (5 new 
farms) 
No new commonage 
and none required at 
present 
One farm donated 
by the Department 
of Public Works 
and other land is 
required 
 
5.3. The Acquisition of Commonage  
According to both the Cacadu and Amathole district offices of the DLA, local municipalities can apply 
to the DLA for funding for the acquisition of commonage. This is what a Development Planner in the 
Cacadu District Municipality, Ms Bezuidenhout (pers. comm. 2008) refers to as the “needs-based” 
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approach of the Commonage Programme. A Senior Planner in the Amathole District DLA indicates 
that the DLA expects local municipalities to identify the land that they would like to obtain, that they 
commission an evaluation report and that they produce a management plan (Zungula pers. comm., 
2008). The management plan must contain a veld assessment section that details the carrying 
capacity of the land, as well as indicating what the land will be used for and how it will be managed. 
The Deputy-Director of the Cacadu District DLA states that there must also be a grazing agreement 
or lease agreement formulated (Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 2008).  
 
Once the DLA has found all these requirements to be satisfactory, it will purchase the land on behalf 
of the local municipality and ownership will pass to the municipality through a title deed (Zungula 
pers. comm., 2008). The DLA in Cacadu indicated that the existence of certain documents often 
depends on the local municipality and official dealing with a certain application (Prinsloo, H. pers. 
comm., 2008), which suggests that some required documents may exist while others may not. The 
DLA has the right to register a notarial against the title deed that sets out certain conditions that 
must be met. If any title deed condition is to be subsequently changed, the local municipality must 
apply to the Premier of the province to get permission to do so (Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 2008). 
Once the title deed is registered, the municipality has the sole responsibility of managing the land 
with the support of other government departments. A key question is the monitoring of commonage 
management after ownership has been transferred to Local Municipalities. In this regard, the DLA in 
Amathole indicated that the monitoring and evaluation of all Land Reform projects is undertaken by 
the Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the DLA. However, monitoring is restricted to 
assessing the success or failure of Redistribution projects and does not necessarily include assessing 
the management of commonage land (Zungula pers. comm., 2008). Therefore, there is little or no 
monitoring and evaluation of commonage projects. However, the commonage programme as a 
whole was investigated by the National DLA office which involved evaluating a number of 
commonage projects (DLA, 2005). 
 
Support for local municipalities takes the form of funding for infrastructure from the Department of 
Agriculture. The municipality must approach the DoA with a funding proposal. The DoA, by means of 
their Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP), can fund the provision of 
infrastructure on commonages; such as dams, fences and dipping facilities (Zungula pers. comm., 
2008). However, H. Prinsloo (pers. comm., 2008) indicates that this funding is difficult to acquire 
because the DoA is mandated to use the funds primarily for private agricultural projects or for 
private landowners; therefore, local municipalities have a small chance of successfully acquiring 
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funding for infrastructure. A Chief Planner in the national DLA offices feels that the DoA should do 
more to support the Commonage Programme, because the DoA is mandated to be involved but fails 
to fulfil all of its responsibilities (Prinsloo, A. pers. comm., 2008). This failure to fulfil its mandate may 
be because the DoA lacks the capacity to do so, as suggested by Bates (pers. comm., 2008) 
 
The District Municipalities (Amathole and Cacadu) in the study areas claim to have little or nothing 
to do with commonage management (Bezuidenhout pers. comm. 2008; Sawuti pers. comm., 2008). 
Both of these District Municipalities consider commonage to be a local municipal function and the 
role of the district municipality as a government department is simply to support the local 
municipality when there is a need; for example, when the local municipality feels it does not have 
the capacity to fulfil one of its legislated mandates in terms of the Municipal Systems Act 
(Bezuidenhout pers. comm., 2008; Sawuti pers. comm., 2008). A district municipality is, however, 
required to ensure that the local municipality carries out all of its mandates, whether related to 
commonage management or other mandates. However, the extent to which this supervision is 
carried out will depend on the district municipality concerned (Bezuidenhout pers. comm., 2008). 
This indicates that the amount of supervision may depend on the capacity of the respective district 
municipality and the performance of the local municipality. Bezuidenhout (pers. comm., 2008) feels 
that district level municipalities are just there as guiding institutions and do not “wave a big stick” 
over the local municipalities to ensure that responsibilities are fulfilled.  
 
5.3.1. New commonage in Grahamstown 
Grahamstown, situated in the jurisdiction of the Makana Local Municipality, is the only municipality 
in the three study sites that purchased additional land for the expansion of the commonage. Five 
additional farms were purchased in 2003. A Grahamstown-based NGO, the Eastern Cape Agricultural 
Research Project (ECARP), was commissioned to do veld assessment of the old commonage and 
suggest new farms/land to purchase, to create a management plan which included an indication of 
carrying capacity, to draw up grazing agreements and to suggest grazing management schemes. 
According to a researcher in ECARP (Faye pers. comm., 2008) the following process was followed. 
Meetings were set up with livestock owners to determine the amount of livestock being grazed on 
the land at that time. Unfortunately, this was a flawed process as many commonage farmers failed 
to reveal their true number of livestock. Even so, it was discovered that the old commonage carrying 
capacity was being severely exceeded. The carrying capacity was measured at 400 Large Stock Units 
(LSU) and 1222 Small Stock Units (SSU) as compared to the actual numbers of livestock grazing on 
the land, which was estimated at 1858 LSU and 1912 SSU respectively (ECARP, 2002d). The ECARP 
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report suggested that the commonage be extended by 4770 ha, which would increase the land by 
200% from 2003 ha to 6773 ha. The new farms were identified for purchase which added on an 
additional 2054 ha, although this additional land was still not sufficient for the number of animals at 
the time. The carrying capacity increased to 1357 LSU and 2612 SSU for all commonage land, which 
allowed for additional SSU but required that large stock numbers be adjusted to carrying capacity 
(ECARP, 2002a). 
 
Table 3: The expansion of Grahamstown commonage and the impact this had on the number of 
livestock that the land has the capacity to support 
 
The Expansion of Grahamstown Commonage 
 
Carrying 
capacity 
before 
expansion 
Carrying 
capacity after 
expansion 
Estimated 
Livestock 
numbers (2003) 
Difference between carrying 
capacity and actual numbers 
Large Stock 
Units 400 1357 1858 301 
Small Stock 
Units 1222 2612 1912 -700 
 
In 2003, once the reports were completed by ECARP, they were handed over to the Makana 
Municipality, whose job it now was to implement the recommendations and plans. According to the 
Management Plan and Grazing Agreement for Grahamstown Commonage (ECARP, 2002b) and the 
Management Plan and Grazing Agreement for the Extension Farms (ECARP, 2002c), the grazing fee 
was set at R2/SSU/Month and R10/LSU/Month. During the consultation process the livestock owners 
agreed to pay the fee, but once regulations were enforced the livestock owners refused to pay (Faye 
pers. comm., 2008; Bates pers. comm., 2008). A poor relationship has developed between the 
livestock owners and Makana Municipality, and the refusal by the livestock to pay a fee can be 
attributed to this. 
 
5.4. Direct Use of Commonage 
The users of commonage consist mostly of stockowners, people in the “townships” (poor residents), 
traditional healers and, in Bathurst and Grahamstown, white residents. All three commonages are 
predominantly being utilised by black farmers for grazing livestock. Smaller projects have been 
initiated on some of the commonages but they use only a small percentage of the available land. 
One must take into account that the informants in Fort Beaufort were unsure of all activities taking 
place there, and more activities are predicted for the commonage; such as initiation ceremonies. 
However, the uses of commonage in Grahamstown and Bathurst, as indicated by informants, seem 
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to be more diverse than in Fort Beaufort. Uses are included in Table 4. This table indicates direct 
uses of commonage. It does not take into account the indirect services of commonage such as the 
ecosystem processes that commonage supports. It also fails to consider the intrinsic value of the 
commonage as a resource or the future benefits that may be derived from the resource. 
 
Table 4: The use of, users and numbers of cattle on the commonages in the study sites 
 
Commonage Characteristics 
  Grahamstown Bathurst Fort Beaufort 
Use of 
land 
Grazing Yes Yes Yes 
Piggery Yes   
Sand Mining Yes Yes  
Fuelwood and Plants Yes Yes  
Initiation Ceremonies Yes Yes  
Cultivation   Yes 
Users   
Stock Owners, 
Traditional healers, 
Township residents 
Stock Owners, 
Traditional healers, 
White residents, 
Township residents 
Stock Owners, 
Township residents 
Cattle No Estimated 2000-2500 200 / 500-700 Unknown 
Ha/LSU  7ha/LSU 3.5ha/LSU 7.5ha/LSU 
 
Illegal activities are taking place on the Bathurst commonage. Some residents are poaching game 
and some white residents are collecting rare flowers or plants for their gardens. There is also illegal 
sand extraction and the felling of trees for fuelwood (this latter activity requires a permit). These 
activities are regulated by the commonage Ranger and his staff and illegal activities are reported to 
the Conservation Unit (Ndlambe Local Municipality) and the Department of Conservation (Eastern 
Cape Parks). Illegal activities are not confined to Bathurst. The DEDEA in Grahamstown has 
suggested that there is over-harvesting of medicinal plants occurring on the Grahamstown 
commonage (Hahndiek pers. comm., 2008). Other illegal activities were not mentioned; however, 
considering that people harvest many natural resources from commonage, it may be the case that 
many other illegal activities are occurring on the Grahamstown and Fort Beaufort commonages. 
 
The cultivation occurring on the Bathurst commonage is a vegetable project established by a local 
Grahamstown NGO called Umthathi, which employs a handful of poor, black Bathurst residents. 
However, according to the Ndlambe Local Municipality, the economic benefits are not large and 
there is an urgent need to commercialise the project (Mjacu pers. comm., 2008). According to 
anecdotal evidence, the project failed after Umthathi pulled out of the project. The NGO considered 
76 
 
the management to be up to standard, and the presence was no longer necessary; however, they 
realised later that the management was not effective after the crops failed and the greenhouses 
were vandalised. The Ndlambe Local Municipality have plans for future agricultural projects; these 
are mainly cropping projects and possibly an essential oils project (Mjacu pers. comm., 2008). The 
tourism development side of the LED department is finding it difficult to acquire funding for tourism 
opportunities (Marala pers. comm., 2008). Tourism on the commonage can take the form of hiking, 
4X4 trails, craft, camping or eco-tourism. This is possible because the commonage borders on a state 
reserve called Waters Meeting State Reserve and may be incorporated into the Reserve in order to 
create a viable land area. 
 
According to the Emerging Farmers’ Association’s of Grahamstown and Fort Beaufort, anyone is 
allowed access to the respective commonages. Furthermore, this access is not regulated through 
rules, an institutional body or other users (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. comm., 2007; Mamkeli pers. comm., 
2007). However, when questioned about the use of commonage by white people it was considered a 
humorous statement because white people do not use the commonage for grazing (Mamkeli pers. 
comm., 2007). However, in Bathurst and in Grahamstown, the commonage is utilised by whites for 
collecting plants and for recreational purposes respectively. Access to part of the Grahamstown 
commonage is restricted. This land is called “southern commonage” and is currently included in the 
Oldenburgia Conservancy (Bates pers. comm., 2008). The Working for Water Programme (WfW) is 
using poison to kill Alien Invasive Plants (AIPs) and the cattle may be poisoned if they were to graze 
there (Bates pers. comm., 2008). Access to this land may in future to granted to farmers running 
herds of Nguni cattle (a cattle breed that is indigenous to South Africa), but there will be strict 
controls regarding this access (Bates pers. comm., 2008). This commonage land is mainly used by 
people in the town for recreational purposes. 
 
5.5. Commonage Concerns 
There are a number of concerns related to the commonages in the study sites. These concerns are 
contained within table 5. 
1. Infrastructure (boreholes, water tanks, fences and gates): poorly delivered and maintained 
commonage infrastructure, non-existent infrastructure or vandalised infrastructure.  
2. Housing development: encroachment of formal and informal housing onto commonage. 
3. Overgrazing or overstocking: exceeding the carry capacity of the land.  
4. Stock theft: stock owners or other residents stealing from one another and selling the stock in 
adjacent areas. 
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5. Elite capture: a minority of stock owners grazing a large number of stock (which exceeds the 
regulated number) whilst the majority graze only a small number of stock. Wealthy or powerful 
stockowners intimidate weaker members of the community. 
6. Rapid urbanisation: due to a number of reasons, more and more people are settling in urban 
areas and this is placing enormous pressure on the Local Municipality to supply social and 
infrastructural services.  
7. Land hunger and conflict: people requesting more land on which to graze cattle and, due to farm 
evictions and subsequent urbanisation, more people requiring it. 
8. No employment opportunities: people relying on surrounding land (e.g. commonage) to supply 
natural resources to supplement their social grants/incomes.  
 
Table 5: The problems that affect the use and management of the commonage 
 
Commonage Concerns 
  Grahamstown Bathurst Fort Beaufort 
1. Vandalism Yes Not mentioned Not mentioned 
2. Housing 
encroachment 
Yes, informal No Yes, formal 
3. Over-grazing Yes Yes No 
4. Stock Theft Yes Not mentioned Yes 
5. Elite Capture Yes Yes Not mentioned 
6. Rapid 
Urbanisation 
Yes Not mentioned Yes 
7. Land hunger Yes Yes Yes 
8. No employment Yes Yes Yes 
 
The following sections will explain these issues in more detail. 
 
5.5.1. Infrastructure  
The infrastructure on Grahamstown commonage was badly damaged in the period preceding the 
1994 democratic elections (Bates pers. comm., 2008). Since then, the subsequent efforts of the 
Municipality to deliver infrastructure has been hindered by the constant vandalism and theft of 
fencing for informal housing and other purposes (Bates pers. comm., 2008). This has become the 
most contentious issue on the commonage because the stockowners are refusing to pay a fee to the 
Makana Local Municipality due to the lack of infrastructure on the commonage (Bates pers. comm., 
2008; Mamkeli pers. comm., 2007). Bates (pers. comm., 2008) feels that the vandalism of the 
infrastructure could be deliberate efforts by the stockowners to sabotage the infrastructure 
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implementation of the Makana Local Municipality; thereby allowing them free and unrestricted 
access to the commonage. The stockowners feel that the Makana Local Municipality have not kept 
their promise with regards to the building of kraals for cattle and, because it is the Local 
Municipality’s land, they should manage it properly (Mamkeli pers. comm., 2007). Until 
infrastructure is implemented, no fees will be paid, no rules made and the management plans will 
not be followed (Mamkeli pers. comm., 2007). This is a catch-22 situation and the only way the 
Municipality sees it being resolved is through a mass implementation project which will require a 
huge funding effort (Bates pers. comm. 2008). So far, the only infrastructure on the commonage is a 
boundary fence, but even this is often cut and damaged. 
 
The infrastructure on the Bathurst commonage is in a state of disrepair (Mjacu pers. comm., 2008) 
even though the Ndlambe Local Municipality has a commonage ranger who actively maintains the 
fencing (Fouche pers. comm., 2008). According to the informant in the Ndlambe Local Municipality, 
the commonage ranger is in charge of all commonages in the jurisdiction of the Municipality and, 
therefore, he lacks time and manpower to do a more efficient job (Fouche pers. comm., 2008). The 
lack of adequate water on the commonage is a hindrance to doing more cultivation.   
 
On Fort Beaufort commonage there seems to be little or no infrastructure (Mxoli pers. comm., 
2007). The Nkonkobe Local Municipality does not seem to actively manage the commonage, 
although the IDP indicates that money has been set aside for fencing the commonage (Nkonkobe, 
2007: 47).  
 
5.5.2. Housing Development 
In Fort Beaufort, the Nkonkobe Local Municipality has allowed RDP houses to be erected on 
commonage land (Mhlaba pers. comm., 2007; Mxoli pers. comm., 2007). No informal housing is 
being erected on the land because there are a sufficient number of RDP houses being built near the 
town (Mhlaba pers. comm., 2007). In Grahamstown, old commonage is being encroached upon by 
informal settlements; however, houses are not being built on new commonage land (Bates pers. 
comm., 2008). Bathurst seems to have no problem with informal or formal settlement 
encroachment onto commonage; however, the Nolukhanyo Township was originally erected on 
commonage land (MAFA, 2006: 7) on one side of a main road, with most of the commonage situated 
on the other side. This could be a deterrent for anyone wanting to build a house on the commonage, 
as they would be separated from the rest of the Township by the main road.    
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5.5.3. Overstocking 
In all three study sites, one or a number of informants have indicated that overgrazing is occurring 
due to overstocking of the commonage. On Bathurst commonage the Conservation Unit indicated 
that there is overgrazing occurring and that there is also encroachment by Alien Invasive Plants 
(Fouche pers. comm., 2008). The local LED officer for Agriculture also mentioned overgrazing (Mjacu 
pers. comm., 2008), although another informant says that he has never heard of reports of 
overgrazing (Ntlokwana pers. comm., 2007).  
In Grahamstown, the informant for the Makana Local Municipality feels that the land is being 
overgrazed (Bates pers. comm., 2008), as does the ECARP informant (Faye pers. comm., 2008), the 
DoA (Nelani pers. comm., 2007) and Department of Economic Development and Environmental 
Affairs (Hahndiek pers. comm., 2008). The DoA feels that the carrying capacity regulations are not 
being adhered to (Nelani pers. comm., 2007). However, the Emerging Farmers’ Association does not 
see overgrazing as an issue affecting the commonage (Mamkeli pers. comm., 2007).  
It is only in Fort Beaufort that the Emerging Farmers’ Association and the Nkonkobe Local 
Municipality agree that there is no overgrazing, although the Emerging Farmers’ Association feels 
that more land is needed (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. comm., 2007). However, the Amathole DLA has 
indicated that the Local Municipality acknowledges that there are too many head of cattle currently 
utilising the available land (Zungula pers. comm., 2008). A local resident and range ecologist feels 
that the veld surrounding Fort Beaufort is being abused (Trollope pers. comm., 2008). 
Despite overgrazing been mentioned as a problem due to too many head of cattle on the 
commonage, key informants were unable to indicate actual livestock figures. In Grahamstown, the 
figure given is between 2000 and 2500 head of cattle (Ward, 2007) and in Bathurst the figure was 
given as 200 head of cattle (Ntlokwana pers. comm., 2007), although anecdotal evidence shows that 
one cattle owner alone has 200 head of cattle. The MAFA document (2006: 27) indicates that there 
are between 500 and 700 head of cattle on the Bathurst commonage. The Nkonkobe Local 
Municipality does not know cattle figures and could not even give an estimate. 
Ainslie (pers. comm., 2007) indicates that authorities may be unable to calculate cattle numbers 
because many cattle owners perform what is known as “shadow herding” to confuse local 
authorities about actual cattle numbers. Cattle numbers are usually calculated at dipping sessions. 
However, some livestock owners will only bring half their herd one week and the other half the 
following week – alternating in this way so that no one can count the real numbers of livestock that 
they own. 
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5.5.4. Stock Theft 
Stock theft is mentioned as a major problem in both Fort Beaufort and Grahamstown. Both the 
municipalities and the Emerging Farmers’ Associations mentioned this. Part of the reason for this 
high incidence of stock theft is poor herd management of the livestock, and lack of fencing on the 
commonage, which allows animals to stray all over the respective towns (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. 
comm., 2007; Mamkeli pers. comm., 2007). The Grahamstown Emerging Farmers’ Association 
blames some white farmers for the theft, suggesting that they are the ones who are purchasing the 
animals (Mamkeli pers. comm., 2007); however, the Makana Local Municipality says that, although 
one theft took place where a white farmer was involved, it was an isolated incident and nothing 
could be proved (Bates pers. comm., 2008). Because of stock theft, many animals are kept in the 
township or in the garden’s of houses, which is not an ideal system due to health problems 
associated with cattle (Mamkeli pers. comm., 2007).  
 
5.5.5. Elite Capture 
In Grahamstown (Bates pers. comm., 2008) and Bathurst there are reports of elite capture. This 
phenomenon refers not only to inequitable numbers of cattle (a few people grazing more head of 
cattle than regulations allow, whilst others only graze two or three head of cattle), but also to a 
“mafia” syndrome, whereby a few stock owners use the land shamelessly, and to the detriment of 
other resource users, and intimidate anyone who speaks up about it. Anecdotal evidence indicates 
that a white farmer in Bathurst is grazing a herd of cattle on the commonage that is in excess of 200 
head. He is married to a black woman who is the local chief’s daughter. Although, by law, he is only 
allowed 20 head of cattle (and the commonage is only for the use of black people) his cattle are 
managed by various family members and so he is able to hide the true number of head of cattle 
from the authorities. It has also been suggested that, in Bathurst, the stock owners are a powerful 
social force and dominate commonage use. They are able to intimidate other resource users and this 
is causing conflict between resource users.  
 
In Grahamstown, the local Chairperson of the Emerging Farmers’ Association has moved onto one of 
the farms that make up new commonage. He has taken over this farm for his own use and even 
charges other people to graze cattle on the land (Bates pers. comm., 2008). However, the Local 
Municipality is in the process of removing him from the land. Bates (pers. comm., 2008) suggests 
that the Emerging Farmers’ Association committee, and those who are literate, dominate those who 
are poor and illiterate. They are now a very powerful group of people on the commonage. They have 
also been defying the Makana Local Municipality by vandalising the fences and refusing to pay a fee; 
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and even organised a march when the Local Municipality tried to implement certain regulations. 
Bates (pers. comm., 2008) also suggests that commonage managers are subject to bribes or 
intimidation. This is not an isolated case; the DLA (Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 2008) indicates that 
some pressure groups are driving the management processes on many commonages and that elite 
people, who do not even live in the respective towns, will graze cattle on commonage because of 
the cultural and social status that is achieved by doing so.  
 
There is an interesting disparity between Fort Beaufort and the other study sites. The elite capture 
of commonage resources happening on the Fort Beaufort commonage is fuelled by the nepotism 
and corruption of the Nkonkobe Local Municipality, who allow friends and families access to 
commonage before allowing other residents the same benefit. This is according to the Fort Beaufort 
Emerging Farmers’ Association (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. comm., 2007). Although unproven, it does seem 
like a conceivable scenario given the reports of other incidences of corruption throughout South 
Africa. 
 
5.5.6. Rapid Urbanisation 
In Grahamstown and Fort Beaufort, urbanisation is proving to be problematic for the management 
of the commonage. This is due to the rising number of people who are relying on the land around 
the towns to supplement their income and for the provision of fuelwood and other resources. In 
Grahamstown, there are approximately 200 cattle owners (who come to livestock meetings) (Bates 
pers. comm., 2008). This requires regulating the movements of all these owners and their cattle, 
which the Makana Local Municipality is finding difficult to do at present. This problem of 
urbanisation contributes to the subsequent issue of land hunger. Local Municipalities are under 
increasing pressure to provide services for the people, and subsequently are unable to meet all of 
their mandated responsibilities. In Bathurst, this trend is substantiated in the IDP, which indicates 
that the region has a housing shortage due to an influx of farm workers into the towns (Ndlambe, 
2007: 14).  
 
5.5.7. Land Hunger  
In all of the study sites, land hunger is stated as a problem affecting the commonage; there is not 
enough land for all the commonage users. This can be attributed to urbanisation, unemployment, 
increasing cattle numbers and the encroachment of housing or other land uses. The Emerging 
Farmers’ Association of Fort Beaufort and Grahamstown indicate that they require more land for the 
purpose of grazing livestock (Mamkeli pers. comm., 2008; Dyasi & Tonisi pers., comm., 2008). Land 
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hunger is also driven by farm evictions (Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 2008), and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that evicted farm workers will often bring cattle to the towns. These animals were acquired 
from the farm owner or manager during their employment on the farm. 
 
5.5.8. Limited Employment Opportunities 
Related to rapid urbanisation, the lack of employment in the study sites is impacting on the use of 
commonage. Both the Grahamstown and Fort Beaufort Emerging Farmers’ Associations (Mamkeli 
pers. comm., 2008; Dyasi & Tonisi pers., comm., 2008) have indicated that this is a problem in the 
towns, which is potentially leading to increasing numbers of people relying on the commonage to 
supplement their income. This is substantiated by the IDPs of the respective municipalities. 
 
5.6. Governance of commonage 
5.6.1. General Policy 
According to the DLA, the Commonage Policy was under review in 2004, but any envisaged changes 
to the Policy have been shelved (Prinsloo, A. pers. comm., 2008). Some of the problems that are 
being experienced by local municipalities, when attempting to manage their commonage, are lack of 
capacity, poor lease implementation and enforcement and lack of political will (Prinsloo, A. pers. 
comm., 2008). However, a new Commonage Implementation Manual is in the process of being 
developed (Prinsloo, A. pers. comm., 2008). One of the major concerns of the DLA is the 
implementation of a planning grant system so that local municipalities can develop feasibility and 
planning documents before applying for new commonage (Prinsloo, A. pers. comm., 2008). 
According to the national offices of the DLA, there are still commonage projects (acquisition of new 
commonage) being implemented in South Africa (Prinsloo, A. pers. comm., 2008). For example, in 
Gauteng the DLA is purchasing commonage because high urbanisation rates are leading to township 
development and there is an accompanying increase in demand for land for livelihood provisioning. 
In the Northern Cape, because the land has a low carrying capacity, more needs to be purchased for 
increasing livestock numbers in peri-urban areas.   
 
With regards to other Land Reform Policies, the LRAD programme has been renewed. One of the key 
changes in the LRAD policy is an increase in the size of the grants, ranging from a minimum of 
R111 000 to a maximum of R430 000 (Prinsloo, A. pers. comm., 2008). This has a potential influence 
on the “stepping-off” policy of the Commonage Programme, as will be discussed below. 
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5.6.2. The Stepping-off Policy 
 
As encapsulated in the 2002 policy (DLA, 2002), the commonage Programme now regards 
beneficiaries as belonging to either the subsistence farming bracket or the emerging farming 
bracket. New commonage land must be used to support the latter, whereby commonage farmers 
can increase their herds until they are ready to “step off” commonage and purchase their own land 
by means of Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) or through an emergent 
farmer programme. These farmers will then begin to farm commercially and produce for the market 
(DLA, 2002). They would have gained, from their time accessing commonage land, the necessary 
skills, experience and assets to do so (DLA, 2002). Furthermore, through the emergent farmer 
programme, it is envisaged that local municipalities will engage with provincial level departments of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs, thereby providing support and planning capacity to local municipalities, 
to help them implement an emerging farmer system (DLA, 2002).  
 
The key informants in the study sites have all agreed that the Emerging Farmer Programme has not 
been performing as envisaged and that there are serious flaws with the implementation of this 
policy. According to the Local Municipalities, the Cacadu district DLA and other key informants, there 
have been no or few cases of farmers stepping-off the commonage. According to the interviewees, 
the reasons for this trend are as follows: 
 The farmers are not earning enough from commonage farming to purchase their own land 
and LRAD funding is insufficient (Mxoli pers. comm., 2007). 
 There is no infrastructure or services on the newly purchased land (Mxoli pers. comm., 
2007). Therefore, post-settlement support is essential on new farms, but this is unattainable 
or inadequate (Mxoli pers. comm., 2007). This is directly related to the LRAD grant being 
insufficient for farming. 
 Land is too expensive (Bates pers. comm., 2008; Mhlaba pers. comm., 2007; Nelani pers. 
comm., 2007; Ntlokwana pers. comm., 2007), which again relates directly to the insufficient 
LRAD funding. 
 Information about funding to purchase other land is not communicated to the commonage 
users (Ntlokwana pers. comm., 2007). 
 Land in the Eastern Cape that can be purchased with available funds is not producing 
enough as it has a low carrying capacity; therefore, farmers will be unlikely to see profits 
immediately (Bates pers. comm., 2008, Hahndiek pers. comm., 2007). This indicates that 
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farmers will need large capital inputs to maintain the farm until the land is producing a 
profit. 
 Farming is a difficult career path and requires extensive training and skills. Some emergent 
farmers will never acquire these skills by farming on commonage (Bates pers. comm., 2008). 
 Farming requires a lot of capital input for fertilizer, livestock feeds and medicines and 
farming implements. Finding money for these inputs is not possible for small emergent 
farmers (Bates pers. comm., 2008).   
 People are reluctant to lose a free resource such as commonage (Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 
2008). 
 The Department of Agriculture is not supplying the right equipment for the farmers and 
sometimes the equipment cannot be maintained due to lack of skills or money (Hahndiek 
pers. comm., 2007). 
 The selection of beneficiaries for LRAD grants is flawed and needs to be re-evaluated. At 
present the beneficiaries are affluent people who have political connections and no farming 
background (Hahndiek pers. comm., 2007). 
 Ainslie (pers. comm., 2007) sees cultural and social constraints to commercialising livestock 
on commonage. He feels that others will get jealous and livestock owners may fall out of 
favour with the community. People are expected, if they have sufficient animals, to supply 
livestock for funerals, weddings and other cultural and social events. Therefore, it will be 
difficult for emerging farmers to produce large herds of livestock. 
 
Solutions to these problems were discussed and the following recommendations were supplied by 
interviewees: 
 Information on funding options must be communicated to local farmers (Ntlokwana pers. 
comm., 2007). This would enable those farmers who are interested in becoming commercial 
farmers to identify subsidies and support. 
 More training is needed and funding made available for post-settlement support (Mxoli 
pers. comm., 2007). Mentoring is required for farmers while they are still on the 
commonage. This may also require more intensive extension support. 
 Municipalities must buy the new land and rent it to farmers, but not refer to it as 
commonage (Mhlaba pers. comm., 2007). This could be a transitional phase between 
commonage framing and commercial farming on private land. 
 The DLA should keep a data-base of individuals who are eager to become commercial 
farmers and require funding to access land. This will prevent land being allocated to people 
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who “do not have the heart to farm” (the necessary passion, skills and knowledge) (Bates 
pers. comm., 2008). The selection criteria for beneficiaries must be re-evaluated or 
rigorously and fairly implemented (Hahndiek pers. comm., 2007). 
 The time it takes for the famers to step off is too lengthy and pressure remains on the 
commonage resources (Bates pers. comm., 2008). Municipalities must “increase the 
pressure” to get off commonage – they should increase the amount one pays per head of 
cattle as the amount of cattle owned increases (sliding scale of fees) (Prinsloo, H. pers. 
comm., 2008). 
 
Land prices, and the corresponding productivity of the land, are a matter of concern. According to H. 
Prinsloo (pers. comm., 2008) the market prices for agricultural land are beyond the value of 
production and it is now no longer possible to farm in an economically sustainably manner. 
Agricultural and other land prices in South Africa have increased by 400% since 2003, although it has 
now stabilised. In the Eastern Cape, the average was a 360% increase (Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 
2008). Bates (pers. comm., 2008) argues that emerging farmers cannot be expected to farm 
profitably on land that white farmers were unable to do the same on, especially because some farms 
are expected to support more than one beneficiary.  
 
Prices in the Eastern Cape, in terms of 2008 figures, are on average R10 000 per 10 hectares of land 
and some land can only support 1 LSU per hectare (Nelani pers. comm., 2007). This is according to 
the local DoA. Therefore, if one farmer receives a R20 000 grant for the purchase of land, he can still 
only purchase 20 hectares of land and support 20 LSU on such a piece of land. This information is 
somewhat inaccurate of the reality of the area. A quick overview of farms purchased in the Eastern 
Cape from March to June this year (farm prices derived from Farmers Weekly) shows that the 
average price of agricultural land in the Eastern Cape is R2 800/ha. However, the average for 
Grahamstown is R3 600/ha and Bathurst is R17 000/ha. According to one source in real estate, the 
price of agricultural land in the area ranges from R6 000/ha to R10 000/ha, which seems like a more 
accurate estimate. Furthermore, according to the Department of Agriculture (Raath, 2004) the 
grazing capacity (or carrying capacity) of the area ranges from 3.5 ha/LSU near Bathurst, to 7 ha/LSU 
north of Grahamstown. According to ECARP (2002d) the carrying capacity of Valley Bushveld (the 
predominant vegetation type of the area) is 3 ha/LSU, which is much less than the carry capacity 
mentioned by the informant from the Department of Agriculture.  
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The variation in carrying capacity values indicates that the carrying capacity must be ascertained on 
an individual farm basis. Carrying capacity changes with vegetation composition and rainfall and is 
subject to change from day-to-day (Trollope pers. comm., 2008). Therefore, carrying capacity must 
be evaluated constantly, and will change according to the stocking rate (the number of animals on 
the land). Therefore, if one exceeds the carrying capacity by stocking too many animals of the land, 
the veld condition will deteriorate, and the carrying capacity will change – growing increasingly 
worse (Trollope pers. comm., 2008).  
 
This shows that some land may be in a good condition and may support a large number of animals. 
However, the stocking rate suggested by the other sources indicates that even fewer animals can be 
grazed on the surrounding land and the prospects for emerging farmers are poor. At the figure of 
3.5ha/LSU, a group of 10 farmers in Bathurst, who each receive R20 000 from LRAD, could purchase 
a farm of 20 ha (at a price of R10 000/ha) and graze approximately 6 head of cattle.  Due to the high 
prevailing land prices, the DoA have indicated their dissatisfaction with the current level of the LRAD 
grant (Nelani pers. comm., 2007). 
 
Land prices are not the only constraint to “stepping off”, as one can see from the list above. There 
are two examples of LRAD initiatives in the area that have failed for different reasons – not 
mentioned by key informants. The first initiative, by a certain Mr Xinsa, was an LRAD purchase of 
approximately 50 ha of land next to the Nolukhanyo Township in Bathurst (Ainslie pers. comm., 
2007). The land was invaded by people in the township, who grazed their animals on the land and 
even set the farm house on fire. Mr Xinsa was not utilising the farm at the time, and was not using 
the farmhouse. It is not certain what has happened since, but Ainslie (pers. comm., 2007) thinks that 
the land may have reverted back to the government.  
 
The second LRAD project is near the Kenton-on-sea Township. The farm is called Foresthill, and at 
the time of purchase was heavily degraded and had extensive tracts of alien vegetation. The land 
was completely unproductive and would have required approximately R1 500 000 to restore, with 
an annual extra R150 000 for maintenance. The land has been invaded by residents from the nearby 
township for grazing purposes. 
 
5.7. Management of Commonage 
The next few sections describe key aspects of current commonage management in the three case 
studies. A comparative table is provided below. 
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5.7.1. Institutional Context 
Local municipalities, as the owners of the land, are responsible for commonage management 
(Bezuidenhout pers. comm., 2008). The responsibility for commonage management is allocated to 
different departments within a local municipality, which all depends on the organogram and 
structure of the individual local municipality. In all three study sites, the community (and social) 
services branch of the corresponding Local Municipality is the highest level of commonage 
“management”. The day-to-day management will take place at a sub-branch of the community 
services department.  
 
In Grahamstown, the responsibility is mandated to the Parks and Recreation Department, whose 
duty it is to oversee all public spaces within its jurisdiction (which includes all towns with the Makana 
region). The day-to-day management is undertaken by a commonage manager, who at the time of 
the research, had been suspended (fired) for incompetence (Bates pers. comm., 2008). His or her 
duties are to communicate with the Emerging Farmers’ Association and to report problems on the 
commonage. 
 
In the Ndlambe Municipality, the responsibility is mandated to the Conservation Unit; however, in 
recent times this responsibility has shifted to the Department for Local Economic Development 
(Fouche pers. comm., 2008). The Conservation Department also has a lower management tier in the 
form of a commonage ranger, whose responsibilities are to oversee all commonages within the Local 
Municipality’s jurisdiction. He or she is responsible for maintenance of infrastructure, the reporting 
of problems, alien invasive plant eradication and stray animal recovery. The developmental duties of 
the commonages rest with the LED department. This includes agricultural and tourism development 
(Marala pers. comm., 2008). 
 
In the Nkonkobe Local Municipality, the responsibility of commonage management is mandated to 
the LED officer. He had left the municipality at the time of the research (Mxoli pers. comm., 2007), 
so no information could be ascertained about his duties or responsibilities. It is, therefore, assumed 
that he has the responsibility to initiate and implement development projects on the commonage. 
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5.7.2. Emerging Farmers’ Associations 
5.7.2.1. Institutional Arrangements 
The Commonage Policy envisages that a Commonage Management Committee (CMC) be established 
to manage commonage. This would be through a co-operative body comprising of members of the 
local municipality, commonage users and other relevant departments. All three commonages have 
an Emerging Farmers’ Association or Livestock Owner’s Association (referred to as an Emerging 
Farmers’ Association collectively). It is debatable whether their role is that of the CMC, as envisaged 
by the Commonage Programme (DLA, 1997). Instead, the Emerging Farmers’ Associations 
interviewed seemed to be wholly responsible for livestock; this being any type of domesticated 
animal such as goats, cows, pigs, donkeys and sheep. However, those informants interviewed 
seemed only to be concerned with cattle and one informant said that there were other associations 
for other types of livestock (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. comm., 2007). None of these Associations were 
concerned with any other type of resource that is provided for by commonage. 
Each Emerging Farmers’ Association is a sub-group of a bigger Emerging Farmers’ Association; for 
instance the Emerging Farmers’ Association in Fort Beaufort is known as the Ngxwence Emerging 
Farmers’ Association, which is a sub-branch of the Nkonkobe Emerging Farmers’ Association (district 
level) and this is a sub-branch of the Amathole Emerging Farmers’ Association (regional level). It is 
unclear how the committee members are elected and who they report to. However, the Ngxwence 
Farmer’s Association does have an annual meeting with the Nkonkobe Emerging Farmers’ 
Association (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. comm., 2007). The same structure is applicable in the Makana local 
area; there is a Grahamstown Stockowners’ Association, which is part of the greater Makana 
Emerging Farmers’ Association. 
The Ngxwence Farmers’ Association was formed after 1994, owing to the encouragement of the 
Nkonkobe Municipality, and represents the interests of the livestock owners in Fort Beaufort (Dyasi 
& Tonisi pers. comm., 2007). They have some women representatives on their committee and at 
present have a constitution drawn up with the help of the DoA (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. comm., 2007).  
The Grahamstown Farmers’ Association was formed before 1994 because black livestock owners 
were using the commonage prior to the creation of the Commonage Policy (Mamkeli pers. comm., 
2007). There are some women representatives on the committee and the Constitution of the 
committee is currently being updated (Mamkeli pers. comm., 2007). Both committees meet once a 
month to discuss issues affecting them. 
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5.7.2.2. Management Responsibilities  
In terms of the management responsibilities, it appears that the main role of the Emerging Farmers’ 
Associations in the study sites is communication, information gathering and dissemination, 
discussion and advice. Discussion topics relate mainly to livestock and land issues. However, from a 
capacity point of view, they claim to have little power or influence to make a difference at Local 
Municipality level; but rather try to influence the livestock owners themselves. In other words, the 
discuss problems and try to educate livestock owners about issues such as the danger of stray 
animals. They are supported mainly by the Municipality and DoA, although the Nkonkobe Emerging 
Farmers’ Association does not communicate well with its Local Municipality and its main support 
base is the Cape College of Education (the former agricultural college) and the DoA. There is at 
present no mentorship of farmers in any of the towns and very little structured and consistent 
training.  
5.7.2.3. Aspirations and Capacity 
There seems to be a divergence between the aspirations, and capacity to fulfil these aspirations, of 
the Emerging Farmers’ Association of the Makana Local Municipality, in comparison to that of the 
Nkonkobe Local Municipality. This may be a skewed opinion, in that only the chairpersons of the 
respective Emerging Farmers’ Association were interviewed, and as already mentioned, the 
chairperson of the Makana Emerging Farmers’ Association may represent only an elite point of view.   
 
There is a strong desire in the Ngxwence Emerging Farmers’ Association in Fort Beaufort to sustain 
the land and animals, develop the livestock production in the area and create a good institutional 
structure with power and capacity (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. comm., 2007). They are concerned about 
conservation of this resource and the sustainability of the committee. They also acknowledge the 
need for payment of services (a stock fee); however, they feel they are unable to pay this fee due to 
high unemployment rates and pressing poverty. They desire more communication with the Local 
Municipality (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. comm., 2007). The situation at present is not conducive to fulfilling 
such a need or desire.  
 
The Makana Emerging Farmers’ Association, on the other hand, has a dedicated Local Municipality, 
which has purchased more land for commonage, which develops projects on the commonage to 
improve LED and which continues its attempts to provide infrastructure. However, the Makana 
Emerging Farmers’ Association seem to be deliberately frustrating Makana Local Municipality efforts 
to improve the commonage management situation, even though this is to the detriment of the land 
and their livestock. They are refusing to pay for the use of the commonage until infrastructure is 
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upgraded. They have commercial aspirations for the commonage but do not mention a desire to 
engage in conservation. 
5.7.2.4. Concerns expressed by the Farmers’ Associations 
In Grahamstown, the Emerging Farmers’ Association identified several concerns (Mamkeli pers. 
comm., 2007). They felt that the Makana Local Municipality had not fulfilled promises that they had 
made to them regarding the development or improvement of infrastructure on the commonage. 
They voiced concerns about the stray cattle and stock theft occurring on the commonage and felt 
that the Municipality was slow to seek funding to improve their situation. Because of the high 
unemployment rate and lack of jobs in Grahamstown, they emphasised the economic and cultural 
value of cattle, which is largely not accounted for when decisions about commonage management 
are made.  
 
In Fort Beaufort, the Emerging Farmers’ Association was frustrated by the poor communication with 
the Nkonkobe Municipality and the lack of power and influence of the Emerging Farmers’ 
Association to change things. They worried about cattle diseases, the cost of impoundment when 
cattle stray, the fact that there is no rotational grazing system in place and no stock fair for 
marketing their animals (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. comm., 2007). The chairperson was also frustrated by 
the dumping of waste on the commonage by the Municipality. He felt that the Municipality has a 
poor understanding of the economic and cultural value of cattle.  
 
5.7.3. Financial Management 
In the Ndlambe Local Municipality and Makana Local Municipality provision was made for a fee 
per/LSU and SSU to be paid to the municipality for the use of the commonage. Nevertheless, the 
Municipalities indicated that no fees are being paid at present. In Fort Beaufort, it is unknown if a 
fee has been planned for; however, the Amathole DLA have indicated that there is a fee system 
(Zungula pers. comm., 2008). Nonetheless, no fees are paid to the municipality (Mxoli pers. comm., 
2007). The fee that is required for the use of commonage is expected to be used to finance the 
upkeep and maintenance of the commonage land and infrastructure (DLA, 2002). Therefore, the 
initial commonage expansion and infrastructure development is financed through the DLA, but 
maintenance of the land is the responsibility of the respective local municipality, which should use 
the fees to finance this.  
 
Without finances acquired from the fee system or lease system, funding for commonage 
infrastructure, including development and maintenance, has to be sourced from elsewhere. 
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According to the various IDPs (Nkonkobe, 2007; Ndlambe, 2007; Makana, 2008) the main sources of 
funding for commonage infrastructure development and maintenance are the DoA, the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant and the municipal coffers (the municipality will often receive funding from 
central government and also lesser amounts from rates and taxes). Therefore, it is difficult to 
predict, should fees be paid, what the money will be used for, whether it will be ‘ring-fenced’ and 
how it will be managed.  
 
According to the Cacadu district DLA (Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 2008), the National Government 
makes funding available for the acquisition of new commonage from the Commonage Programme, 
and the DoA has funding available for infrastructure development; possibly from the Comprehensive 
Agricultural Support Programme (CASP). The DLA undertakes roadshows and other means to 
educate municipalities about their options for funding for the expansion commonage, and therefore 
the Cacadu district DLA (Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 2008) feels that municipalities should be aware of 
the avenues for funding. Nonetheless, the number of Local Municipalities requesting funding for 
purchasing new commonage has decreased in recent times; either because they are satisfied with 
the number of hectares of land they currently own, or do not want the added burden of managing 
more land (Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 2008). 
 
5.7.4. Management Plans 
Bathurst does not have a management plan for its commonage (Fouche pers. comm., 2008); and 
according to the Chairperson of the Rate Payers Association, no management occurs on the 
commonage (Gess pers. comm., 2008). It is unknown whether the Fort Beaufort commonage has a 
management plan. However, a local rangeland specialist, Dr Trollope (pers. comm., 2008) is 
concerned that a management plan needs to be formalised and implemented. The Grahamstown 
commonage had management plans for old commonage and the new commonage land parcels. 
However, these plans are not being implemented and the grazing agreements are not being adhered 
to (Faye pers. comm., 2008). 
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Table 6: The management of commonages in the study sites 
 
Commonage Management 
    Grahamstown Bathurst Fort Beaufort 
Management 
Bodies 
Responsible 
Municipal 
Department 
Parks and Recreation 
(Corporate and Social 
Services) 
Conservation and LED 
(Corporate Services)  
Local Economic 
Development (Corporate 
Services) 
Dedicated 
Municipal staff 
member 
Commonage Manager but 
laid-off for incompetence 
Commonage ranger (for all 
commonages) 
LED officer but 
subsequently left 
Duties 
Communicate with EFA, 
report problems, 
maintenance of 
infrastructure 
Maintenance of 
infrastructure, report 
problems, manage cattle, 
stray animal recovery, alien 
invasive plant eradication 
Not known 
Other  
Emergent Farmers’ 
Association  
Emergent Farmers’ 
Association 
Emergent Farmers’ 
Association 
Contracts, leases 
or grazing 
agreements 
Type 
Grazing agreements with 
households, also: Slaaikraal 
is leased to 5 farmers 
Permit system for resource 
extraction, grazing 
agreement 
Lease agricultural land to 
emergent farmers 
Agreement 30 cows/ household 20 cows/individual Fee per LSU 
Management 
Plan 
  
Yes, but not 
implemented 
None 
DoA has produced one 
for the new land (none 
for Old Commonage) 
Communication 
and 
Relationships 
  
Lack of communication 
between parties. Poor 
relationship between 
Municipality and EFA 
Poor relationship between 
Municipality and 
Stockowners’ 
Lack of communication 
between parties. Poor 
relationship between 
Municipality and EFA 
Rules and 
enforcement 
  
Impossible to impose rules, 
no law enforcement or 
monitoring 
Monitoring by Eastern 
Cape Parks and 
Municipality (fines) 
People manage 
themselves 
Fees   Poor payment No system in place Poor payment 
Land or Resource 
conflicts 
  
Conservancy denies access 
for grazing purposes 
None mentioned 
The Agricultural College 
(formerly commonage 
land)has been invaded 
by livestock owners 
Other points of 
contention 
  
Refusal to pay fees, 
intimidation of 
Municipality by MEFA, 
deliberate vandalism of 
infrastructure 
Poaching, illegal sand 
extraction and felling of 
trees, Stockowners’ 
confrontational 
  
 
5.8. Relationships 
It is difficult to make any real conclusions about the relationships between commonage 
management bodies, except to give a broad assessment, based on what little evidence was given; 
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evidence which is often subjective or hearsay. Nonetheless, the following relationships between 
management bodies were deduced from interviews. 
 
5.8.1. Relationships With Other Government Departments  
In the study sites, according to key informants, the local municipalities receive little or no support 
from their district counterparts. Instead, the district-level DoA is the main source of funding or 
support and the Local Municipalities are seeking other ways of fulfilling their management needs; for 
example by employing Eastern Cape Agricultural Research Project to create management plans. 
Despite the fact that is provides funding for infrastructure and dipping facilities, the DoA has very 
little technical capacity and manpower to undertake management on the commonage (Bates pers. 
comm., 2008; Trollope pers. comm., 2008). Instead, the DoA is not a developmental partner, but 
focuses primarily on the veterinary care of commonage livestock. The district level DLA is another 
body whose role in commonage management extends only as far as the transfer of land and funds to 
the Local Municipality, and to ensure that the Local Municipality has various planning documents 
available before transfer (Zungula pers. comm., 2008).  
 
5.8.2. Relationships between Municipalities and Emerging Farmer Associations 
The Local Municipalities in the study sites receive little or no support from their respective Emerging 
Farmers’ Associations and the relationships between these two management bodies are poor, 
ineffectual or sometimes contentious. In Grahamstown, the key informant in the Makana Local 
Municipality believes that there are deliberate actions by the stock owners to subvert management 
attempts (Bates pers. comm., 2008). The source of contention, as mentioned before, is the 
unwillingness of stock owners to pay commonage fees; the refusal being justified by the poor or 
non-existent state of the infrastructure. The Local Municipality in Fort Beaufort feels that it has a 
good relationship with the local stockowners; however, the stock owners themselves feel frustrated 
by a lack of communication with the Local Municipality (Tonisi & Dyasi pers. comm., 2007). In 
Bathurst, the white livestock owner who dominates the number of cattle being grazed on the 
commonage has allegedly benefitted financially from the arrangement; so much so that has been 
able to buy another piece of land. However, this new land is degraded and, according to various 
people, he continues to graze his cattle on the commonage. The Municipality has been unable to 
rectify this situation. The municipality has also indicated that the other livestock owners are 
uncooperative (Mjacu pers. comm., 2008). 
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Through information gathered through informal discussions and through key informant interviews, 
the key point of contention between the stock owners and local municipalities (not just those from 
the study area) is the reduction of stock on the commonages. Due to various social and cultural 
reasons, livestock owners refuse to reduce their cattle for any reason; especially for “environmental” 
reasons. The social and cultural benefits of livestock relate to the practices of lobola, the sacrifice of 
animals on important occasions and the sale of animal products. A study done by Puttick (2007) on 
the Grahamstown commonage shows that there is a disjuncture between what western science 
would consider degraded or unproductive land, and what cattle owners would consider degraded 
land. As such, the livestock owners are unwilling to reduce numbers for the sake of ensuring that 
land does not become degraded according to westernised standards.  
 
5.8.3. Relationships within Municipalities 
In Grahamstown, Bates (pers. comm., 2008) mentions that the relationships within the Local 
Municipality are poor because communication is poor and the rate of personnel replacement in the 
Local Municipality is high. He says that the LED department has initiated development projects on 
the commonage without consulting him or the commonage users.  
 
The two departments that are concerned with commonage in the Ndlambe Local Municipality do 
separate functions; in other words, the LED department is concerned with development and the 
Conservation department is concerned with day to day maintenance.  
 
5.9. Capacity 
The DLA (Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 2008) realises that local municipalities have little capacity to 
participate in effective commonage management. There are usually more pressing issues, such as 
service delivery, and because it is not a political priority there is little will to be involved. The national 
DLA agrees that there is a lack of political will to be involved in commonage projects (Prinsloo, A. 
pers. comm., 2008). 
 
5.9.1. Grahamstown 
In Grahamstown, Mr Bates (pers. comm., 2008) openly admits to having little technical capacity and 
too little manpower to fulfil his obligations and responsibilities. He does not have enough support 
staff and his jurisdiction now covers the whole of the Makana region, which encompasses three 
larger towns, as well as smaller rural villages. He also feels that agricultural development is not part 
of his mandate and that the Agricultural Department was more effective in the past, in terms of 
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management of commonage and agricultural land. However, he does realise that every government 
department has its own problems and that the DoA, as mentioned before, suffers from staff 
shortages, a large geographical jurisdiction and loss of technical expertise. Nelani (pers. comm., 
2007) says that the mandate of the DoA is livestock dipping, land management and funding. How 
much of this mandate is fulfilled was not mentioned although dipping occurs every two weeks on 
every commonage within the jurisdiction of the DoA. 
 
Bates (pers. com. 2008) refers to his job as “disaster management” and feels that he is too often 
dealing with day-to-day problems to think futuristically. The commonage manager, who was 
subsequently laid off, was incompetent and did not have the necessary skills to achieve commonage 
goals. He also feels that intimidation and bribery of officials, including the commonage manager, has 
serious consequences for land management because people can continue to abuse the resource 
without serious penalties. Bates (pers. comm., 2008) also suggests that the transitional period (since 
1994) has proven disastrous for land management and the environment due to the free-for-all 
system that prevails and because people feel they are entitled to the services provided by 
government.  
 
The Grahamstown Emerging Farmers’ Association (Mamkeli pers. comm., 2007) agrees that the 
Makana Local Municipality has too little financial and personnel capacity but also mentions the 
Emerging Farmers’ Association’s own lack of funding and resources. They receive little support from 
elsewhere and would like an administration building with administrative resources from where they 
can manage the cattle owners and hold meetings. Mamkeli  (pers. comm., 2007) feels that the 
manpower for management is available in the form of cattle owners, who he feels will be willing to 
help with management and policing, but for now it seems that they are not co-operating (Bates pers. 
comm., 2008). Mamkeli (pers. comm., 2007) feels that another hindrance to proper management is 
the lack of infrastructure and funding. Lastly, the Makana Emerging Farmers’ Association feels that 
the Local Municipality has all the power to make decisions about the commonage and that the 
commonage manager and users have little power to change the rules (Mamkeli pers. comm., 2007). 
 
5.9.2. Bathurst 
In Ndlambe Local Municipality, the LED Department seems to be out-sourcing its capacity; therefore, 
it is paying other bodies to do work that they do not have the skills to do themselves. Marala (pers. 
comm., 2008) says that the Local Municipality is unable to do effective conservation and is looking to 
Rhodes University to help in this regard. The agriculture sector of the LED Department has large 
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stakeholder involvement, from users themselves, to the DoA (provincial), the Department of Labour 
and the Department of Social Development (Mjacu pers. comm., 2008). However, the local 
commonage ranger feels that the Local Municipality is too over-burdened at the moment to engage 
in co-management, are underfunded and have too little manpower. Therefore, they are struggling to 
fulfil their mandates (Ntlokwana pers. comm., 2007). Fouche (pers. comm., 2008) indicates that the 
commonage ranger has a large geographical jurisdiction and can only do day-to-day tasks. He 
believes that because no one person is responsible for commonage management, and it is 
essentially a management “grey area”, and many projects “fall flat”. 
 
5.9.3. Fort Beaufort 
The Nkonkobe Local Municipality has financial problems and relies mainly on the equity share 
funding from central government to ensure that the Local Municipality functions optimally (Mxoli 
pers. comm., 2007). The Local Municipality has to rely on this fund because it has a very small 
revenue base in the town, which is exacerbated by the high unemployment rate and lack of industry. 
Mxoli (pers. comm., 2007) emphasised the need for the commonage to generate its own income and 
so be financially self-sustainable. The Emerging Farmers’ Association says it has no funding support 
for administrative purposes and, therefore, little capacity (Dyasi & Tonisi pers. comm., 2007). Their 
general support base consists of the local college (Cape College), with very little DoA and NGO 
involvement. The Emerging Farmers’ Association feel that the Municipality has its own agenda (and 
nepotism is rife) and are not proactive enough in commonage management issues (Dyasi & Tonisi 
pers. comm., 2007). They further mention the lack of democratic rule, the bribery and corruption 
being experienced within the Municipality and the poor communication skills of the Local 
Municipality. The Emerging Farmers’ Association feels that, without adequate infrastructure, they 
cannot farm efficiently and effectively.  
 
5.10. Monitoring 
According to the Cacadu and Amathole DLA there is little or no monitoring on commonage projects 
(Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 2008; Zungula pers. comm., 2008). The DLA is only responsible for 
ensuring that management plans are available upon purchase of the land (Zungula pers. comm., 
2008) and the effectiveness of the implementation of this plan will usually also depend on the DLA 
official dealing with the case (Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 2008). 
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Table 7: The capacity and support given to the Local Municipalities 
 
Capacity and Support 
    Grahamstown Bathurst Fort Beaufort 
Capacity 
  
Municipal 
Little in LM: too big a 
jurisdiction and no focus 
exclusively on 
commonage 
Little in LM: too many 
other priorities and not 
enough manpower or 
vehicles 
No capacity and no 
funds (poor revenue 
base due to poor 
area) 
Other 
Alleged bribery of 
officials, high councillor 
turnover rate, loss of 
institutional memory in 
DoA 
   
Revenue  Only from Slaaikraal None None 
Involvement of 
other 
Who DoA, DEDEA 
DoA, Dept of 
Conservation (ECP) 
DoA 
What 
DoA: Funding for 
infrastructure, dipping 
and inoculations, DEDEA: 
Conservancy 
DoA: Dipping and 
infrastructure, Dept of 
Conservation: monitoring 
illegal activities 
DoA: training 
Training and 
Mentorship 
 
No, but LM feels 
something should be 
done about this 
None 
DoA training of 
emergent farmers 
Local Ecological 
Knowledge 
Used at all? No No No 
 
5.11. Environmental Management 
The Department of Economic Development and Environmental Affairs (DEDEA) is the former Eastern 
Cape Department of Conservation. The regional Department’s jurisdiction includes Fort Beaufort, 
Grahamstown and Bathurst. This regional body indicates that it has no involvement in commonage 
management except in Grahamstown, where a part of the commonage has been included in the 
Oldenburgia Conservancy (Hahndiek pers. comm., 2007). The Oldenburgia Conservancy is envisaged 
as a conservation area for education, training and recreational purposes. It consists of the “Southern 
Commonage”, private farms and a nature reserve. Essentially no access will be permitted to livestock 
owners (Hahndiek pers. comm., 2007). 
 
The lack of involvement of DEDEA shows that little or no environmental management is formally 
undertaken, if one excludes agricultural management as advocated by management planning in the 
respective Local Municipalities. Environmental management is therefore ad hoc, informal and 
implemented by different agencies or when it is absolutely necessary (for instance in Fort Beaufort).  
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Table 8: Environmental management occurring on the commonages in the study areas 
 
Environmental Management of Commonage 
    Grahamstown Bathurst Fort Beaufort 
Environmental 
Management 
How 
Southern Commonage 
incorporated into 
Conservancy, no other 
management 
Eastern Cape Parks 
monitors illegal 
activities 
None, unless serious 
environmental issue, 
then DEDEA intervenes 
Responsible 
Department 
DEDEA and LM ECP and LM DEDEA 
Problems with 
EM 
Environmental 
management on 
Oldenburgia 
Conservancy 
Township residents 
opposed to 
conservancy  
No body to do this 
Environmental 
problems 
Alien invasive 
species 
WfW programme 
underway 
Yes Unknown 
Illegal activities Plant extraction 
Poaching, sand 
extraction and felling 
of trees 
Dumping municipal 
waste 
Overgrazing Yes Yes Yes 
Future plans     Joint venture with ECP   
Protected areas 
in vicinity 
  
Oldenburgia 
Conservancy 
Waters Meeting State 
Reserve 
 
 
Eastern Cape Parks monitors activities in Bathurst because the commonage borders the Waters 
Meeting Nature Reserves. The body is concerned with poaching and illegal extraction of fuelwood, 
sand and plants, activities which are subject to a fine (Fouche per. comm. 2008). In Fort Beaufort, 
DEDEA will only intervene in “serious” cases (Mxoli pers. comm., 2007). In Grahamstown, the 
activities on the Conservancy are monitored, but no environmental management is implemented on 
the rest of the commonage.  
 
One key informant, Mr Rob Gess, the Chairperson of the Bathurst Rate Payers Association 
mentioned that the commonage users in the Nolukhanyo (township) were approached with plans to 
create a conservancy on the commonage. The idea was objected to immediately; although, Gess 
(pers. comm., 2008) feels that the local people misunderstood the idea behind a “conservancy” and 
saw it as a means of excluding them from the land. 
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5.12. Integrated Development Planning 
5.12.1. Nkonkobe 
As mentioned in section 2, Nkonkobe Local Municipality is under the jurisdiction of the Amathole 
District Municipality. Commonage development is recognised in the Amathole IDP as a spatial 
planning approach and is, therefore, reflected in its Spatial Development Framework (SDF). The SDF 
outlines several key principles and policies (Amathole, 2006: 158). It stipulates that the most 
favourable areas for land reform are existing settlements. Where a settlement is surrounded by 
commonage, the existing settlement must expand into the commonage and new land be found to 
extend the existing commonage area. Good agricultural land must be reserved for commonages and 
farmlands. Emerging farmers (those with large herds) must be identified and moved onto 
agricultural land elsewhere, as this will make additional commonage land available to other users. 
Therefore, the SDF recognises that land reform is essential in peri-urban areas, that there is a strong 
need for commonage land for use by residents in settlements and that emerging farmers must make 
room for subsistence users.  
 
The Nkonkobe Local Municipality IDP (Nkonkobe, 2007: 47), in which Fort Beaufort is situated, 
mentions the ‘commonage’ under its social needs projects and suggests the allocation of R120 000 
towards the fencing of the commonage. The source of funding is suggested as the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant. Besides this, it is not mentioned again and is not considered a resource for 
potential projects or strategic development. Yet, Nkonkobe is in a dire situation, compared to the 
Local Municipalities of Ndlambe and Makana. The IDP indicates extreme underdevelopment, very 
high levels of unemployment (only 3.5% of the economically active population have access to jobs in 
the Nkonkobe economy) and very low income levels (74% of the population are without an income). 
The IDP acknowledges that, through a proper planning process, the Municipality must derive the 
maximum benefit from available resources.  
 
In terms of the LED context, the Nkonkobe Municipality has identified that the agricultural sector in 
the region is in decline, but has a potential for growth. Also, tourism has been identified as a sector 
that could revive the economy of the Nkonkobe region, and the Municipality is making positive steps 
towards seeking funds, creating partnerships and building tourist infrastructure to help in the 
process of tourism development. The Municipality has identified nature conservation, game reserves 
and heritage sites as having the largest potential for LED, although the former requires the support 
of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. In a somewhat contradictory manner, the IDP 
acknowledges that Environmental Management is not prioritised in Nkonkobe and that 
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“environmental concerns do not surface in any part of its operations” (section 5.5) (Nkonkobe, 
2007). Fort Beaufort has a high concentration of people and economic activity, in comparison to 
other towns in Nkonkobe, yet still has low employment levels. The IDP states that agricultural revival 
is crucial for LED throughout Nkonkobe, together with tourism and SMME’s as other potential LED 
activities. 
 
5.12.2. Makana 
Makana Municipality (Grahamstown), in contrast to the Nkonkobe Municipality, does view 
commonage as a potential developmental asset and has allocated large amounts of funding to 
infrastructure establishment and upgrades and even to the establishment of new commonage is 
other towns in the Makana jurisdiction (Makana, 2008: 74). Unfortunately, it seems that many of the 
plans are unfunded, although the Makana Local Municipality is seeking funding from the DLA, DoA 
and from its own internal coffers. The overall objective relating to commonage is “to ensure that 
commonages, farms and nature reserves are managed effectively and efficiently at all times” 
(Makana, 2008: 74). There is currently an established stock farming project. The IDP also suggests a 
timeframe for these commonage projects: 90% of the target to be reached by 2010, whereby the 
current standing is 0-25% (depending on the project). The responsibility for these projects rests with 
the Parks and Recreation Department, which suffers from low expertise capacity, insufficient 
management of newly acquired farms and too many functions (Makana, 2008: 43).  
 
The IDP recognises the environmental wealth of the Makana region whilst also recognising the 
following threats to the vegetation: (1) overgrazing, (2) development of new lands for agriculture, (3) 
the collection of plants and (4) invasive alien plants. In particular, the IDP recognises the role that 
uncontrolled subsistence grazing is playing in wetland degradation (Makana, 2008: 19). However, 
they are aiming to draft a sustainable management plan for the commonages and stray animals. 
Furthermore, the IDP recognises the need to effectively implement the Conservation of Agricultural 
Resources Act 43 of 1983 (CARA),  in particular the implementation of carrying capacity regulations,  
and the appointment of a permanent conservation officer (Makana, 2008: 20). 
 
5.12.3. Ndlambe 
The Ndlambe IDP (2007: 44) recognises the role that well-managed commonage facilities play in 
food security and income generation strategies, and that commonage offers the municipality an 
opportunity to contribute to the improvement of quality of life. However, it recognises numerous 
problems with commonage (Ndlambe, 2007: 44): (1) commonage is not well managed; (2) 
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communities are hesitant to use it because of theft of animals; (3) poor availability of commonages 
in some communities; (4) refusal to pay for use and access; (5) fences continue to get stolen; (6) lack 
of infrastructure and adequate roads; and (7) insufficient water on commonages. The IDP 
acknowledges the needs for a closer and better relationship with the DoA; however, it also 
recognises the challenge of effective management in terms of camp creation, maintenance of 
infrastructure and monitoring its use, as well as managing it in a way that is makes a meaningful 
contribution to poor households. 
The IDP reflects that Ndlambe Local Municipality has allocated funding to commonage fencing, with 
the suggestion that these funds be derived from the DoA. It also has suggestions to expand some of 
its commonages through DLA funding (Ndlambe, 2007: 87). Through this LED project, which aims to 
provide facilities to support economic activities in the community, fencing and establishment of 
commonages will be combined with capacity building of emerging farmers. The major problem of 
crime in Bathurst will be dealt with through commonage guards (Ndlambe, 2007: 128). The IDP 
further acknowledges the need for commonage management plans for all the commonages, which 
will require the active participation of the Community Services Division, in particular the LED 
Department. Furthermore, through a commonage and coastal conservation project, alien vegetation 
will be eradicated from the municipal commonages (Ndlambe, 2007: 57). 
 
Table 9: The LED initiatives mentioned on the commonages in the study areas 
 
Local Economic Development on Commonage 
  Grahamstown Bathurst Fort Beaufort 
Projects 
Piggery, Mining and 
Brick making factory, 
goat project 
Cultivation (crops) but 
poor marketing and 
benefits  
LM expects residents 
to approach them 
with development 
plans (incl an EIA) 
Other 
LM does not think 
development is 
possible 
Plans for Tourism 
ventures and more 
cultivation  
None  
Hindrances to LED 
Need more water for 
cultivation 
Need more water for 
cultivation 
  
 
5.13. Recommendations for Improving Management 
5.13.1. Management Recommendations 
The various key informants gave various recommendations for overcoming some of the problems 
with commonage management, problems that were raised in the interviews. The Local 
Municipalities of Ndlambe and Nkonkobe offered the suggestion of co-management (Fouche pers. 
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comm., 2008, Mxoli pers. comm., 2007). This suggestion takes the form of an all-inclusive 
management body with representatives from the Municipality (Fouche suggests one department; 
preferably the LED department), user associations (including cattle owners as well as other 
commonage users), ward councillor/s, other government departments and even the commonage 
rangers. Fouche (pers. comm., 2008) sees a facilitation role for municipalities.  
 
Bates (pers. comm., 2008) suggests a leasehold system whereby pieces of land are leased to 
livestock owners and only certain numbers of animals can be grazed on each piece of land. This is 
offered as a solution to management problems related to elite capture. This echoes the feelings of 
the Nkonkobe Local Municipality who feel that land must be made available to people who indicate 
their need to the Local Municipality, which will then purchase land to be made available for 
agricultural purposes (Mxoli pers. comm., 2007).  
 
H. Prinsloo (pers. comm., 2008) feels that the culture of expectancy and dependency must change. 
People must become more aware of the value of commonage and that they need to pay for such a 
service. Bates (pers. comm., 2008) feels that users must be educated to become better acquainted 
with the reality of the commonage situation. He realises that law enforcement is too confrontational 
and will never work. Furthermore, he feels that education may help to change the attitudes of 
people, after which the payment of fees can be better enforced because people begin to take 
responsibility for the land. He also believes that the commonage users have an important role to 
play in policing each other and ensuring that rules are followed. 
 
5.13.2. Practical Recommendations 
Bates (pers. comm., 2008) in Grahamstown feels that the co-operation of livestock owners is crucial 
for success of commonage management but sees a hindrance to this co-operation being the high 
numbers of cattle owners who are difficult to control and monitor. Without fences and the 
regulation of movement, management is impossible. Therefore, Bates (pers. comm., 2008) feels that 
large amounts of funding must be made available for the mass implementation of infrastructure on 
the commonage. So far, the fluctuating funding is proving ineffectual. The respective Chairpersons of 
the Emerging Farmers’ Associations in Fort Beaufort and Grahamstown also expressed a wish to see 
a “commercialisation” of the commonage, with better infrastructure and markets, and the 
implementation of conventional rangeland management practices (Mamkeli pers. comm., 2007; 
Tonisi & Dyasi pers. comm., 2007). Better markets could be crucial for the sale of livestock, which 
would help ease the burden of grazing on commonage. However, people are unwilling to sell 
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because their cattle fetch poor prices on the markets as they are often bought for the slaughter 
houses. Their animals are generally in poor condition and diseased. 
 
Other practical recommendations are as follows: 
1. General management recommendations: There is a need to introduce a fee system (per 
head of livestock) or improve the current fee system (Mjacu pers. comm., 2008; Prinsloo, H. 
pers. comm., 2008).  
2. Development recommendations: LED can be enhanced through a tourism venture on the 
Bathurst commonage (Marala pers. comm., 2008; Gess pers. comm., 2008). H. Prinsloo 
(pers. comm., 2008) warns that the benefits of such a venture should accrue to the 
community and not the municipality. The commonages need good local-level markets to 
enable people to sell their stock for reasonable prices and they will also need to be educated 
about market mechanisms (Ainslie pers. comm., 2007). An Nguni Project can be introduced 
onto commonage which would lead to better quality of animals, reduced pressure on 
grazing resources and more economic benefits from this highly priced animal (Ainslie pers. 
comm., 2007; Gess pers. comm., 2008). 
3. People development recommendations: Emerging farmers on commonage need mentorship 
(Prinsloo, H. pers. comm., 2008). Local skills of people should be optimised and 
commercialised (Ntlokwana pers. comm., 2007). 
4. Environmental and Veld Management systems: Strategic water points and strategic herding 
will make infrastructure like fences less important for rotational grazing (Ainslie pers. 
comm., 2007). Fodder should be grown on the commonage for those seasons and times 
when grazing is poor (Trollope pers. comm., 2008). Large herds need to be removed from 
the commonage, as well as people who are abusing the commonage (Gess pers. comm., 
2008). A conservancy needs to be created on the Bathurst Commonage so that better 
management principles are applied (Fouche pers. comm., 2008). More land must be 
purchased and some set aside for conservation (in Bathurst) (Ntlokwana pers. comm., 2007). 
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6. Discussion  
6.1. What Have We Learnt? 
The results of this research confirm existing findings in the literature, with regards to the 
management of commonages in South Africa. Other case studies conducted throughout the country 
support many of the issues raised in the previous section. In particular, the failures of commonage 
management can be linked strongly to the inability of Local Municipalities to fulfil their 
“developmental local government” mandate and all the responsibilities that are associated with 
their role as developmental agencies. As Fouche (pers. comm., 2008) stated, commonage 
management is a “grey area”, indicating that Local Municipalities are often unsure of their 
responsibilities, and often lack the capacity to develop commonage in such a way that it contributes 
to poverty alleviation or economic development. 
 
Some of the issues that have emerged in this research, such as poor infrastructure, overstocking, 
stock theft and elite capture can readily be attributed to inadequate management of commonage, 
resulting from local municipalities with poor financial capacity and too few resources. However, 
social concerns such as poor employment prospects, land hunger and rapid urbanisation, although 
they impact on the amount of people who use commonage to provide for their livelihoods, are 
concerns that are out of the scope of the municipality to rectify; except over the long term. These 
are social and economic concerns that stem from broader processes within South Africa and from 
the inequality that was promoted during the years of Apartheid. Hence, this is an obvious example 
where management processes are embedded in the broader governance structure. It is clear, 
therefore, that commonage management in South Africa is affected by wider policies, institutions 
and governance structures. This is certainly the case for the commonages in the study sites, 
considering they are situated in South Africa’s poverty-stricken province of the Eastern Cape. One 
may deduce that there are constraints to commonage management found at a broader governance 
level. As one will begin to see in the subsequent discussion, resource use is complicated by the 
contextual factors that affect institutional interplay and which determine the use and management 
of commonage.  
 
6.2. Commonage Management 
One of the failures of commonage management in the study sites can be attributed to financially 
weak, but socially powerful Emerging Farmers’ Associations. In Bathurst and Grahamstown, the 
Emerging Farmers’ Associations have poor commonage user representation and are able to 
intimidate the Municipality and other commonage users. The characteristics of Emerging Farmers’ 
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Associations in other parts of the country suggest that they are informally and loosely organised, 
lack representation of poor and women stakeholders but often consist of the most powerful 
members of the community (Benseler, 2004). They are sometimes relied upon for management but 
are unqualified to do so (Buso, 2003). Commonage management committees in Namaqualand, who 
regulate access and use of the commonages, are dominated by wealthy or non-poor members of a 
community, who are mainly men, and because the municipality fails to regulate their actions, the 
committees flout regulations, capture resources for themselves and overstock the land (Lebert, 
2004). The committees use the narrative of degradation to justify the quasi-commercialisation of 
farms and the subsequent private tenure that it involves, but fail to implement commercial 
rangeland management practices; for example, carrying capacity regulations, resting and rotational 
grazing (Lebert & Rohde, 2007). 
 
Although it is sufficient in terms of the commonage policy (DLA, 2002) to have the user association 
represented by the livestock owners association, it is insufficient for reaching the goals of equitable 
and efficient use of the commonage. This system threatens the livelihoods of other commonage 
users because it fails to represent their interests and it is subject to elite capture by the livestock 
owners. It also threatens the ecology of the commonage because the harvesting of NTFPs on the 
commonage is unchecked, because these resource users are unaccounted for, and, if the CMC is 
dominated by livestock owners, livestock numbers are not properly monitored.  
 
The Municipal interviewees in Fort Beaufort and Bathurst suggest that a system of co-management 
should be initiated on the respective commonages. However, as discovered in the literature on 
natural resource management, this system of management has many flaws, especially when there is 
lack of true collaboration between affected parties, either due to power imbalances or failure to 
define resource rights (Kepe et al., 2003). This collaborative element is already missing from 
commonage management in the study areas, when one considers the poor relationships and poor 
communication that occurs between municipal departments, between municipalities and emerging 
farmers associations and between emerging farmers associations and other users. There is also a 
lack of integration of other government departments into governance structures.  
 
The interviewees also suggest a number of practical recommendations to improve commonage 
management, such as improving livestock herds or implementing a fee system. Although they may 
prove useful for commonage managers, and are certainly examples of creative thinking, they do not 
account for the framework of management, and the exogenous and endogenous variables that 
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affect the physical, ecological and socio-economic environment. In other words, these 
recommendations do not address the governance situation in when management is embedded. It is 
uncertain what the outcome of such interventions would be, and issues of community buy-in, 
sustainable development and success of management interventions are not considered. 
 
6.3. Commonage Rangeland Degradation 
There is evidence that there is, or may be, rangeland degradation on the commonages in the study 
sites. Degradation can be linked to over-stocking of the land and other poor rangeland management 
practices. However, these drivers are also linked to other governance issues such as: 1) growing 
township populations resulting from rapid urbanisation rates in the Eastern Cape and the eviction of 
farm workers from farms; 2) poor regulation and management of cattle numbers; 3) poor marketing 
facilities which constrains the sale of livestock; 4) increasing unemployment and the accompanying 
reliance on natural resources to supplement social grants; 5) too little land for increasing livestock 
numbers; 6) poor infrastructure and lack of rotational grazing and stock movement; 7) failure of 
some livestock owners to keep their herd sizes within sustainable limits; and 8) the encroachment of 
other land uses (such as housing) onto the commonages.  
 
In Grahamstown, the condition of the vegetation suggests that there is some degree of degradation 
because there is a shift from palatable to unpalatable species composition (Puttick, 2007: 29). 
Puttick (2007: 29) attributes this to a combination of overgrazing and poor rainfall. Although CPR 
analysts suggest that in non-equilibrium rangeland conditions, climatic factors may be more 
important drivers of rangeland condition than rangeland management practices (see for example, 
Benjaminsen et al., 2006). Puttick (2007) states that overgrazing plays an important role in 
degradation because older commonage areas are more degraded than new commonage areas. This 
supports the idea presented in the first section that one must better understand the dynamics of the 
rangeland in order to attempt to understand the drivers of degradation. However, Higginbottom et 
al. (1995: 96) asserts that “it is universally agreed that on most veld types in the Eastern Cape, 
stocking rates above those recommended for an extended period of time will lead to a decline in the 
number of stock that can in the future be supported”. Hence, overgrazing plays a significant part in 
rangeland degradation in the study sites and can lead to a loss of productivity.  
 
The constraints to appropriate rangeland management practices are related to broader socio-
economic and political drivers in the Eastern Cape. Considering the extent of the poverty in the area, 
it is crucial to be more sensitive to the needs of the peri-urban dwellers, because they are often 
107 
 
people with few income generating opportunities, very few skills, deal with poor service delivery on 
a day-to-day basis and are finding natural resources in the area subject to increasing competition. 
Furthermore, commonage land may be the only natural resource available to the poorest in the 
community. Although Benseler (2004: 23) suggests that poor institutional arrangements and failure 
to comply with regulations as drivers of overgrazing, it is too simple to consider such site-specific 
factors as the sole determinants driving poor rangeland management.  
 
When considering the broader context into which commonage management falls, the drivers of 
poor management and overstocking become more complicated. Not only are there ecological 
factors driving degradation, such as the rangeland dynamics that characterise ecological systems 
(Puttick, 2007; Atkinson, 2007a: 29), but socio-economic drivers also impact on rangeland 
management, in particular the poverty which is prevalent in the Eastern Cape (see for example 
Lahiff, 2003). However, it is difficult to say whether it is poverty or wealth that leads to 
overutilization of the commons and consequent degradation (Agrawal, 2001: 1658). Management 
objectives also drive rangeland management, as argued by Benjaminsen et al. (2006), who feels that 
stocking densities are rational adaptations to the objectives and needs of the farmers using 
commonage. Other drivers, such as political factors which relate to developmental local 
government, the Land Reform Programme and other policy changes in South Africa, and global 
drivers such as climate change and the current food crises, also have an impact on rangeland 
management practices. Agrawal (2001: 1655) also suggests that market forces, state interventions 
and population pressures are exerting an influence on commons use. Hence, commonage is facing 
many challenges from multiple scales. It is necessary to consider these contextual factors on a case 
by case basis (Agrawal, 2001: 1657). 
 
6.4. Developmental Local Government and Capacity Constraints 
This research gives evidence of the pressure that municipalities, and other government 
departments, are under to provide services for their growing urban populations, whilst still being 
burdened by the necessity of Local Economic Development. Research in the Northern Cape, Free 
State and Karoo suggest that this is not unique to the Eastern Cape (see Buso, 2003; Benseler, 2004), 
although one can argue that the poverty levels and poor development in the Eastern Cape make LED 
more difficult in the study sites than in other areas of South Africa. As Higginbottom et al. (1995: 94) 
suggests, the management of homeland towns, of which there are many in the Eastern Cape, has 
deteriorated rapidly following the incorporation of the homeland states into the Republic of South 
Africa and the subsequent release of the tight controls that the former Apartheid government 
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implemented in these areas. The commonage of Fort Beaufort is arguably the most poorly managed 
of the three commonages, and this may be attributed to its location right near the former Ciskei 
homeland. Consequently, it is situated in the least developed town, which has the highest 
unemployment rates and is the most burdened by service delivery requirements. 
 
In the Northern Cape it was found that commonage management requires additional capacity at 
municipal level, and that the staff responsible for commonage management are unskilled, have no 
agricultural background and no financial resources (Benseler, 2004: 35). Commonage management is 
considered a burden to the municipalities, is poorly implemented and increasingly, the municipalities 
are relying on the commonage users to maintain the infrastructure on the commonage (Benseler, 
2004: 44). Commonage projects in the Free State are constrained by lack of support to 
municipalities, lack of qualified personnel and lack of support to commonage users (Buso, 2003: 69). 
These case-studies support the current research in the Eastern Cape. The management of the 
commonages in the study sites are also constrained by lack of municipal capacity, poorly qualified 
personnel, non-existent or poor clarity of management roles, lack of funding and poor or 
uncoordinated support from other stakeholders or government departments.  
 
This suggests that capacity constraints in municipalities are related to manpower and funding 
constraints, but also to a lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities. However, it can be argued that 
capacity constraints also relate to others mentioned by Lambin (2005). He suggests that sustainable 
management of resources requires the provision of appropriate physical, technical and institutional 
infrastructure. This indicates that resource management requires a policy that allows for rule 
creation, the technology and skills to implement management, high levels of social capital amongst 
stakeholders, the availability of labour and capital and the readiness of resource users to adapt  to 
changing circumstances (Lambin, 2005: 179). This implies that sustainable natural resource 
management requires more than just physical infrastructure and manpower. As suggested by Bates 
(pers. comm., 2008) and H. Prinsloo (pers. comm., 2008), commonage users need to have the right 
attitude towards commonage management and there needs to be co-operation between 
management stakeholders such as users and municipalities. It is, therefore, imperative that social 
capital is invested in so that all management parties can strive towards a collective goal. 
Furthermore, the lack of political will amongst municipal officials to be involved in commonage 
management, as suggested by some sources, needs to be rectified and a culture of accountability 
created, whereby a town’s populace can expect local government to account for all their actions and 
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thereby, allow local people to influence future decision-making processes in respect of commonage 
land use and access rules. 
 
As shown in the Fort Beaufort case, commonage management is being undermined because access 
is controlled by municipal officials who are subject to nepotistic and corrupt practices. Corruption 
has also affected a project on the Grahamstown commonage known as the Makana Goat Project. As 
the Grocott’s Mail reports, a final audit of the project revealed that almost a million Rand was used 
“ineligibly” and now the project may have to be discontinued if the funding partner pulls out 
(Butana, 2008). These cases of misused funds are not unique to the study sites or commonages, but 
can be found in other Land Reform case studies. An investigative report by The Mercury shows how 
an agricultural project failed, even though millions of Rands had been obtained for the project from 
Eskom and the South African government (Dardagan, 2008). The Mercury reporter found that the 
farm had been abandoned and that the machinery that had been bought was missing.  It is difficult 
to be optimistic for the future of Land Reform in a climate such as this. 
 
6.5. The Tenure Situation on Commonage 
It can be argued that commonage is state land, with a public nature, that is common to a community 
(or town), and as such is a common property resource, but is subject to open-access land-use 
practices. The use of commonage is communal (Atkinson & Buscher, 2006: 457), due to its public 
nature and because it is mainly used for subsistence agriculture (Masiteng et al., 2003: 89). 
Therefore, it shares many similarities with rural communal rangeland use, such as the use of multiple 
and diverse natural resources and the tendency of users to engage in multiple income generating 
activities. It can be argued too that a trend of “individualisation” is affecting commonage land-use in 
the study sites, whereby emerging farmers are informally securing access to portions of the land, 
and are powerful enough to deny access to other members of the community. In Fort Beaufort, a 
number of black farmers are leasing a portion of land that was donated to the municipality and in 
Grahamstown, a similar phenomenon is happening on one new farm that was purchased by means 
of the Commonage Programme. This individualisation could have detrimental effects on the 
equitable use of the commonage and does not necessarily lead to the sustainable use of the natural 
resources (Dietz et al., 2003: 1907). The negative results of this trend of individualisation are 
detailed in research done in Namaqualand (see for example, Lebert, 2004; Lebert & Rohde, 2007 and 
Benjaminsen et al., 2006).  
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Individualisation will not necessarily lead to inequitable use of the commonage, if it is regulated and 
controlled in a fair and democratic way. At the moment, however, wealthier cattle owners are 
engaging in a form of “elite capture” by ignoring regulations, intimidating weaker members of the 
community, conflicting with other users of the commonage and by refusing to pay a user fee. This 
may be attributed to a failure to acknowledge the existence and worth of other livelihood activities 
on the commonage. In the subsequent section, it will be argued that other commonage uses are just 
as important as grazing. Therefore, systems must be put in place to “dilute” the power of these 
individuals, by giving other land use options equal weight when deciding on the future of 
commonage, and by putting an end to elite capture through democratic and accountable control 
over resource access. 
 
6.6. Uses and Users of Commonage 
The predominant use of commonage in the study sites is for grazing purposes.  However, this finding 
fails to account for the number of different activities taking place on commonage that are either 
unknown, illegal, have very little economic worth or are not considered to be agricultural. This is 
similar to the argument in livelihoods literature, that the use of NTFPs and other natural resources is 
often unaccounted for (see for example, Shackleton et al., 2001). Nonetheless, there is also failure of 
interviewees to differentiate between the commercial and subsistence needs of commonage users. 
It is also unknown why livestock seems to be the predominant livelihood strategy on the 
commonages. Although the results presented fail to inform the reader about the equity of the 
commonage use in the study areas, it is suggested that commonage grazing dominates use, that it is 
predominantly a male occupation (Davenport & Gambiza, 2008: 5) and that the failure to recognise 
the other livelihood generating activities on commonage may lead to potentially inequitable access 
and use of commonage.  
 
The commonage programme advocates an agricultural development land-use model, dominated by 
grazing (Govender-van Wyk & Wilson, 2006: 2). As the literature suggests, the use of commonage by 
poor residents, in particular women, could be constrained by management systems that 
individualise portions of the commonage (Higginbottom et al., 1995). Women play a critical role in 
harvesting products from a common pool resource but are often marginalised from decision-making, 
ownership of assets and exercising power (Agrawal, 2001: 1657). Furthermore, the agricultural  
focus of commonage management systems ignores the other livelihood opportunities that are 
presented by tourism or other projects (Govender-van Wyk & Wilson, 2006: 2), which could have 
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benefits that accrue to the whole community, such as is envisioned by the tourism project on 
Bathurst commonage. 
 
Anderson (1996), in a preliminary study of commonage, indicates that conservation or other land-
use practices have not been fully investigated as a way to use commonage in an equitable and 
sustainable manner. She discusses a number of “creative options” for the use of commonage, from 
stock farming in a subsistence manner, to game farming, recreation and tourism. As Higginbottom et 
al. (1995: 97) recommends, the constraints to certain land-use options must be investigated and the 
use of commonage tailored to the specific vegetative, geographical, social and political situation in 
which it features. Evidence from the IDPs and the interviews suggest that the commonages in the 
study sites are being considered for development initiatives, but it can be argued that projects are 
not being implemented, and when projects are implemented, such as the vegetable cultivation in 
Bathurst, they are inclined to be small-scale and fail to show community benefits. Furthermore, they 
are not always successful.  
 
 In Namaqualand, Govender-van Wyk & Wilson (2006) found many constraints to livestock farming 
as a livelihood option on commonage and suggests that tourism has enormous potential for local 
economic development and benefits can be spread widely throughout the community. In the 
Northern Cape, Benseler (2004: 45) suggests that the commonage is often the only available land 
that can be used for projects to benefit communities, but that these projects must not be limited to 
those of an agricultural nature; commonages should be considered for community initiatives, local 
economic development projects and tourism facilities.  
 
The focus on tourism as a potential LED initiative is of particular importance when considering the 
commonage in Bathurst. The MAFA document, quoted many times over, was an initial report 
focussed on reporting the likelihood of initiating conservation efforts on the commonage and the 
potential benefits that may accrue to the community of Nolukhanyo through ecotourism. The 
purpose of conservation is not to deny the community access to the commonage, but rather to 
conserve key ecosystem processes and ensure that the commonage is managed sustainably, whilst 
developing projects on the commonage that will be show economic and ecological returns to all 
residents of Bathurst. This idea has become a contentious issue, as indicated by Gess (pers. comm., 
2008); however, Ntlokwana (pers. comm., 2007) felt that many members of the Nolukhanyo 
community do support conservation efforts and see the value of sustainable harvesting and tourism. 
It would be an interesting case study if the conservancy idea was initiated on the Bathurst 
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commonage. Similar projects have been successful in other places in South Africa, such as Rooiberg 
Conservancy Project in Eksteenfontein, whereby a community turned their commonage into a viable 
tourist destination (see Govender-van Wyk, 2007). The project has shown real benefits to the 
greater community and is more viable than other land-uses in the area (Govender-van Wyk, 2007: 
211).  
 
Despite the potential for conservation and tourism, the argument that commonage managers should 
use creative thinking when initiating projects on commonage does not preclude the use of 
commonage for livestock production. As noted in the first section, livestock have a range of uses, 
and the benefits of the use accrue to all members of the community. They also have immense social 
and cultural wealth, although it is evidently difficult to quantify this. Livestock production will always 
be considered a valuable land-use option, and to deny people use of the commonage for grazing will 
result in conflict. The Emerging Farmers’ Associations have indicated that they hope that 
municipalities will acknowledge the worth of livestock and promote projects to improve its 
production. Suggestions such as the introduction of Nguni cattle, fodder production, marketing 
facilities and strategic water points prove valuable in this regard, and it is crucial for municipalities to 
consider creative ways of improving livestock management practices too. Furthermore, it is 
important for municipalities to consider just how “productive” subsistence livestock production can 
be. It is not always appropriate to measure this against Western standards. Work done by Nicholas 
Davenport on the commonages in the study sites suggests that commonage use is much more 
productive per hectare than other commercial land-use options (Davenport, 2008).  
 
6.7. Implications for Land Reform in South Africa 
Evidence from the research conducted in the study suggests that the failure to exit commonage is 
linked to problems experienced by the Land Reform Programme in South Africa, such as high land 
prices, poor post-settlement support, bad planning, insufficient farming knowledge and poor 
beneficiary organisation. It can be argued too that until the failures of Redistribution, and in 
particular LRAD, are addressed, using commonage as a “stepping stone” for emerging farmers is not 
going to be effective because farmers are constrained by the broader agricultural climate. A closer 
look at lessons learned may, however, indicate where commonage, for graduation purposes and as a 
sub-programme of the Redistribution Programme, can be used to complement the Land Reform 
Programme of South Africa.  
 
 
113 
 
6.7.1. Constraints to Graduation 
The stepping stone system in Namaqualand is found to favour non-poor over poor residents because 
little support is given to those members of the community who wish to convert from subsistence 
agriculture to commercial systems of agriculture (Anseeuw & Laurent, 2007: 668). In earlier research 
conducted on Grahamstown commonage, is was found that the stepping stone policy fails to clarify 
who subsistence and emergent farmers are, and how and when the latter should exit (Davenport & 
Gambiza, 2008: 6). Nonetheless, no graduation cases have been reported by the informants in the 
research. This can in part be attributed to the “privileged” LRAD system (which requires capital 
input) and part to the insufficient funding offered through LRAD. LRAD is only beneficial if one has 
capital to begin with (Anseeuw & Laurent, 2007: 667) and the necessary financial skills to manage 
the business.  
 
As indicated in the first section, the Redistribution Programme, which aspirant farmers would apply 
to for funds to buy their own land, has been shown to be suffering under a number of constraints.  
The high price of agricultural land is a major constraint to purchasing a private commercial farm. 
Land ownership is failing to ensure that black people benefit in a way that alleviates poverty. It is 
sometimes more of a burden than an opportunity. As mentioned by some of the interviewees, 
farming is a difficult business and requires more than just knowledge about farming. It also requires 
knowledge about management practices, rangeland management, marketing and other skills 
(Masiteng et al., 2003: 87). Furthermore, it requires “heart” (Bates pers. comm., 2008). This may be 
an indication of why many commercial farmers are farming on a part-time basis or have multiple 
income streams. Farmers in the Eastern Cape have also changed to game farming enterprises due to 
its lucrative nature. 
 
Farming in a communal system, that characterises commonage farming, is difficult for a number of 
reasons; for example, the size of the land is not adequate to build up sufficient resources and earn 
enough money to exit commonage (Masiteng et al., 2003: 93). For farmers who have acquired farm 
land in Namaqualand, the key constraint to success is the high capital costs that are associated with 
commercial farming, which is unlikely to make a profit in the first few years of production (Anseeuw 
& Laurent, 2007: 666). Therefore, it may be necessary to reduce these risks by introducing a system 
that allows for people to exit the commonage without incurring the costs of farming commercially 
immediately. 
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6.7.2. Objectives of Commonage Users 
As  Atkinson & Buscher (2006) show in Philippolis, commonage users cannot be clearly categorised 
as either commercial or subsistence users. The authors questioned a number of commonage users 
and discovered that the objectives of livestock production are complicated and, therefore, the 
typology of users exist on a continuum between survivalist users and proto-capitalist users (Atkinson 
& Buscher, 2006: 451). Livestock owners will keep livestock for a number of reasons such as 
livelihood provisioning, as a safety-net in times of crisis, for subsistence use, because they have 
commercial aspirations or simply because they enjoy having animals (Atkinson & Buscher, 2006: 
449). These objectives will determine the numbers of animals that a person will keep and how that 
person will practice rangeland management. 
 
Many farmers will prefer to keep using the commonage, because they have no aspirations to farm 
privately, but would like the management of the communal commonage area to be improved (see, 
for example, Masiteng et al., 2003). However, even if there are farmers with aspirations of 
graduating to their own farms, there are many constraints to achieving this. Commonage is often a 
free or cheap resource, and there is no incentive to find alternative land. Although managed sub-
optimally, in the face of constraints to farming in rural areas or on private farms, it can be argued 
that commonage is a more attractive resource than private farms, especially on those commonages 
that are poorly regulated and where payment of user fees is not enforced. 
 
The objectives of the users will need to be considered in the emerging farmer system in order to 
avoid conflict and to optimise use of the commonage. It will also be important in the interests of 
fairness, because livestock owners are usually the dominant users. Presently, more emphasis is 
placed on rangeland management in the interests of livestock production; however, this is often 
uninformed and prejudiced against other commonage land-uses. A thorough understanding of the 
aspirations of commonage users will help to inform the management of commonage because it will 
impact on how the emerging farmer system is implemented. 
 
6.8. Equity and Efficiency  
It can be argued that the goals of Land Reform, in terms of poverty reduction and fostering national 
economic growth, as well as the goal of redressing the injustices of the past, are more simply goals 
of equity and efficiency. Hence, redressing the injustices of the past will require 30% of agricultural 
land to be passed from white to black, which is considered fair and equal by government. However, 
in parallel to this, the government hopes that equitable land distribution will contribute to poverty 
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alleviation and economic growth. As a component of Land Reform, commonage is land that is used 
to address the issue of black and white ownership, because it is now considered as land for the 
exclusive use of poor and previously disadvantaged members of the community, and is also seen as 
an asset that can contribute to economic growth through the creation of a class of commercial black 
farmers. As noted in the first section, Land Reform is failing to address both its equity and efficiency 
goals. As such, it is important to consider whether equity and efficiency are being addressed by the 
current system of commonage management.  
 
Access to particular livelihood provisions are bound up in property rights and relations and 
configurations of power (Plummer & Armitage, 2006). Commonages in the study sites, as well as in 
other towns in South Africa, are arguably used for many livelihood needs, such as fuelwood and 
medicinal plants, as well as for cultural purposes, such as Lobola and initiation ceremonies. In an 
attempt to reconcile the different, and sometimes competing, uses of commonage, a land tenure 
situation must be found that allows for equitable access, while ensuring that the land is used for 
sustainable development that contributes to LED. Hence, rights to use of commonage and its 
resources should be based on the value of equity.  
 
6.9. How Can Commonage Complement Land Reform? 
There are two ways in which commonage can complement Land Reform. The first way is through the 
Emerging Farmer Programme discussed above. However, this Programme needs to be carefully 
planned and the following sections will show just how. The second way that commonage may 
complement Land Reform is a renewed interest in its purchase and expansion. In this way, 
commonage may become the bridge that links urban to rural and may become crucial to an agrarian 
reform programme in South Africa.    
 
Although it was mentioned before that the aspirations of livestock farmers are complicated and that 
some farmers do not wish to exit commonage because it is less risky than farming on a private farm, 
there are still people who do wish to own their own farm. These are the people who should be 
targeted for the Emerging Farmer Programme, a programme that, if implemented appropriately, will 
be an effective mechanism for complementing the Land Reform Programme. However, the 
constraints to graduating need to be addressed. In particular, the agricultural policies that the 
government has adopted do not support the Land Reform Programme (SABC, 2008) and, as 
mentioned before, the Land Reform Programme must be integrated into an Agrarian Reform 
Programme that addresses the constraints to effective farming (Lahiff, 2003; CDE, 2008b). As some 
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of the stories in Farmer’s Weekly suggest, the Land Reform Programme is focussed too narrowly 
(Zvomuya, 2007). Farming is a business and should be promoted as such, instead of placing unskilled 
people on productive farms and expecting them to know how to manage the farm efficiently 
(Zvomuya, 2007).  
 
There is a greater demand for urban or peri-urban land in South Africa at present. This land is more 
attractive for a number of reasons, such as shorter distances to markets and homes and better 
services and infrastructure. Therefore, is it not justified to suggest that commonage is the most 
important land-use option in terms of the Redistribution Programme because it requires low levels 
of investment, enables multiple livelihoods, promotes rural development and is low-risk for many 
users (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 25). Anderson & Pienaar (2003: 25) indicate that there is a 
substantial demand for commonage. Although the purchase of new commonage is tailing off, it can 
be argued that there needs to be a renewal of interest in acquiring more land for commonage 
purposes. Although it may not be an attractive option for local municipalities, with the correct 
tenure options and better management, commonage could prove to have real poverty relief 
potential while contributing to the goals of equity and efficiency.  
 
Commonage can help to achieve the 30% target of the Land Reform Programme. By 2003 the 
Commonage Programme had accounted for the largest percentage of land transferred by one 
programme within the Land Reform Programme (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003: 25). Considering the 
failures of the Redistribution Programme to alleviate poverty, it may be more productive and useful 
to concentrate on commonage within the Land Redistribution Programme. Recent reports on Land 
Reform in South Africa suggest it is vital that the Government begins to prioritise land for Land 
Reform Programmes. Land Reform will require the investment of R200Billion if the government 
hopes to reach its target of 30%, and invest in post-settlement support services (Nxumalo, 2008). So 
far, only 4% of the 30% target has been reached. Furthermore, the government has to extend its 
target date from 2014 to 2025 (SABC, 2008). 
 
6.9.1. National Food Security 
Unfortunately there is one aspect of commonage that is irreconcilable with Land Reform and that is 
the limitations of its ability to contribute to national food security. As has been argued before, 
commonage plays a crucial role as a safety-net for households in times of crisis. Although it may be 
argued that commonage is efficiently used, the argument does not specify how efficient that use is. 
It, therefore, remains a challenge to reconcile food security issues with productive use of 
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commonages. Arguably it contributes sufficient revenue to ensure household food security for many 
people living in peri-urban areas. Furthermore, this contribution to food security and as a safety-net 
in times of crisis is crucial for many households, either to see them through these crises in their lives, 
or to ensure they do not fall into poverty or deeper poverty (see for example Davenport, 2008). It is 
submitted that commonage will never play a role in national food security simply because there is 
not enough of it and it is not managed adequately to ensure that Local Economic Development 
occurs. However, if it integrated into a greater rural development programme, such as an emerging 
farmer programme, it may become part of the skills development process of the new class of black 
commercial farmers. These farmers will then be able to contribute to national food security through 
the commercial production of livestock or through other agricultural enterprises. 
 
6.10. The Potential of Small-Holdings  
As was argued in the first section, the value of small-holdings and rental markets have been 
identified by various analysts as a means to ensure that the poor have better access to land, and that 
the land is used efficiently (see for example van den Brink et al., 2006; van den Brink et al., 2007). 
The informant in the Nkonkobe Local Municipality indicated that land is being rented out to a 
number of emerging farmers in Fort Beaufort. The informant, Mr Mhlaba, insists that this land 
should not be considered commonage and should be leased as a commercial farm to aspirant 
farmers who have requested access to new land. However, the concept is not new if one considers 
that commonage land was leased to white farmers before 1994. The difference between now and 
then is that, if his suggestion was common practice, the land would be used in a communal fashion 
in contrast to private nature of the rental market before 1994. Furthermore, the suggestion mimics 
that of the DLA Commonage Programme (2002) in that new commonage should be used to support 
emerging farmers through the Emerging Farmer Programme mentioned above. Through this system, 
commercial or highly productive land can be set aside or be subdivided and individual leases drawn 
up between the emergent farmer and the local municipality (DLA 2002). Again, Mr Mhlaba suggests 
that a number of individuals be allowed access to a certain piece of land; and they will be expected 
to pay a fee per LSU. This fee could also be a commercial fee, although subsidies from government 
may help to include those that are very poor. 
 
This land tenure system may be efficient and supported by policy, but it still borders on privatisation 
of land and may be elitist. However, if the land is not considered “commonage” and commonage 
land remains for the use of the poor members of the community, such a system should be carefully 
considered as a means to improve the use and management of commonage and as a system that 
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can contribute towards Land Reform goals. Firstly, it ensures that people with large herds of cattle, 
but insufficient capital to purchase land, are able to exit the commonage. Secondly, it allows people 
to farm independently. Thirdly, the land will be peri-urban in nature and close to markets and 
services. Therefore, it is not as risky to utilise as rural land, and may ensure that the land is used 
productively. Furthermore, it will benefit non-users because the fee system will ensure that the land 
is managed sufficiently and will not require the input of other monetary sources such as taxes. 
Lastly, it will allow the poor to engage in farming, which has been indicated in the literature as a 
positive aspect of the rental market.  
 
Although lease systems may appear to be elitist, with the wealthiest capturing the benefits of the 
system, it can be argued that these systems are not necessarily inequitable because they can be 
democratically regulated and leases can be withdrawn if necessary. Access to this land should be 
regulated in a fair manner. Regulation of the use of this land should be separate from commonage 
management. The use of commonage, especially old commonage, should be regulated by a 
management system that does not support sub-division and rental. The commonage should be 
managed as a Common Property Resource because of the potential of its natural resources to 
contribute to peoples’ livelihood needs. However, if there is sufficient space, and the rights of 
subsistence users are not infringed upon, it may still be viable to introduce a small-holder lease 
scheme.  
 
The above arguments indicate that commonage may be important in its own right and not just as 
part of the Land Reform Programme. Furthermore, the South African government has placed an 
emphasis on the ownership of land, as opposed to the access of land. If one had to consider 
commonage and land rental as instruments of land access, then the Land Reform Programme could 
be considered as performing well if this access was promoted. In the same vein, one should question 
whether the productive use of land is more important than the ownership of land. Land that is 
rented has been shown to be as productively utilised as land that is privately owned. Furthermore, 
productive use is more likely to reduce poverty than the private ownership of land.  
 
6.11. Improving Management – Suggestions from Interviewees 
Many of the interviewees offered suggestions on how to improve the management of commonage 
and, therefore, the likelihood of being able to exit the commonage. These suggestions are important 
because they are creative ways to improve management and come from people with experience in 
commonage management. These recommendations should be shared across municipalities. The 
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recommendation of “commercialising” the commonage system is interesting because it relates to 
the emerging farmer system. Ways of “commercialising” the commonage system are introducing a 
mentorship programme, introducing an Nguni programme and introducing markets. The 
commercialisation of commonage systems can be advantageous for both the local farmers and the 
ecological system. If the local municipalities were able to improve the marketing facilities and 
marketing prospects for commonage farmers it is likely that the off-take on commonage would 
improve and many commonage farmers could make a better living from livestock production.  
 
Other recommendations are also advantageous for the ecological system. For example, a well 
enforced fee system has many advantages, such as reducing the number of animals on the 
commonage. It may encourage farmers to exit the commonage as costs rise in proportion to the 
number of animals that one has. Introducing fodder production will allow the pressure on grazing to 
be reduced in times of drought because animals can be fed on fodder. Furthermore, strategic 
watering points will encourage livestock movement and allow sections of the veld to rest.  
 
However, the success of these endeavours is not certain because it has not been researched. One 
can be certain that manager will encounter obstacles when implementing any of these 
recommendations because they only address the immediate management problems. They are also 
short to medium-term solutions. Obstacles in the governance of commonages will need to be 
addressed before management interventions will be affective. It is for this reason that this thesis will 
argue in the following section that the governance regime must be improved, before an over-all 
improvement in management will be seen. 
 
Furthermore, commonage management, up until now, has been largely driven by concerns about 
rangeland management. This is indicative of a focus on the Emerging Farmer Programme and how to 
maximise the productivity of agrarian style practices such as livestock farming. This has failed to 
account for the diversity of livelihood needs. Commonage management should be broadened to 
consider natural resource management, which combines elements of rangeland management, as 
well as biodiversity conservation and sustainable harvesting practices. This holistic management 
system requires an approach that considers various uses and users (Cousins, 2000: 8).   
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7. Recommendations  
It is argued that commonage should be managed as a common property resource to ensure equity 
and efficiency of use. However, the success of CPR management is determined by as many as 30 to 
40 factors within a Social-Ecological System (SES) (Agrawal, 2001: 1660). These factors relate to the 
characteristics of the resource system, characteristics of the user group, institutional arrangements 
and the external environment (Agrawal, 2001: 1659; Gibson et al., 2005). Effective governance is 
easier to achieve when there is monitoring and communication, when rates of change in the system 
are moderate, when users support the governance system and when there is easy exclusion of 
outsiders (Dietz et al., 2003: 1908). As evidence from South African case studies suggests, there are 
poor relationships between users, local municipalities and other government departments and there 
is a failure of managers to support one another. There is also lack of support for management from 
the users. Lastly, there is no exclusion of outsiders from use of the resource. 
 
Drivers of change are often complicated and multi-dimensional (Agrawal, 2001: 1664) and change 
can rarely be attributed to one cause (Ostrom, 2007: 15181). As argued above, commonage 
management is influenced by many factors in the SES. Describing the SES is, therefore, more 
complicated than one imagines, and Ostrom et al. (2007: 15176) warns against recommending a 
blue-print for governance (for example, privatisation, government ownership or community 
property). However, advocating a CPR regime, with elements of adaptation, makes sense for 
commonage management. Firstly, the Commonage Programme advocates a co-management 
framework; secondly, CPR regimes are better for attaining goals of equity and efficiency of resource 
use; and lastly, in the face of increasing change, the resilience of commonage as a natural resource is 
questionable. 
 
7.1. Adaptive Co-Management 
This research supports other commonage case studies which show that poor management is leading 
to potential resource degradation; and this indicates that a new approach to managing commonage 
as a natural resource should be identified. An approach that should be considered is Adaptive Co-
Management (ACM). As discussed in the first section, ACM combines the linking element of co-
management with the learning element of adaptive management (Armitage et al., 2008). Therefore, 
ACM of commonage will require the creation of meaningful partnerships and networks. These 
networks will require collaboration between commonage users, government departments and other 
experts or stakeholders. Furthermore, ACM of commonages will require state support (Agrawal, 
2001: 1653) though the creation of appropriate policy guidelines. ACM of commonage will also 
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require that, through the networks of actors, learning takes place. The ecological component of 
learning will require an understanding of rangeland dynamics and the resources available for use. 
The social component will require an understanding of population dynamics, needs and desires and 
power relations; and how these affect the use of commonage resources.  
 
7.1.1. The Adaptive Co-Management Model 
Figure 3 indicates the model for ACM of commonage. Commonage policy and funding should 
originate from national government bodies, but these should be closely informed by information 
obtained through networks of learning. Information and ideas should flow throughout the system; 
firstly, between stakeholders at the local level, and secondly, between the local level and the 
national level. A commonage steering committee must be constituted by the local municipality, the 
commonage ranger and user groups (representing all uses of the commonage). The local 
municipality should perhaps have more than one representative on the committee; firstly, because 
they are the owners of the commonage and have many responsibilities towards its management, 
and secondly because various departments within the municipality may be responsible for different 
aspects of management, such as infrastructure, livestock management and LED. However, users 
must also be able to communicate with the steering committee. It is important to note that there 
should be direct communication with district- and regional-level departments, including the 
Department of Environmental Affairs, who has been previously excluded from commonage 
governance. Another aspect of this model, which is important to note, is that information and ideas 
should feed into plans and regulations for the commonage; plans which should be flexible enough to 
change as new knowledge is processed into action. Furthermore, because the DLA is only necessary 
for funding of new commonage and development of commonage, they are only required to 
communicate with district municipalities (for Land Reform planning); however, their ideas and 
knowledge should be shared with all governance institutions.  
 
7.1. Transformation to an Adaptive Co-Management System 
As argued in the first section, the development of an ACM system requires either the crafting of new 
organisations or is the outcome of self-organisation (Olsson et al., 2004a: 83). Over time, institutions 
evolve and self-organise, through learning and adaptation, with changes in the ecological system 
(Nayak, 2004). However, the commonage policy in South Africa, which advocates that commonage 
should be made available for the use of previously disadvantaged individuals, is relatively new; the 
policy having been in place for just over ten years. Hence, there has not been enough time for self-
organisation to take place. As seen from this research, and from case studies, there is a danger of 
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resource degradation occurring to such an extent that the productivity of commonage is severely 
reduced. This will certainly be the case if the influx of people into urban areas continues to the 
extent that it is occurring at the present moment and increases the demand for commonage 
resources. As yet, management of commonage has proven to be inadequate to ensure sustainable 
utilisation of this resource. Although crisis in a SES often triggers transformation (Folke et al., 2005: 
455), crisis may prove to be detrimental to the lives of those depending on commonage for a large 
part of their income or livelihood. Therefore, it is essential that commonage management is 
improved as soon as possible, and it is argued that new organisations for adaptive co-management 
must be crafted at the soonest possible moment.  
 
 
Figure 3: The Adaptive Co-Management Model for Commonage 
Note the flow of information, knowledge and ideas 
 
A case study conducted on a SES in Sweden shows how the transformation to an adaptive co-
management regime required three phases: 1) a phase that prepares the system for change; 2) a 
phase where a window of opportunity allows transformation to begin; and 3) a phase where 
resilience is built up in the new system (Olsson et al., 2004b: 19). The first phase requires that 
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knowledge is built up, networks are created and leadership emerges (Olsson et al., 2006: 22). In the 
second phase, windows of opportunity can present themselves in many ways, but usually occur 
when there is awareness of a problem and political action results in a solution (Olsson et al., 2006: 
24). The last phase occurs while the system re-organises itself to a more adaptive state. This phase is 
the least predictable and the most turbulent (Olsson et al., 2006: 28). However, the entire process of 
self-organisation is important for capacity building, allowing the SES to become more robust to 
failures in natural resource management (Olsson et al., 2004a: 87). It is process of building 
conservation knowledge in co-management systems (Nayak, 2004: 9). The process of transformation 
of ACM on commonage will now be discussed in detail. 
 
7.1.1. Leadership and Trust Building 
In the Swedish case, a key steward was involved in the process of transformation to an adaptive 
governance system. This individual provided leadership, took advantage of a policy change inside the 
municipal structures and built and processed knowledge about the ecological system (Olsson et al., 
2004b: 5). Leaders, or key stewards, play a role in trust building, senses making of knowledge, linking 
actors, initiating partnerships, managing conflict, compiling knowledge and mobilising support (Folke 
et al., 2005: 451). Their role in transformation is arguably vital and they are key features in any SES 
(Folke et al., 2005: 451; Olsson et al., 2006: 31). Leaders should be embedded across scales because 
the work of one person can be complemented and enhanced by the work of others at higher levels 
(Olsson et al., 2006: 33).  
 
Because Adaptive Co-Management is a process, it requires that collaboration and social learning 
takes place; and Plummer & Armitage (2006: 66) warns of the dangers of ignoring the long-standing 
institutions and social values that contribute to the system. One of the key social aspects of a SES 
that must be maintained throughout transformative process is trust (Olsson et al., 2004b: 23). Trust 
is a fundamental characteristic in any SES and is an essential element of social capital (Folke et al., 
2005: 444). Social capital, itself, is the “glue” of adaptive capacity and is created through trust, 
norms, reciprocity, common rules, sanction and connectedness (Folke et al., 2005: 451) and any 
processes that generate learning, meaning and knowledge are part of this social capital (Folke et al., 
2005: 445). It is important then that stakeholders invest in social capital and that the process of 
transformation is democratic and open to infuse trust within the resource community. 
 
Consultation with commonage users can lead to the identification of leaders in the community. 
Another source of leadership could be the commonage manager; someone who is appointed by the 
124 
 
Local Municipality. The best person for this job would probably be someone from the community 
who has an education or special skills, who is innovative, organised, trustworthy and who knows the 
community well. However, this person must be guided by national and provincial government policy 
and local government by-laws. The research indicates that the Local Municipalities of Ndlambe and 
Makana recognise the importance of having a commonage manager, whose sole job is to manage 
commonage. However, if the commonage is to be managed in the fashion of ACM, the person 
should also take on the responsibility of ensuring the creation of networks and the combining of 
knowledge systems. Perhaps it is important to emphasise that the role played by the leader is vital 
for the whole system of governance, and that this person needs to be skilled and trained in 
community development. 
 
7.1.2. Enabling Policy Environment 
Adaptive Co-Management of an SES requires motivation to change, which is related to many aspects 
of the system, including the policy environment which allows for subsidies and incentives for 
management (Lambin, 2005: 178). The policy environment must also ensure that there is devolution 
of real power and capacity to the resource users, who are then able to make decisions regarding 
resource use independently of top-down control (Olsson et al., 2004a: 83). This may require that de 
facto and de jure property rights are reconciled. In other words, rights that are recognised by the 
community (de facto rights) must also be recognised by the government (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992: 
254). This will make the community rules more legitimate, ensure that they are legal and can be 
easily enforced. 
 
There is a distinction between operational rights and collective choice rights, whereby operational 
rights are those that determine access and use of the resource, and collective choice rules determine 
the future of the resource (Suryanata & Umemoto, 2005: 751). Advocates of the Institutional School 
are strongly supportive of collective choice, which is a community’s ability to participate in rule-
making, enforcement and institution building. Devolution of rights results in local users being able to 
use their collective choice rights. In a case study conducted by  Suryanata & Umemoto (2005) it was 
found that users feared losing control over the future of their resource, and through participating in 
decision-making process, the fears were abated and the community was more willing to be involved 
in natural resource management (Suryanata & Umemoto, 2005: 756). Therefore, collective choice is 
important for institutional legitimacy and buy-in from the community (Suryanata & Umemoto, 
2005). Furthermore, the devolution of management rights allows for adaptation by the community 
(Folke et al., 2005: 449). 
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The right of use of the commonage will be meaningless if it is not legally protected, and if the future 
of the resource cannot be controlled by that right. Rights of access and use must be recognised by 
the community and government, must be democratically and fairly obtained, and must ensure that 
the future of the resource is secured. Already there is a strong culture of devolution in South Africa, 
but devolution must ensure that these rights are real, that people have the capacity to change and 
enforce them, and that power is given to the poorest and weakest members of society to participate 
in this process. 
 
7.1.3. Funding 
Funding is essential for responding to environmental change and embarking on remedial action 
(Olsson et al., 2004a: 84). Funding is also required for projects, for physical and technical 
infrastructure (Dietz et al., 2003: 1909) and for incentives to induce compliance with rules. Funding 
will be essential throughout the transformative life of ACM of commonage, as well as after 
institutions are created. It may be more important and more useful to fund the transformation to 
ACM than to fund physical infrastructure. The Grahamstown commonage case study has shown that 
no matter how dedicated the Local Municipality is at securing funding and using it effectively, the 
infrastructure is continually being damaged. Once people become custodians of the land, and are 
willing to participate in managing the land, it is likely that efforts at infrastructure development will 
not be continually frustrated by vandalism and theft. 
 
7.1.4. Monitoring 
Monitoring of natural resource change and adapting to these changes requires that local people are 
involved in the process. This is also financially advantageous because it is often too costly to rely on 
state intervention (Olsson et al., 2004a: 85). Monitoring by community members often results in the 
respective members gaining knowledge about resource dynamics and ensures the creation of local 
knowledge systems (Olsson et al., 2004a: 85). In a study done by Gibson et al. (2005: 282), it was 
found that monitoring of resources and enforcement of rules of use and access significantly 
contributed to maintaining a good ecological condition in forests. Therefore, it is the role of the user 
and non-user community to monitor the commonage and to monitor rule compliance. There must 
be systems in place where complaints and knowledge can be communicated to other members of 
the governance community and where incentives for sustainable use and sanctions for rule-breaking 
can be implemented.  
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7.1.5. Information Flows 
There is a strong emphasis on learning through partnerships (Armitage et al., 2008), and sharing 
knowledge systems (Berkes et al., 2000) in ACM literature. There are three types of learning, 
according to Armitage et al. (2008: 88): experiential learning, transformative learning and social 
learning; which allows for groups of people to learn through experimenting, and use knowledge 
gained to transform their SES into a new desired state. Through sharing knowledge systems, 
“western” knowledge can be combined with local practices to enhance what is known about the 
attributes of a particular ecological system and the ability to respond to changes in the system 
(Berkes et al., 2000: 1254).  
 
Providing information can help actors to understand their SES and the interactions that occur and 
help to predict the affect that decisions will have on the resource (Dietz et al., 2003: 1908). ACM is a 
problem-solving process (Plummer & Armitage, 2006: 70). It is crucial to assimilate information on 
ecosystem functioning, the inherent uncertainty of the system and the social values that underpin 
decisions (Dietz et al., 2003: 1908). A SES requires knowledge which is communicated (Lambin, 2005: 
178). This will require that information flows through networks of actors, who are often key 
stewards, and it is, therefore, essential that social networks are crated and maintained (Olsson et al., 
2004a: 85). Furthermore, these networks must be horizontal as well as vertical; in other words, from 
user to user, and from user to higher management persons (Olsson et al., 2004a: 85). Some of these 
networks can be informal and “shadow” more formal networks but are just as critical for facilitating 
information flows (Olsson et al., 2006: 29). 
 
Agricultural knowledge is considered important for effective commonage management and for the 
emerging farmer programme. DoA extension services are ineffectual at the moment, even though 
these services are crucial for commonage management (see for example, Atkinson, 2007b). 
Emerging farmers often lack the managerial, entrepreneurial and financial skills, as well as capital 
assets, to farm in a productive way (Olubode-Awosola & van Schalkwyk, 2006: 554). This can be 
rectified by mentorship alliances between commercial farmers and emerging farmers. Commercial 
farmers can provide the information on production, marketing and finance, but can also jointly-
manage farms with new entrants into the Redistribution Programme (Olubode-Awosola & van 
Schalkwyk, 2006: 556). Articles in the Farmers Weekly show that mentorship is proving to be 
effective and is helping to fill in the gaps created by poor agricultural extension services. 
Furthermore, some emerging farmers have benefitted from their years farming on commonage land.  
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7.1.6. Combining Information 
The mismatch of scale between ecosystem processes and the scale of decision-making is considered 
a key reason for many environmental problems (Cundill et al., 2005: 11). One way to ensure a 
matching of scales is to combine information. The management of complex adaptive systems 
requires that a combination of knowledge be integrated into the learning element of ACM (Olsson et 
al., 2004a: 76). Therefore, traditional ecological knowledge, which has generally evolved with 
changes in the resource system, should be combined with “western” systems of knowledge and the 
best elements of each used to respond to management needs (Olsson et al., 2004a: 77). However, 
knowledge about the local environment is not always considered “traditional”; therefore 
contemporary local practices can also contribute to understanding of local system dynamics (Berkes 
et al., 2000: 1252).  
 
Adaptive capacity requires learning and the ability to experiment and foster solutions to SES 
problems (Armitage, 2005: 703). There are four dimensions to adaptive capacity: learning to live 
with uncertainty and change, promoting diversity, combining different kinds of knowledge and 
maintaining opportunities for self-organisation (Armitage, 2005: 706). “Learning communities” are 
groups of people with a shared interest in management who actively address learning through 
partnerships (Armitage et al., 2008: 86). In the process of collective learning, social memory is 
captured at community level (Olsson et al., 2004a: 77). Social memory is derived from experience 
and enhances the SES’s ability to adapt to changes (Folke et al., 2005: 444). This is why it is stressed 
that the institutions adapt with changes in the environment and operational rules are shaped by the 
constant learning; in other words, adaptive capacity must be maintained (Rammel et al., 2007: 14).  
 
Vegetation change should not always considered as an indication of degradation (Benjaminsen et al., 
2008: 236). It is better to understand the dynamics of the ecological system that is to be managed. If 
overstocking is playing a strong role in degradation, systems to reduce stock numbers must be 
considered. This will require building up an understanding of indicators of degradation, systems to 
counteract degradation and sustainable harvesting levels. It is also essential that resource managers 
begin to recognise the drivers of degradation and the complexity of their interactions. Once a better 
understanding of the resource is gained, it will be easier to recognise the opportunities presented by 
certain land uses, the constraints to these uses and how certain land uses are a threat to the ecology 
of the system.  
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A recognised concern of ACM is the relations of power and the ability of actors to be involved in the 
learning process (Armitage et al., 2008: 93). Power relations have been shown to influence the use 
of commonage, with women, youth and the poor unable to participate fully in decision-making 
about management; therefore, it is important to include all commonage users, from different socio-
economic strata, to be involved in all aspects of management. This involves the learning and linking 
elements of ACM.   
 
In the first section, the discussion on rangeland management practices showed that some 
communities were able to manage their resources through community norms and existing 
institutions. The value of these should be carefully considered and protected to ensure that the 
needs of commonage user community are respected and that the positive elements of their 
traditions are developed to enhance the management practice. This will also ensure that the 
community feels comfortable with commonage management and feel responsible for its future. 
 
7.1.7. Sense Making 
It is no use having knowledge if sense cannot be made of it. Sense making of information and 
knowledge requires interpreting the information and making decisions based upon these 
interpretations (Olsson et al., 2004a: 86). For as Folke et al. (2005: 464) explains, it is essential that 
adaptive governance systems build knowledge and understanding of resource and ecosystem 
dynamics and feed this knowledge into practice. This will require that a strong vision and value 
system is developed, so that knowledge can be fed into practices that are accepted by all resource 
stakeholders (Olsson et al., 2004a: 86). Furthermore, it requires recognising the value of local 
knowledge and practices (Ainslie, 2002) and resisting the urge to impose “westernised” standards 
into commonage management systems. 
 
Consultation and better knowledge of commonage dynamics will no doubt prove that the livelihood 
provisioning services provided by commonage are very complicated. Research conducted in the 
three study sites by Davenport (2008) shows that commonages provide numerous resources, from 
fuelwood, medicinal plants, wild vegetables and grazing for livestock. Furthermore, commonages are 
used for initiation ceremonies, for arable fields and for recreation. New awareness of services 
provided by commonage will help to identify the needs of the poorest and those who use it for 
marginal products. The management actors can then create a typology of the resources used and 
guide the management of them. Management actors must also recognise the aspirations of 
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commonage users and identify opportunities for projects. This emphasises how important it is to 
have a strong manager or leader, who will be involved in sense making of this information. 
 
7.1.8. Arenas for Collaboration 
Arenas for collaboration require that platforms are created where meaningful participation can 
occur (Olsson et al., 2004a: 86). These arenas should provide a place for conflict resolution and rule 
making (Dietz et al., 2003: 1909). They are also used as a space for learning (Armitage et al., 2008: 
96). These arenas should be physical, as well as figurative. The policy space must recognise the need 
for such interactions, and encourage the sharing of information and participation of all interest 
groups. Therefore, it is important for the commonage managers and other interested and effected 
parties to participate in discussions that identify management problems, give feedback on 
monitoring and allow for rule creation and alteration. 
 
7.2. Evaluating Adaptive Co-Management and Livelihoods 
When evaluating Adaptive Co-Management Plummer & Armitage (2006: 65) feel that you should 
focus on three aspects of the system: 1) the ecological component and whether critical natural 
capital is conserved; 2) the economic component and whether livelihoods are sustainable (resilient); 
and 3) at the process. Sustainable livelihoods, in the context of the transformation of commonage 
management, are a critical factor to consider in commonage research. As Armitage et al. (2008: 95) 
warn, there are risks to livelihoods in ACM initiatives, and these often require trade-offs between 
individual and group, and long-term and short-term, livelihood needs. However, just as ACM 
initiatives increase resilience and adaptability in a SES, so sustainable livelihoods are ones that are 
resilient and adaptable (Plummer & Armitage, 2006: 68). Therefore, resilient livelihoods cope with 
and are able to recover from shocks, maintain and enhance existing capabilities and assets and 
ensure that sustainable livelihoods opportunities are available for future generations (Plummer & 
Armitage, 2006: 68).  
 
In evolving complex systems, natural resource management requires trade-offs between efficiency 
(local needs) and adaptability (system needs); investing in adaptability lowers efficiency gains today, 
but investing in efficiency lowers the ability to adapt to changes tomorrow (Rammel et al., 2007: 17). 
Sometimes it is more important to ensure that one minimises the costs to livelihoods, as opposed to 
maximising the livelihood gains (Plummer & Armitage, 2006: 69). These warnings are crucial for 
commonage management because commonage is a resource that provides for livelihoods. However, 
as indicated by research around the country, the ability to provide resources is reliant on the 
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sustainable use of commonages. Without an effective management regime, the ability of the system 
to keep providing these services will deteriorate over time, to a point where the system can no 
longer recover from shocks. In the interests of the resource and the people reliant thereon, the time 
for transformation is now.  
 
7.3. The Letsemeng Model 
The Free State Department of Agriculture has developed an innovative information booklet for 
emerging farmers in the region of the Letsemeng Local Municipality (Letsemeng Local Municipality, 
2005). Within this booklet the CMC structure is set out. Of importance are the following: it sets out 
the roles and responsibilities of members; the CMC has various sub-branches representing various 
user groups; the committee comprises of representatives from the municipality, various government 
departments and the users themselves; and lastly, the committee is headed by a full time 
commonage manager. The management structure is responsible for the supervision of the 
commonage, where as the sub-structures are in charge of routine supervision and the reporting of 
any problems (reporting is done through a formal scheduled meeting where feedback is given by all 
interested parties). Of crucial importance is that the system allows for commonage farmers to move 
from subsistence agriculture to quasi-commercial agriculture with the assistance of the Local 
Municipality. 
 
There are elements that can be found within the outline of this CMC structure that indicate an ACM 
model. There are networks for learning and joint problem solving which is crucial for building 
knowledge about the system, for including multiple objectives and linking lower level institutions to 
higher level organisations (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005: 72). Powers are devolved and responsibilities 
designated in a clear manner (Cousins, 2000) which is crucial for autonomy (Benseler, 2004). The 
committee is built on existing institutions and allows for the interests of many different stakeholders 
to be expressed (Andrew et al., 2003). There is a high level of accountability to users and this helps 
to create legitimacy and support (Njaya, 2007: 138). It creates access for users to bodies that can 
assist in conflict resolution and help with legal matters (Cousins, 2000) and also helps to monitor rule 
compliance (Lebert, 2004). Through these elements the capacity and legitimacy of the CMC can be 
increased, which will have a positive effect on the capacity of municipalities to effectively manage 
their commonages (Benseler, 2004). This model may be an excellent example to other Local 
Municipalities across the country who would like to embark on the transformation to an Adaptive 
Co-Management model for commonage management. 
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7.4. Conclusion 
What this research has attempted to show is that current systems of commonage management are 
failing due to limitations in the governance structures and due to exogenous factors beyond the 
control of Local Municipalities.  Furthermore, after an extensive literature review undertaken in the 
first section, it was possible to identify many limitations to commonage governance, communal 
rangeland management and Land Reform. The policy environment is limited in its ability to see 
commonage for its contribution to peoples’ livelihoods and advocates agrarian style practices that 
fail to incorporate natural resource management. Although commonage can contribute to the Land 
Reform Programme by acting as a stepping stone to commercial farming, current failures in the Land 
Reform Programme make it impossible for the contribution to be meaningful. If the South African 
government could concentrate Land Reform on promoting access to land, rather than private 
ownership, through a good land rental market scheme, the contribution of commonage to Land 
Reform may be enhanced, because it will become the link between urban subsistence farming and 
rural commercial farming.  
 
In addition to agrarian style land-use practices on commonage, local municipalities should focus on 
site-specific Local Economic Development opportunities presented by commonage land. 
Furthermore, commonage management must be tailored to the context of the commonage, which 
should include the aspect of natural resource management. Furthermore, commonage managers 
must take cognisance of the objectives of communal rangeland systems, especially livestock 
production strategies. By including the needs and aspirations of the commonage users in 
management systems, commonage may continue to provide for the livelihoods of poverty-stricken 
peri-urban dwellers.   
 
Adaptive Co-Management will not only be context-specific, but allows for adaptation to changes in 
the system. With increasing pressure being placed on commonages to provide for growing urban 
populaces, and in the face of climate change uncertainty, ACM is the arguably the most appropriate 
management regime for this important natural resource. The steps to transformation have been 
explored in this research and can easily be followed by any local municipality with the will be 
improve their current commonage management practices.  In summary these are: 
1. Prepare the system for change 
This involves building up knowledge about the system, identifying leaders and creating linkages. 
2. Grasp a window of opportunity 
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Influence or create a new policy which generates an enabling environment for adaptive co-
management. 
3. Build up system resilience 
This is the stage where re-organisation takes place. During this stage the leader and other managers 
will embark on the Adaptive Co-Management strategy. This requires trust building, funding, 
monitoring, information flows, combining knowledge, sense making and arenas for collaboration. 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviews 
 
 
 
 
Date Interviewee Position Department Place 
07-04-2008 Mr R Gess Chairperson Bathurst Rate Payers Association Bathurst 
17-09-2007 Mr Ntlokwana  Commonage Ranger Ndlambe Local Municipality Bathurst 
29-05-2008 Mr S Zungula Senior Planner Department of Land Affairs for Amathole District  East London 
30-09-2008 Mr Z Sawuti Land and Housing Division Amathole District Municipality East London 
14-10-2007 Mr H Mlaba Housing Officer Nkonkobe Local Municipality  Fort Beaufort 
17-10-2007 Mr Mxoli Town Planner Nkonkobe Local Municipality  Fort Beaufort 
22-07-2008 Dr W Trollope Associate Professor University of Fort Hare Fort Beaufort 
22-11-2007 Mr Tonisi and Mr Dyasi Chairperson and Secretary Ngxwence Emerging Farmers Association Fort Beaufort 
06-10-2007 Mr P Nelani Extension Officer District Department of Agriculture Grahamstown 
09-10-2007 Mr M Mamkeli Chairperson   Makana Emerging Farmers Association Grahamstown 
10-02-2007 Ms B Faye Researcher ECARP (NGO) Grahamstown 
13-02-2008 Mr K Bates Director, Parks and Recreation Makana Local Municipality Grahamstown 
24-10-2007 Mr A Ainslie Researcher Khanya aicdd (NGO) Grahamstown 
07-11-2007 Mr Q Hahndiek Regional Director DEDEA  Grahamstown 
09-04-2008 Mr F Fouche Conservation Officer Ndlambe Local Municipality Port Alfred 
09-04-2008 Ms Z Marala and Mr S Mjacu LED, Tourism and Agriculture officers Ndlambe Local Municipality Port Alfred 
23-04-2008 Mr H Prinsloo Deputy Director Department of Land Affairs for Cacadu District  Port Elizabeth 
01-10-2008 Ms C Bezuidenhout Development Planner Department of Infrastructure and Planning for 
Cacadu District Municipality 
Port Elizabeth 
30-09-2008 Mr A Prinsloo Chief Planner Directorate for Redistribution and 
Implementation Systems 
Pretoria 
Appendix 2: Questionnaires 
 
Local Municipality Questionnaire  
 
Interviewer   
Interviewee 
Municipality 
Place 
E-mail address  
Telephone No 
Date                                                   Time 
 
Introduction, nature of research, risks and benefits, confidentiality and 
feedback 
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Section 1 
Commonage history/scale 
 
1. What kinds of commonage do you have in your jurisdiction? 
a. How many hectares are there of each? 
b. Do you feel that the boundaries of the commonages are well defined and that 
people are aware of them? 
c. Are there obligations attached to the title deeds of old and new commonage and 
what are these? 
2. Before the land reform programme, how was the commonage land managed? (Was there a 
system of leasing?) 
 
Section 2 
Post 1994 and the establishment of commonage 
  
1. Tell me about the establishment of commonage after 1994. 
a. When did it happen? 
b. Who was the land intended to benefit and roughly how many people are they? 
c. On whose initiative was this undertaken and who assisted you?  
2. What was the process involved and what was that process like (frustrating or easy)?   
3. Was the funding for the project sufficient? 
4.  Was there post-delivery support? Who provided it? 
5. Were legal arrangements in place before the land was transferred to you and did the land 
come with a set of legal obligations in terms of the use and alienation of the land? 
6. Who made decisions about the management of the commonage, particularly who the users 
are and how they may come to use the land? 
a. How do they decide who the users should be- are there criteria? 
7. Did the public have a say in the management of the commonage (in terms of users and 
management bodies)? 
8. How were the management bodies selected? 
9. Is the new commonage managed differently from the old commonage (i.e. the commonage 
inherited from 1994)?  If so, how and why? 
 
 
Section 3 
Use of the commonage 
 
1. What are some of the uses of the commonage, and what is the primary use? 
2. Who are the people using the commonage, what kind of people are they, where do they 
come from?  
3. Do you think certain groups should be prioritised? 
4. Is there a contract or rental agreement with the users, or are users regulated through 
municipal bylaws?   
a. If contract: What does it stipulate?  Can I get a copy of this? 
b. If bylaws: what do they stipulate about commonage use? 
5. Do the users all belong to commonage committees or other representative structures? 
6. Are you able to stop ‘outsiders’ from using the commonage and if so, how do you do this?  
7. Are there rules about commonage use? 
a. Who makes decisions regarding the rules about commonage use? 
b. Are the rules simple to follow and understood by all? 
c. Is there a fee for use (rent)? 
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d. Who is in charge of the collection of this fee and the enforcement of the fee? 
e. Who enforces the other rules regarding the commonage? 
f. If people don’t comply, are there any penalties? 
g. Are there any incentives to co-operate with the rules? 
8. Are there conflicts occurring over the land and who are the stakeholders involved in the 
conflicts? 
9. Is there good communication between users and the Municipality? 
10. What can be done to improve the use of commonage and the systems of regulating this use? 
 
Section 4 
The physical commonage 
 
1. What infrastructure is provided on the commonage?  How is it budgeted for? (M minutes 
will show actual money spent on commonage) 
2. What is the condition of the fences, pumps, drinking points? If it is not in good working 
order, why not? 
3. Are there any protected areas (for environmental conservation)? 
4. Who is in charge of maintenance of the infrastructure? 
5. In your opinion should the commonage users be more involved in payment, maintenance or 
management of infrastructure? 
 
Commonage and economic development 
 
6. Do you feel that commonage land can be used as a strategic resource to improve the lives of 
the poor people living close by?  
7. Do you think that commonage land could be used for Local Economic Development? Please 
comment on why you think so? 
8. Is the land being encroached upon by informal settlers  
9. Is the land being used by unauthorised users? 
 
Co-management  
 
10. What are your views on co-management (joint management between the Municipality, 
users and supporting institutions) as an approach to commonage management? Has your 
department had any experiences of this and knowledge about it? 
11. Are the experiences of other Municipalities and their commonages ever evaluated, 
discussed or used to improve the management of the commonage?  
 
Training and mentorship 
 
12. Are people on the commonage being trained? 
a. What kind of training is occurring and who is doing the training? 
b. Is it effective? 
13. Are people on the commonage being mentored?  
a. Who is involved? 
14. Are there Extension officers present on the commonage? 
a. What are some of their duties? 
b. Are they being effective in terms of training and mentoring users? 
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Section 5 
Developmental local government 
 
1. How is the municipality structured?  What departments are there?   
a. Which department is primarily responsible for commonage? (e.g. technical dept, 
financial dept)  
b. Is it a specific portfolio?  
c. What are some of their duties?  
2. How do you feel about Local Municipalities becoming centres of local development and do 
you think they have the capacity to fulfil this mandate?  
3. Is there a management plan for the commonage? 
4. Is commonage featured in the IDP? Are there plans for future expansion? 
5. What/who compels the Municipality to become involved with commonage?  
6. What are the Municipality’s developmental goals and targets related to commonage? What, 
in your opinion, would count as ‘successful commonage management’? 
7. Is any revenue received from the commonage users?   
a. Is this sufficient to cover expenses?   
b. What are these expenses?  
c. Is such revenue “ring-fenced” (i.e. is it used exclusively for commonage, or is it 
added to the general municipal revenue)? 
d. Is there any way of getting other funding for commonage management? 
8. What is the District Municipality’s involvement in commonage and some of their duties? 
Should these be expanded? 
9. In your opinion, is there a common policy in the government system with regards to the 
commonage? E.g. Department of Agriculture, Dept Land Affairs. 
10. Are these Departmental policies and programmes appropriate and sufficient to assist the 
municipality to manage its commonage? 
11. What are your feelings about devolution of powers to local level: is this feasible, should it be 
done, is it being done and is there a will to do so? (For example, do you think that agriculture 
and/or land reform should be devolved to municipal level? Can local users take on certain 
responsibilities effectively?) 
 
Section 6 
Institutional involvement, other govt involvement, Non Governmental Organisations and 
Commonage Management Committees 
 
1. Which institutions are involved in the management of commonage? (prompt ideas) 
a. Do they have a legal status? 
b. How did they become involved? 
c. What are their interests in the commonage and what are their functions? 
d. Are they seen as legitimate stakeholders by your Department and the people using 
the commonage? 
e. Do they have a constitution and code of conduct? 
f. Do they have a strong motivation to be involved? 
g. Do they have women and youth representatives? 
2. What are the relationships like between them? Is there trust, reciprocity and equal power 
relations? Are there political rivalries? 
3. Are there rights, obligation and powers clarified? Is there an overlap and therefore conflict? 
4. What is communication like between them? Do you think that there is a flow of 
information? 
148 
 
5. Is there ever a negotiation of powers and responsibilities? How do they decide who does 
what? 
 
Section 7 
Environmental management 
 
1. Is there overgrazing occurring on your commonage? 
2. Are there rules/regulations for grazing?   
3. How do you view the concept of carrying capacity?  Is it enforced in your department? 
4. What other measures have been introduced to maintain the condition of the commonage? 
a. What are some of the strategies and procedures? 
5. Who do you think should be responsible for environmental management? 
6. Are any other government departments and/or institutions helping your department with 
environmental management? 
7. Are the knowledge systems of the users being acknowledged? Are they being supplemented 
with environmental information? 
 
Section 8 
Land reform, Privatisation and “stepping off” of the commonage 
 
1. Do you think that commonage development can be regarded as a type of land reform? In 
your opinion is commonage reform working on a national scale. 
2. What do you see as some of the solutions to problems associated with commonage 
management? (Would you suggest better rule making and enforcement, a more specific 
portfolio in local government, more support from other departments, long-term leases as 
what happened in the past etc) 
a. Considering long-lease systems further: can it occur, would be help and what would 
be the major drawback of doing so? 
3.  Are people leaving the commonage to access their own privately-owned land? 
If yes 
a. Why do you think they are doing this? (because they want to/it is easy or because it 
is encouraged) 
b. How may this be improved? 
If no 
c. Why not? 
d. What can be done to assist people to do so? 
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District Municipality questionnaire 
 
Interviewer 
Interviewee 
Municipality 
Place 
E-mail address  
Telephone No 
Date                                                   Time 
 
Introduction, nature of research, risks and benefits, confidentiality and 
feedback 
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Section 1 
Developmental local government 
 
1. Is your department involved in commonage management or commonage policy in any way?  
a. Do you have a management plan for commonages under your jurisdiction? 
b. What department in the District Municipality has an interest in commonage?  
2. In the local municipalities within your jurisdiction, are there management plans for 
commonage?  
a. Do you consider them in close alignment with your own plans? 
3. Are municipalities in your jurisdiction developing their commonage? What are your feelings 
on the capacity of Local Municipalities under your jurisdiction to carry out a developmental 
mandate in general?  
a. Has National Government given them the means to do so and is there a will to do 
so? 
4. What are some of the problems that Local Municipalities in your jurisdiction are 
experiencing with regards to management of commonages specifically? 
a. Is it proving too costly? 
5. Is commonage featured in the District IDP and are there plans for the future expansion of 
commonage land? 
6. Is there political will in your department, and in other District Municipalities, to become 
involved with commonage and is it a topic that arises frequently, if at all? 
7. Does your department incur any expenses with regards to commonage land under your 
jurisdiction? 
8. Do you think that there is a common policy within the national, provincial and local 
government that deals with commonage, and do the different departments act in a 
consistent and similar fashion? What are the relationships like between the departments 
when it comes to managing commonage land? 
 
Section 2   
Institutional involvement, other govt involvement, Non Governmental Organisations and 
Commonage Management Committees 
 
1. What are some of the institutions that are involved with the commonages in your District? 
(NGO’s, Private sector stakeholders, unions, Commonage Management Committees etc). If 
no idea, skip section. 
2. Do you think that these organisations make a constructive contribution to commonage 
management and development?  Do they co-operate with each other? 
3. What is the relationship like between the institutions and your own department? 
a. Do these institutions communicate with the relevant departments? 
b. Are there conflicts of interest? 
4. What are your thoughts on the devolution of powers to these institutions?  
a. What powers should be devolved?  
b. Has/will it worked for commonage and could devolution be improved? 
 
Section 3 
Environmental management 
 
1. Is environmental management of the commonages happening in your district?  
a. Who is involved? Who is concerned? 
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b. Is there an obligation on government departments (such as Agriculture, DLA or 
DEAT) to assist municipalities regarding the environmental management of 
commonage? 
2. What are some of the regulations for the commonages in your District with regards to 
environmental management, i.e. are there rules about carrying capacity, resource use etc? 
3. Does your Department have management strategies or plans regarding environmental 
management in general?  
4. Do other government departments get involved in environmental management of 
commonages? And what do they do? (Extension officers involved?)  
5. Is information about land degradation and its solutions being given to Local and District 
Municipalities? 
6. Are environmental knowledge systems of the users (people on the ground) being taken into 
account or being acknowledged as beneficial or valuable?  
7. Are people being trained in land conservation measures?  
a. Who is involved/should be involved in this? 
8. Are farmers on commonage being mentored?  
a. Who is doing this?  
b. Is it successful?  
c. Could this be improved?  
d. What is some of the knowledge being passed on? 
 
 
Section 4 
Land reform and “stepping off” of the commonage 
 
4. Do you think Land Reform in South Africa is going too slow? What are some of the other 
problems with the Programme? Do you think that commonage development can assist land 
redistribution in South Africa?  If so, how? 
5. What do you see as some of the solutions to problems associated with commonage 
management? (Would you suggest better rule making and enforcement, a more specific 
portfolio in local government, more support from other departments, long-term leases as 
what happened in the past etc) 
a. Consider long-lease systems further: can it occur again like what happened in the 
past, would be help and what would be the major drawback of doing so?  
6. Are people stepping off the commonage land and buying up private land on which to farm?  
If yes 
a. Why? 
b. How may this be improved? 
If no 
c. Why not? 
d. What can be done to assist people to do so? 
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National Government departments 
 
Interviewer 
Interviewee 
Govt department 
Place 
E-mail address  
Telephone No 
Date                                                   Time 
 
Introduction, nature of research, risks and benefits, confidentiality and 
feedback 
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Section 1 
Your experience of the commonage issue 
 
1. What is your Department’s involvement with the management or support of municipal 
commonage?   
a. Do you have a management plan for commonages under your jurisdiction?  
b. Is there a specific portfolio, within this Department, for the management of 
commonage? 
2. Does your Department incur any expenses with regards to commonage land under your 
jurisdiction? 
3. Does your department interact with municipalities about commonage?  If so, which 
municipalities, and what kind of assistance is provided? 
4. Is there political will to become involved with commonage and is it a topic that arises 
frequently, if at all?   
 
Section 2 
 Developmental local government 
 
9. Do you think there is the capacity within local municipalities to carry out a developmental 
mandate? Distinguish between political will, financial capacity (what expenses are incurred) 
and technical capacity. 
10. In District and Local Municipalities, are there management plans for commonage? 
11. Is commonage featured in the IDPs and are there plans for the future expansion of 
commonage land? 
12. Do you think that there is a common policy within the national, provincial and local 
government that deals with commonage, and do the different departments act in a 
consistent and similar fashion? What are the relationships like between the departments 
when it comes to managing commonage land?  
13. Are there conflicts occurring between the District, Local Municipalities and National 
Departments in terms of commonage land? What other topics are the causes of conflict? 
 
Section 3 
Institutional involvement, other govt involvement, Non-Governmental Organisations and 
Commonage Management Committees 
 
5. What are some of the institutions that are involved with the commonages in general? 
(NGO’s, Private sector, unions, CMC etc) 
a. How did these institutions become involved? 
b. Whose interests are the representing? 
c. How do these institutions benefit commonage management? 
6. Do some of the following problems arise with regards to these institutions: their legal status 
is unsure, they don’t have a constitution or code of conduct, they are not seen as legitimate 
by government or by the people, they lack motivation to be involved, they have poor youth 
and women representation? 
7. What is the relationship like between the institutions and your own department? 
8. What are the relationships like between all the stakeholders, in general? Are there trust, 
reciprocity or power issues? 
9. Do these institutions communicate amongst one another and with the relevant government 
departments? 
10. Do they ever negotiate the responsibilities of each?  
a. How do they decide who does what?  
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b. Are there conflicts that arise because of overlapping powers/responsibilities? 
11. What are your thoughts on devolution of powers to these institutions i.e. do you think that it 
is working? Could devolution be improved? 
 
Section 4 
Environmental management 
 
9. Are Local and District Municipalities concerned about commonage land in terms of the 
threat of soil erosion and land degradation? 
10. As far as you are aware, is environmental management of the commonages happening?  
If yes:  
a. Are there measures to ensure that there are not too many animals on the land? 
b. What are some of the regulations for the commonages with regards to 
environmental management, i.e. are there rules about carrying capacity, resource 
use etc? 
c. Do they have management strategies or plans for environmental management? Or 
does the responsibility fall elsewhere? 
d. Do other government departments get involved? And what do they do? (Extension 
officers involved?) 
e. Is information about land degradation and its solutions being given to Local and 
District Municipalities? 
11. Are knowledge systems of the users (people on the ground) being taken into account or 
being acknowledged as beneficial or valuable?  
12. Are people being trained in land conservation measures? Who is involved/should be 
involved in this? 
13. Are farmers on commonage being mentored, in terms of environmental and agricultural 
management? Who is doing this? Is it successful? Could this be improved? What is some of 
the knowledge being passed on? 
 
Section 5 
Land reform, Privatisation and “stepping off” of the commonage 
 
7. Do you think Land Reform in South Africa is going too slow? What are some of the other 
problems with the Programme? Do you think that commonage development can assist land 
redistribution in South Africa?  If so, how? 
8. What do you see as some of the solutions to problems associated with commonage 
management? (Would you suggest better rule making and enforcement, a more specific 
portfolio in local government, more support from other departments, long-term leases as 
what happened in the past etc) 
a. Consider long-lease systems further: can it occur again like what happened in the 
past, would be help and what would be the major drawback of doing so?  
9. Are people stepping off the commonage onto privately owned land? 
If yes 
a. Why, what compels them to do so? 
b. Could the number be improved? How may this be improved? 
If no 
c. Why not? 
d. What can be done to assist people to do so? 
